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ABSTRACT 
Economic influences played a dominant role in design and implementation of 
intellectual property laws and agriculture policy in America. These influences have 
helped shape the values and goals of people who created, administered and interpreted 
patent laws throughout the twentieth century, as well as those who promoted agriculture 
in America and later in the developing world. The historical motivations driving these 
two institutions help explain how and why plants entered the realm of intellectual 
property and why international aid organizations defined and measured progress in 
economic terms. Events that serve to illustrate these dynamics include the Plant Patent 
Act of 1930, the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
agricultural outreach program in Mexico and the Foundation’s formation - in cooperation 
with the Word Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the Ford Foundation - of 
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Resources (CGIAR). Review of 
documents particular to these events reveals a consistent philosophy of progress through 
profit that informed debate over use of intellectual property rights in plants. As aid 
organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation and CGIAR embraced modern 
agriculture as a tool to help the developing world, they inherited and sometimes 
perpetuated this economic philosophy. The biotechnology revolution of the 1980’s 
enhanced the already valuable seed collections held by these institutions and forced them 
to reevaluate their traditional policy of free sharing and address if and how seeds should 
be protected and used to generate income and how profit from such activities should be 
allocated. The solutions to these difficult issues and the historical influences that shaped 
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them help drive the contemporary debate on topics such as GMO food, environmental 
safety and cultural preservation.  
 
 
  
  
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-first century agriculture is rife with debate about the way the industrial 
world produces food. The debate swirls around diverse issues, which reflect genuine 
concerns for any rational and compassionate person but which offer no easy 
compromises. Environmental safety and human health are juxtaposed against the promise 
of abundant and nourishing food produced under varied and sometimes hostile 
conditions. The rights of small farmers to perpetuate their culture and traditions are 
juxtaposed against the opportunity for larger progressive farmers to usher in economic 
growth through more efficient and viable methods of food production. The morality of 
commercializing thousands of years of common labor and free sharing of natural 
resources is juxtaposed against the need to encourage entrepreneurs to invest money and 
years of research in the hope of producing a valuable new product. As is often the case 
when pragmatism meets idealism, advocates on both sides struggle to find a balance.1  
Two common themes in this long running debate are money and power. As the 
science of agriculture becomes more complex and costly, the range of active participants 
(like the seeds they produce) becomes more narrow and uniform, resulting in 
                                                
1 Many books and articles touch on this topic ranging from technical scientific reviews to general interest 
news articles. For introductory works relating to genetics, the environment and food safety, see, e.g., Larry 
D. Kier and Jay S. Petrick, “Safety assessment considerations for food and feed derived from plants with 
genetic modifications that modulate endogenous gene expression and pathways,” Food and Chemical 
Toxology 46, no. 8 (2008): 2591 – 2608; Tim Lang, “Food Control or Food Democracy: Re-engaging 
nutrition with society and the environment,” Public Health Nutrition 8 (2005): 730-737; Nicole Dyer, 
“Techno Food: Genetically Modified Crops cook up a sizzling debate,” Science World, Vol. 58, no. 6 
(November 26, 2001): 16; Lisa Turner, “Weird Science,” Better Nutrition, Vol. 63, no.6 (June 2001): 40. 
For a review of issues relating to indigenous cultures, modern farming and intellectual property, see, e.g., 
David A. Cleveland and Stephen C. Murray, “The World's Crop Genetic Resources and the Rights of 
Indigenous Farmers,” Current Anthropology, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1997), 479 and Michael F. Brown, Who Owns 
Native Culture?, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (2003).  
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consolidation of assets critical to the world food supply.2 Technology has continually 
funneled agriculture into a commercial and industrial model, aided by the availability of 
private economic rights, including intellectual property rights, in plants and seeds. The 
science of plant production has also necessitated greater attention to the global 
environment, from which comes the raw materials that serve as ingredients for modified 
and improved crops. The need to preserve and protect the very environmental diversity 
that modern agriculture threatens to condense and unify demands balance between the 
long and short- term goals of modern agriculture as well as the proper commitment and 
participation of private industry, governments, philanthropies, academia and human 
rights organizations.3  
Advancements in biotechnology and genetic modification thrust these issues into 
a highly public spotlight in recent decades. Media coverage, sometimes sensational, has 
brought this issue to a broad public audience, much of which is confronting these issues 
for the first time. The historical perceptions of both intellectual property and agriculture 
are instructive in fully understanding, perhaps even predicting, the thought processes that 
will likely guide what is for many a case of first impression. These well-established 
perceptions pre-date the current debate by over two hundred years and carry with them a 
                                                
2 According to ETC Group, a non-profit farm advocacy organization (f/k/a Rural Advancement Foundation 
International), the top 10 seed corporations accounted for 55% of the commercial seed market worldwide 
based on 2006 revenues (up from 37% in 1996), including 64% of the proprietary seed market, with almost 
half being concentrated in the top four companies – Monsanto (U.S.), Dupont (U.S.), Syngenta 
(Switzerland) and Groupe Limagrain (France). “World’s Top Ten Seed Companies,” ETC Group, April 30, 
2007 http://www.etcgroup.org/en/node/615 (accessed December 13, 2010). 
3 An example of such efforts is the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, also 
known as Earth Summit, which convened in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and produced the International 
Convention on Biodiversity. The convention represented an effort to dedicate international resources to 
management and preservation of biological diversity that the signatories viewed as critical to human 
survival but that, unlike the ozone layer or the oceans, rested mostly within sovereign borders. See, 
Timothy Swanson, “Why Is There a Biodiversity Convention? The International Interest in Centralized 
Development Planning,” International Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (April 1999). See also, Simone Bilderbeek, 
“Biodiversity as Political Game,” Politics and the Life Sciences, vol. 12, no. 2 (August 1993). 
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long history of economic pragmatism as a central tenet in determining how we farm and 
how we view unique plants and seeds.  
Patents and agriculture both pre-date the United States of America, the former by 
several hundred years and the latter by several thousand.4 Machines, whether simple or 
complex, have been part agriculture ever since men and women used simple tools to 
break the earth for planting. Patents and plants, however, represent a far more recent 
paradigm. A patent is an economic tool used to encourage or entice new and useful 
information into the public domain in exchange for a legally enforceable claim of 
exclusivity for a number of years.5 Patents, like the machines they protected, were a 
pragmatic invention designed to promote progress in a newly independent America. 
Agriculture, by contrast, was an art as well as a science and its primary input, the seed, 
was a self-replicating product of nature. Agriculture existed within a complex cultural 
dynamic of cooperation and sharing that encompassed both occupation and social 
standing. Agriculture gave pre-industrial America its economic teeth but it also 
represented something more than the value of a harvest. Americans viewed a man or 
woman born and bred on the farm as a national asset. For many people, patents 
represented America’s economic progress while agriculture was its muse. This contrast in 
views helped to keep the two institutions at arms length in America for well over 150 
years. Industrial machines dominated the patent books in the early years of the new 
American nation while invention and plants remained conceptually segregated until well 
                                                
4 For a concise overview of patent laws, including examples of European patent laws that informed and 
guided patent policy in the United States, see, “Invention and the Patent System,” Printed for the use of the 
Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 88th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964).   
5 The patent laws of the United States are found in Title 35 of the United States Code. See also, Roger E. 
Schechter and John R. Thomas, Intellectual Property: The Law of Copyrights, Patents and Trademarks (St. 
Paul: Thomson West, 2003), 283. 
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into the twentieth century. Patents focused on man-made machines and processes while 
agriculture focused on nature.6 To be sure, farmers manipulated nature when they 
domesticated crops and animals. Both government and science, however, viewed such 
actions as guiding a natural process rather than building something from nothing through 
a creative process.7 Farmers labored mightily but nature did the creating.  
These distinctions did not go to the ultimate goal of promoting progress, however. 
The same machine of government that created patents as a tool for economic progress 
worked to promote similar results in agriculture as well. In the latter case, progress often 
meant promotion and expansion of knowledge to the end of more profitable farming. The 
government achieved this goal by giving away seeds and the knowledge they contained 
rather than ‘buying’ knowledge with exclusivity.8 In that sense, patents and agriculture 
served the same purpose, achieved by different means. The assumptions about invention 
and nature changed the strategy but not the goal.   
These long-held assumptions changed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century as the art of plant breeding evolved from a natural process of seed selection based 
on appearance to a formalized process designed to produce specific traits that were both 
unique and valuable. Whether produced asexually by grafting or sexually by cross 
pollination, these new plant varieties offered entree into the world of patents on the 
                                                
6 “Patent Injustice,” World’s Work, 61:40-3 (January, 1932), 40. 
7 The United States Supreme Court expressed this sentiment in the famous patent case in which Alexander 
Bell sought to defend his invention of the telephone. The court drew a clear distinction between a force of 
nature (electricity) and the use of that force within an invention (the telephone). See, Dolbear v. American 
Bell Telephone Company, 126 US 1, 532-33 (1887). Even after enactment of the first plant patent law the 
Court adhered to the general rule that phenomena of nature belonged freely to all mankind and that 
invention came only after application of the law of nature to a new and useful end. See, Funk Brothers Seed 
Company v. Kalo Inoculant Company, 333 U.S. 127 (1948).  
8 For an excellent summary of seed distribution programs within the federal government, see, Jack Ralph 
Kloppenburg, Jr., First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1492-2000 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
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grounds that human creativity and intervention had altered nature’s process. Human 
intervention produced a better plant. This intervention was expensive and time 
consuming. Such efforts needed legally enforceable exclusivity that patent laws granted. 
The result was passage by Congress of the Plant Patent Act of 1930, which made 
asexually produced plants eligible for patent protection.9  
The basic philosophies behind patent rights in plants became critical as the use of 
plant breeding expanded and became a key component of agricultural aid to the 
developing world. Directed breeding offered opportunity to establish plant varieties 
designed to thrive in specific parts of the world. Whether it was higher yields, resistance 
to drought or sturdier structure against the elements, custom bred plants could be 
introduced in specific parts of the world to improve local agriculture. American 
philanthropy joined with government-sponsored international aid to bring improved 
farming methods to the developing world.10 The goals were many and varied. At its most 
basic, agricultural aid represented a humanitarian effort to feed a hungry world. It also 
represented a stop-gap measure to buy time while the industrial world pursued the related 
goal of population control. In the post war era, agricultural aid was also one of many 
efforts to export market oriented capitalism as a bulwark against communism.11 Despite 
the many goals of agricultural aid, the goal of ‘improving’ agriculture was anything but 
simple. The American model of agriculture involved an entire package of inputs that 
included extensive use of pesticides, fertilizers and irrigation. Improving agriculture in 
                                                
9 71st Congress, 2nd Sess. Congressional Record vol. 72, pt. 8 (13 May 1930): 8866, codified at US Code 35 
(2000) §§ 161-164. 
10 This dissertation utilizes the Rockefeller Foundation programs as an example. See, Edward H. Berman, 
The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The 
Ideology of Philanthropy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983). See also, Deborah 
Fitzgerald, “Exporting American Agriculture: The Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, 1943-1953,” Social 
Studies of Science, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Aug., 1986). 
11 Ibid. 
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the developing world meant reorienting local rural culture to excess production and 
greater market participation. This reorientation favored larger farmers who had the 
resources and willingness to make dramatic changes in their way of life.12  
Another disturbing result of agricultural aid was reduction in genetic diversity. As 
more and more custom plant varieties claimed agricultural soil, crops became 
increasingly uniform in their genetic profile. This magnified their weaknesses as well as 
their strengths, making the ravages of disease more widespread. Plant uniformity was a 
fact of life in any location where custom bred plant varieties were employed, but hybrid 
plants posed a greater problem in the developing world. By virtue of its climate and 
unaltered landscape, the developing world served as home to the vast majority of genetic 
diversity critical to plant breeding. Raw germplasm from the developing world was a 
critical starting point to plant improvement efforts. As a result, agricultural improvement 
in the developing world worked against its own interests and raised serious questions 
about the need to preserve biodiversity.13 Throughout the twentieth century and into the 
twenty-first, the reach of intellectual property protection expanded to include open 
pollinated plants, bacteria and ultimately genetic information.14 With each breakthrough 
came a new round of debate over myriad and complex issues, including health, safety, 
sustainability, human rights, cultural preservation and ethics. In attempting to sort 
                                                
12 These philosophies are preserved in the Rockefeller Foundation Archives materials relating to its 
program in Mexico as well as its pivotal role in formation of the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Resources (CGIAR), discussed in Chapter 3.  
13 One of the earliest agenda items of the CGIAR was the need for collection and preservation of 
biodiversity. See, “TAC Report on Proposal to Establish a Network of Genetic Resource Centres,” 
committee report, September 28, 1971, folder 2, box TAC I, Record Group CGIAR, Rockefeller 
Foundation Archives: 1. These discussions and their outcome are summarized in chapter 3. In addition, 
international efforts sponsored by the United Nations focused on this issue. See, Swanson, “Why Is There a 
Biodiversity Convention?” 
14 Congress extended patent-like registration protection to open pollinated plants in through the Plant 
Variety Protection Act of 1970. 91st Congress, 2nd Sess. Congressional Record vol. 116, pt. 33 (28 
December 1970), 43590. The United Stated Supreme Court allowed patent protection to living bacteria in 
1980. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
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through these issues and develop a template for discussion, advocates from all disciplines 
must look at the history of plants and patents in American society for some guidance. 
This initial merger of plants and patents forced a re-evaluation of the two institutions and 
a clear understanding of their respective meanings and roles in American society. How 
and why did patent laws come to exist? How and why should plants enter into the realm 
of patents? The answers to these questions helped set the tone for the debate that rages 
today.  
This dissertation cannot answer all of these questions but will explore the history 
of plants and intellectual property rights in key stages of their interaction in the twentieth 
century to understand historical values and assumptions that shaped the contemporary 
debate over these questions. What emerges from this research is a consistent historical 
philosophy of patents as a tool of economic progress and advancement. Once agricultural 
inputs took on a greater economic profile by virtue of plant improvement, Congress and 
the courts recast them in an economic light and grafted them to the patent law. When the 
debate spread beyond the borders of the United States and ownership of plants took on 
global implications, the industrial economic model forged primarily in America came up 
against a global perspective that attempted to keep plants within the realm of common 
heritage.15  A more socialized model of exchange involving raw germplasm and 
improved crop varieties favored developing nations that could not as easily take part in 
agricultural technology in a private capitalistic model. When this effort failed, custodians 
of the developing world’s germplasm fashioned an economic model based on concepts of 
                                                
15 An example is the United Nations’ International Undertaking of Plant Genetic Resources, which sought 
to characterize the world’s germplasm as humankind’s common heritage. See, Gerald Moore and Witold 
Tymowski, Explanatory Guide to the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (Switzerland and Cambridge: International Union for Conservation of Nature and Nature’s 
Resources, 2005). 
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fiduciary management of assets held in trust, thus privatizing germplasm but managing 
its economic power for the benefit of the developing world.16 If one locates the 
philosophy of agriculture and patents as vehicles of economic progress in dynamics as 
old as the United States, as opposed for example to the biotechnology wave of the 
1980’s, it is not surprising that the ultimate solutions employed by advocates for the 
developing world followed a similar arc.  
Methodology 
This dissertation will focus on several key historical events in American history 
involving plants and patents, both separately and together. In each case, I have reviewed 
the historical record in an effort to answer the following question: At this particular time 
in history, what goals and values motivated the actors involved? What were they trying to 
accomplish and how did the public perceive their actions? Finally, how did these 
perceptions inform and shape subsequent events, if at all? What emerges is a series of 
efforts focused on large-scale farming justified by either economic pragmatism or an 
urgent need to address a looming social or political catastrophe – starvation or 
Communist influence. The status of plants and patents most often involved an economic 
solution to an economic problem with its resolution played out largely in the halls of 
Congress, Executive branch offices, the appellate court system and the corporate 
boardroom. Even where the mission of breeding was philanthropic, that mission evolved 
within a progressive mindset that linked cultural well-being to commercial success. The 
history of patents and agriculture reveals relatively few advocates who took to the bully 
                                                
16 In 1994 the CGIAR moved its germplasm collection to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations where it was held in trust. Summary of Proceedings and Decisions, International Centers 
Week,” 1994: 9-10. http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/csop1194.pdf (accessed January 3, 
2011).These events are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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pulpit to demand a broader public discussion on the meaning and role of food in America 
and the world. Those who did had neither the audience nor the clout to make significant 
inroads on the more dominant economic mindset. It is not possible to examine every 
event or every published word about those events. It is possible that profound expressions 
of concern, particularly as to the moral or ethical implications of these events, never 
survived in the historical record. Historical analysis is critical in terms of both content 
and venue. The patent system was not structured to give voice to philosophical concerns 
in any substantive way. What survived and what continues to influence the debate are 
economic considerations. As a result, we are faced in the twenty-first century with 
multiple issues relating to biotechnology and agriculture and the dominant template for 
discussion of these issues is one that stresses pragmatism and economic advancement. 
This template has been under construction since before the American Revolution and is 
by now well girded against competing agricultural theories that stress cultural 
preservation and common heritage.    
Chapter one presents an historical overview of America’s patent law and the 
patent office to identify motivations and goals behind the original patent act. A review of 
the statues, commentary, court decisions and various government publications clearly 
illustrate the desire that patents play a role in promoting progress by creating economic 
incentives for authors and inventors to publish their works.17 Chapter one also examines 
the early status of agriculture policy before and after creation of the Department of 
Agriculture in 1862. Interestingly, the Patent Office soon became the informal home of 
                                                
17 See, Giovanni Batista Ramello, “Access to vs. Exclusion from Knowledge: Intellectual Property, 
Efficiency and Social Justice,” in Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice, Axel Gosseries, Alain 
Marciano and Alain Strowel, Ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) and Jack N. Rakove, ed., The 
Annotated U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2009). 
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seed distribution in the nineteenth century. Congress later funded these activities before 
relocating them to the new department, thus negating any possibility that seeds were 
simply overlooked as a possible subject of patent protection.18 Seeds as a front-end 
agricultural input had little economic status. In fact, the government gave them away in 
hopes that farmers would accept the risk of failed crops for the possibility of improved 
crops and share the best results with friends and neighbors. What emerges is a clear 
historical distinction between products of nature and inventions. The government used 
patents to draw out valuable inventions; it gave away seeds to help and encourage more 
profitable farming. The language of patents was economic; the language of agriculture 
was social.  
Chapter two traces development and eventual enactment of the Plant Patent Act of 
1930 which extended patent protection to asexually produced plants, which were self-
pollinated plants reproduced through cuttings or grafting.19 Review of the Congressional 
Record as well as the papers of Herbert Hoover and various publications of the times 
suggests two primary motivations behind the new law, both of which were founded in 
economic agendas. The private nursery industry, under the leadership of Paul Stark from 
Stark Brothers Nursery, proposed and served as chief advocate for the new law. For the 
nursery industry, the law represented an opportunity to secure exclusive rights to their 
unique plants, flowers and fruits. The nursery industry resurrected the legacy of Luther 
Burbank and cast the law as a long overdue righting of an historical wrong that saw 
Burbank lose the economic benefits from plant after plant as competitors quickly 
                                                
18 The Congressional Globe, V. 32. Part 1, 37th Cong. 2nd Sess., Feb, 17, 1862, 855-856. See also, T. Swann 
Harding, “Henry L. Ellsworth, Commissioner of Patents,” Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 22, No. 3 
(Aug., 1940). 
19 See footnote 7.  
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duplicated new varieties.20 For the nursery industry, therefore, the Plant Patent Act was 
an opportunity to protect its investment development of new varieties and extend the 
profit making potential after public release.  
Congress and the White House viewed the Plant Patent Act in economic terms as 
well. In 1930, the effort of the plant breeding industry to improve its own economic 
footing resonated positively within a Congress battling a fearsome economic depression 
and a Hoover administration that applauded a private sector industry seeking to solve its 
own problems.21 As a result, the Plant Patent Act of 1930 emerged as an economic tool 
intended to build a strong capitalistic market in the long run by granting economic 
monopolies in the short run. No concerns appear in the record regarding the broader issue 
of what it meant to the long-term evolution of American culture to establish property 
rights in a plant.  
Evolution of the Plant Patent Act in chapter two is also examined through the 
actions, or rather inactions, of Henry A. Wallace who’s Hi-Bred Corn Company was 
emerging just as the Plant Patent Act came into being. It is noteworthy that Wallace did 
not take an interest in the Plant Patent Act despite his family’s historical role as a leader 
in farm policy both as politicians and journalists. The Wallace family played a significant 
role in shaping U.S. agriculture policy but spent its political capital on tariff policy, not 
patents.22 Economic factors seem to have played a role in the Wallace strategy, at least by 
implication. Wallace worked in open pollinated, or sexually produced, seed corn, a 
                                                
20 See, Glenn E. Bugos and Daniel J. Kevles, “Plants as Intellectual Property: American Practice, Law, and 
Policy in World Context,” Osiris, vol. 7, (1992). 
21 See, Roger Lambert, “Food from the Public Crib: Agricultural Surpluses and Food Relief Under Herbert 
Hoover,” in Herbert Hoover and the Republican Era, ed. Carl Krog and William Tanner (University Press 
of America, 1984), 158-9. 
22 See, “Vote on the New Tariff Bill,” Wallace’s Farmer, May 10, 1930: 8., “Is the Senate Going to Back 
Down?” Wallace’s Farmer, May 24, 1930: 6 and Wallace’s Farmer, June 7, 1930: 3. 
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distinction that led him away from the patent law just as the nursery industry gravitated 
toward it. Wallace operated in the safe confines of a system that could not be copied in 
the public sphere because the plant he released to the public was a genetic imposter 
whose vigor lasted a single season and then faded, while its parental ancestors remained 
safely under his control. In other words, hybrid corn growers possessed their own 
economic protection – the trade secret – that was not available to nurserymen. Wallace’s 
correspondence and excerpts from Wallace’s Farmer provide a fascinating insight into 
the tight knit network of plant breeders and validation of the economic potential of hybrid 
corn. Wallace was every bit the businessman that Luther Burbank was. He simply did not 
need legal protection for his success. As a result, chapter two portrays the Plant Patent 
Act as being drafted, debated and enacted as an economic vehicle designed to create 
profit for the private nursery industry.  
Chapter three explores expansion of issues to a global stage. In the twentieth 
century, American philanthropists and government administrators turned their focus to 
agriculture in the developing world. Plant breeding was a key component to helping 
farmers increase their yields. Open pollinated plants did not yet enjoy intellectual 
property protection and so the traditional government/academic model of free sharing 
dominated. Developing countries gave freely of their raw germplasm and dedicated 
researchers worked to combine it in ways that would produce crops ideally suited to 
specific geographic regions. This dynamic resulted in the accumulation of large stores of 
germplasm in the hands of informal and cooperative organizations.23 In time, 
                                                
23 By 1991, the CGIAR held approximately 460,000 accessions and between 1987 and 1991 had made 
approximately 745,000 distributions to other entities. See, CGIAR Secretariat, “Stripe Study of Genetic 
Resources in the CGIAR,” April 26, 1994: 13, contained in “CGIAR Mid-Term Meeting, May 23-27, 
1994.” http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/tc9403c.pdf (accesed January 5, 2011). 
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advancements in technology and law transformed these seed stores from a basic input to a 
valuable economic asset. These changes left custodians of raw germplasm in an unusual 
position of both power and perplexity as they wrestled with the proper disposition of 
something that had been freely given and shared but would soon be eligible for legal 
protection. To understand the various responses to this new issue, it is instructive to 
review philosophies that drove agricultural philanthropy in the first instance. For this 
background, chapter three examines the Rockefeller Foundation’s corn program in 
Mexico and its subsequent role in formation of the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR). The Rockefeller Foundation Archives provide a 
compelling picture of genuine desire to improve the lives of others coupled with an 
aggressive philosophy of American exceptionalism as the means of doing so. Grave 
concerns over the spread of communism and a soon to be out of control population 
explosion also drove efforts and helped to bring to the table the World Bank under Robert 
McNamara, the Ford Foundation under McGeorge Bundy and many governments in the 
industrial world in the 1960’s and thereafter. Their collective efforts helped fund CGIAR 
and set its policies. In so doing, they made CGIAR the custodian of one of the greatest 
collections of raw germplasm known to humankind.24 When advances in biotechnology 
greatly multiplied the value of those materials, CGIAR was faced with the question how 
to use them consistently with its mission. Throughout this chapter, the historical record 
reveals a dominant philosophy that the best way to help farmers was to make their farms 
                                                                                                                                            
 
24 Although the CGIAR was estimated to hold only 14% of the world’s germplasm in its collections, it 
amounted to 40% of unique germplasm. See, Private Sector Committee, “Strengthening CGIAR-Private 
Sector Partnerships In Biotechnology: A Private Sector Committee Perspective on Compelling Issues,” 
April 30, 1997: 7, in “CGIAR Mid-term Meeting,” May 26-30, 1997. 
http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/cg9705k.pdf (accessed January 11, 2011). 
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more profitable. That which brought market value to agriculture was the best form of aid. 
This view helped define the attitude of philanthropists and governments toward seeds as a 
new type of economic asset.   
Chapter four is a brief but critical interlude necessary to set the stage for chapter 
five and the conclusion. After interested parties created CGIAR and allowed it to 
accumulate its vast collection of germplasm, numerous specific events combined to 
enhance its value. Chapter four will review the breakthrough in recombinant DNA 
technology that permitted scientists to alter living material at the genetic level. The 
research of geneticists Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen suggested a future in which 
combinations of genes were no longer limited to natural compatibility. Genetic traits 
could be isolated and recombined in host cells to mass-produce valuable proteins. Shortly 
after the Boyer-Cohen breakthrough, the United States Supreme Court issued its 
landmark ruling in the 1980 case, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, in which it recognized the 
right to hold a patent on living bacteria.25 Although the case and the attention it generated 
focused primarily on non-agricultural applications, particularly pharmaceuticals, it had 
vast implications for seeds as well. Within five years, the court expanded its precedent to 
open patent eligibility to all plants. Congress and the Reagan administration quickly 
jumped on the bandwagon with passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, which made it 
possible for research universities and small businesses to retain patents on new 
technology funded with public money.26 To observe that the world reacted to these 
developments with an economic mindset would be an understatement. The Wall Street 
boom in biotechnology stocks represented one of most significant instances of wealth 
                                                
25 See footnote 12.  
26 Pub.L. 96-517, codified at U.S. Code, 35 (2000) §§ 200-212. 
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creation in financial history.27 All of these events combined helped to transform raw 
germplasm from an important agricultural input to a significant economic asset. 
Moreover, these events gave CGIAR entrée into a burgeoning new field where it sorely 
lacked money and expertise: genetically modified crops.  
Chapter Five examines approximately twenty years of debate that took place 
within CGIAR regarding the proper disposition of its germplasm collection. Critical to 
the debate was the issue of whether CGIAR should secure intellectual property rights on 
its seed collection? CGIAR practiced free sharing of seeds with other researchers and 
entities in a tradition dating back to the early days of Henry Wallace. The more people 
who worked on plant breeding, the greater chance for breakthroughs. In the new world of 
biotechnology and intellectual property rights, however, a recipient of CGIAR 
germplasm could potentially use it to create a new plant variety and then secure exclusive 
economic rights, thus robbing CGIAR and the developing world of potential profit from 
its own material. This possibility forced CGIAR to consider not only the economic 
opportunities in its seeds, but also its responsibility toward the developing nation donors 
to manage the seeds in a responsible manner.  
The political terrain was rocky. CGIAR existed to work with developing countries 
but it was funded by the industrial world.28 Both sides expected to see results but defined 
success in different ways. The industrial world did not appreciate being asked for ever 
increasing funding when a valuable asset was not being used to its full potential. The 
                                                
27 “Spliced Genes Make Splash on Market,” Science News, 25 October 1980, 261. 
28 Fifteen entities provided the initial funding for CGIAR: The Ford Foundation, The United Kingdom, 
Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, Canada, The United Nations Development Program, The Rockefeller 
Foundation, The Inter-American Development Bank, The United States (via USAID), The Kellogg 
Foundation, The International Development Research Centre of Canada, Germany, Japan, and The World 
Bank. See, Sterling Wortman to John A. Pino, memorandum, undated, folder 5, box CG I, Record Group 
CGIAR Rockefeller Foundation Archives. 
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developing world looked askance at CGIAR placing its donated seed under the umbrella 
of private property with CGIAR as the owner.29  
CGIAR, being extremely informal in its structure and operation, also faced the 
surprisingly difficult question of its legal identity. Who among its multiple boards, 
committees and research centers actually possessed legal standing to assert and enforce 
ownership rights? In addition, CGIAR had to face the possibility that it could be held 
liable for mishandling its own germplasm by failing to honor rights asserted by other 
researchers.30  
All of these issues came to a head as the global community became entangled in 
issues of trade and bio-diversity. The United Nations called for greater efforts to preserve 
the world’s environment while the industrial world created the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) which called on the developing world to 
step into the intellectual property realm if it wanted to participate in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).31  
  CGIAR’s records are flush with varied and passionate opinions as the world 
began to realize that intellectual property rights in seeds and plants reached deeply into 
economic, cultural and environmental issues. CGIAR’s ultimate solution, to place the 
materials in trust with the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization, 
represented on its face a rare exception to the commercial mindset but one that was 
nevertheless economically defined and driven by the selection of a fiduciary model of 
                                                
29 See, “Report on TAC Review of IBPGR,” International Centers Week, October 27-31, 1980, folder 7, 
box CG VII, Record Group CGIAR, Rockefeller Foundation Archives: 2. 
30 See, “Report of the 16th Meeting of the CGIAR Oversight Committee,” November 1998: 3. 
http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/over16.pdf  (accessed January 15, 2011). 
31 See, World Trade Organization, text of Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (accessed November 14, 2011). 
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asset enhancement as well as recognition of the economic consequences from failure to 
preserve the developing world’s bio-diversity. Also relevant is that the solution placated 
CGIAR’s largest donor, the United States of America, by saving the seeds within a 
context that allowed commercial access.  
This dissertation will conclude with a discussion of how an economic mindset 
dominated nearly every phase of intellectual property policy as well as a significant 
portion of agriculture policy, from 1790 forward. Intellectual property rights and 
agriculture are two powerful institutions propelled by unique policy considerations 
toward similar destinations: the economic advancement of their respective practitioners to 
the ultimate benefit of the general population. Those who operated in and around these 
two institutions – farmers, politicians, judges, academics, philanthropists – did so under a 
set of assumptions that clearly separated products of nature from human invention but 
saw both as economic engines. In the twentieth century, advancements in plant breeding 
and later in genetics cast these two institutions in a new and much more compatible light. 
Manipulation of plants and seeds increased their economic value and intellectual property 
rights offered security and exclusivity for those willing to invest the time and money to 
create new plant varieties. By the latter part of the twentieth century, improved plant 
material (and chemicals and fertilizers that went with them) had largely become assets in 
major international corporations.32 This development forced the world to confront 
numerous practical and conceptual issues. Particularly affected were the government and 
private aid organizations that spread modern agriculture to the developing world through 
a philosophy of free sharing of inputs and outputs. As aid organizations tried to keep pace 
with technological advancements, they were drawn deeper into a system that forced them 
                                                
32 See footnote 2.  
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to confront and resolve conflicts between their traditional methods of operation and the 
economic reality of the world in which they operated. These issues were often more 
practical than philosophical, however. For many philanthropically-minded constituencies, 
‘improving’ life in the developing world meant enlarging the commercial impact of 
agriculture through introduction of technology, including hybrid seeds acquired by 
breeding and genetic modification. Modern farming was a plausible means of achieving 
myriad goals, including profit, economic development, avoiding starvation and national 
security. That some small farmers would fall by the wayside was a given.33 Agricultural 
aid and intellectual property rights were never about keeping small farmers on their 
farms. Similarly, aid to developing nations was never about the wisdom of creating profit 
through an industrial and capitalistic model. It was a given that a larger, market-oriented 
economy benefited a developing nation. The more confrontational issue involved the 
proper participation in and distribution of the profits generated by such a system, 
including the economic value of plants and seeds. Resolving this issue called (and still 
calls) for a wide-ranging dialogue from a diverse set of experts representing expertise in 
ethics, morality, cultural anthropology, human rights and economic profit. All points of 
view have their champions and their forums but, by the close of the twentieth century, the 
dominant voices in this debate, including some that stood philosophically on the side of 
common heritage, supported or resigned themselves to a cost-benefit model of 
determining the proper disposition of plants and seeds. Alternate views remain intense. 
Opposition to GMO foods, particularly in Europe, the rising popularity of organic 
products and concerns over common heritage, cultural identity and tradition all continue 
                                                
33 See, John H. Perkins, “The Rockefeller Foundation and the Green Revolution,” Agriculture and Human 
Values, Vol. VII, (Summer-Fall 1990). 
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to he heard. That voice, however, is sometimes relegated to the academic journal or the 
under- funded movement. With this historical summary, I hope to open a discussion and 
prompt more research on whether a more comprehensive dialogue should take place or 
whether the current balance of interests are sufficient and proper to serve as the standard 
by which we manage the wisdom in the earth.  
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CHAPTER 1. A NEED FOR PROGRESS: PATENTS AND 
AGRICUTLURE IN EARLY AMERICA 
 
 
This chapter will examine the enactment, interpretation and administration of 
patent laws in America, as well as the early interaction between the Patent Office and 
agriculture. Its purpose is to identify the earliest thinking about the meaning and purpose 
of patents and seeds in American history. What emerges is a view of patents as a practical 
economic tool intended to help the American economy grow and compete in its early 
years. Although not eligible for patent protection, seeds also had economic value and the 
government used them to promote growth in agriculture. In both cases, patents and seeds, 
the federal government had the same objective: to get something of economic value into 
the public domain. This thinking remained intact into the twentieth century and provided 
the perspective for enactment of intellectual property laws for plants and seeds.  
Patents in Colonial America 
America was, in significant part, a for-profit venture. Opportunities for profit in 
private property, agriculture and natural resources drove colonization of North America.1 
The early settlers were more than adventurers and separatists; they were also 
entrepreneurs who brought with them a firm belief that risk takers and innovators 
deserved to profit from their effort and ingenuity. They claimed the Americas in the name 
of their kings and by his authority. They went on to wield shovel and plow as the king’s 
proxies with the resulting profits divvied between them.  
                                                
1 In discussing historical events prior to the codification of patent laws, in America, I will use the more 
generic term ‘private property.’ I will also use the term ‘intellectual property’ as a convenient label for 
property rights in non-tangible things, even though the phrase did not become a term of art until well into 
the twentieth century.    
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Those who came and stayed did not abandon this mindset after the revolution 
secured America’s independence. The new Congress extended and formalized these same 
values. The fingerprints of economic progress mark up many pages of the historical 
record, including those relating to intellectual property and agriculture.2 
Exclusivity is a defining characteristic of intellectual property law that gives it 
economic force. Western society long ago recognized the power of exclusivity in 
fostering public welfare. For example, a 1474 statute in Venice stated in its preamble: 
“…if provision were made for the works and devices discovered by [men of great genius] 
so that others who may see them could not build them and take the inventors honor away, 
more men would then apply their genius, would discover, and would build devices of 
great utility and benefit our commonwealth.”3 With this justification, the Venetian 
government enacted a ten-year ban on duplication of new and ingenious devices 
registered with the General Welfare Board under penalty of one hundred ducats and 
destruction of the offending copy.4  
England’s Parliament had slightly different motivations when it enacted a law on 
patents, but was no less mindful of the underlying economic benefit to society from 
exclusive rights in commerce. Patronage drove the early English patent system. Kings 
and queens used letters patent to grant exclusivity of trade in nearly any area or item of 
                                                
2 Historian David Hackett Fischer cautions against any assumption that a generically ‘British’ culture sailed 
across the Atlantic and simply replicated itself on American soil, or that the already diverse regional, 
religious or social variations of British society were not profoundly modified when transplanted in the 
unique topography and climate of North America. See, David Hackett Fischer, Albion’s Seed (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 4-7. Intellectual property laws, however, were the product of western 
thinking long before the existence of the American Constitution and were replicated in that document 
precisely because America needed to compete on even ground with other nations. A brief exploration of 
these broad themes of law and economics helps to place later American actions in context and also supports 
the argument that general themes of risk and profit dominated government involvement in patents and 
agriculture both before and after their merger.  
3 “Invention and the Patent System,” Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the 
United States, 88th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 11. 
4 Ibid. 
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commerce. Unlike the Venetian statue, originality of invention was not a pre-requisite in 
the British system. Rulers gave letters patent to favored subjects or those willing to pay 
an appropriate fee. A relevant example is the Charter of Virginia, issued by King James I 
in 1606. The charter contains five references to ‘letters patent’ and one reference to its 
recipients as ‘patentees.’ These are not the patents of modern American law but they 
embody the modern concept of exclusive rights. The Charter of Virginia made specific 
grants for claimed terrain not held by Christians and for gold, silver and copper, which 
the patentees could mine for themselves for payment to the crown of a one-fifth share of 
gold and silver and a one fifteenth share of copper.5 Exclusive rights to profits helped to 
balance the scale against the countless dangers presented by such a journey.  
Parliament enacted the Statute of Monopolies in 1624 in order to shackle the 
crown’s profligate use of letters patent. By the time Parliament saw fit to take action, 
kings and queens had locked up myriad goods and services in the hands of selected 
individuals for up to twenty years to the great detriment of the English economy. Not 
wishing to end the practice altogether, but instead curb its abuse, Parliament permitted 
the crown to continue granting patents but only to true inventors of new manufacture. 
The American colonies and, later, the new states followed suit.6  
Opportunity to accumulate assets also influenced America’s early agriculture by 
pushing the idea of private property down the social ladder where a middling level of 
society discovered a new and attractive mix of independence, private property and 
                                                
5 Hening's Statutes of Virginia, I, 57-66, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/va01.asp (accessed March 31, 2011). According to Fischer, the 
American colonies attracted many types of settler, including young British sons of name with no hope of 
inheriting their fathers’ estates. These men came to America specifically to make their fortunes. See, 
Fischer, Albion’s Seed, 212-216. 
6 “Invention and the Patent System,” Joint Economic Committee, 11. 
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economic interaction. Many in the American middle class became happily entrenched in 
a kind of life that Europe could not offer. The rare opportunity to own land, combined 
with the relative autonomy of American life, yielded a broad populace that was 
passionate about private property. 7    
Following the Revolutionary War, the newly independent America transitioned 
from England’s military foe to an economic competitor. American independence meant 
little without prospect of survival. Continued independence demanded a strong economy 
and America adopted the tools of commerce that had served England and the colonies, 
including economic reward for innovation. Patents represented one such tool by 
providing an incentive for inventors to participate in American commerce. The qualities 
of exclusivity, private property, autonomy and market orientation emerged strongly in the 
Constitution. Private property in particular enjoyed a two-prong status. It served as the 
foundation for capitalism and the prerequisite for freedom, individual liberty and national 
                                                
7 Abundant land and resources were the most obvious and striking differences between America and 
Europe. Conditions in colonial America permitted a greater number of adult free men to own enough land 
to employ themselves and their families. Opportunity for ownership stretched much farther down the social 
ladder than in Great Britain, as evidenced by the fact that two-thirds of colonials owned land. The threat of 
losing something so rare fostered dogged determination among colonial settlers to preserve what they had. 
See, Allen Kulikoff, From British Peasants to Colonial American Farmers, Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press (2000), 2. Farmers, moreover, operated within a unique system of colonial 
government. While the early colonies technically belonged to the king, he essentially franchised them out 
and authorized private parties to exercise the king’s rights. Thus, colonists enjoyed a degree of latitude not 
available in England. In addition, Corporate charters (as opposed to royal charters) permitted a degree of 
leeway in shaping laws. Parliament did not require settlers organized under corporate charters to send their 
laws to England for review and approval. See, Mary Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial Legal 
Culture and the Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 5. Enlightened thinking resonated 
within a society that was physically removed from many traditional influences and based in a diverse and 
independent yeoman population. Property remained central to this discussion but its nature had changed 
from a benevolent grant to a natural right.  The colonists valued their property too much to turn it over to a 
government which they viewed from a distance and in which they had no voice. See, McCusker and 
Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 
2000), 351-358. The Revolutionary war cut off traditional American sources for imported goods. In 
addition, domestic military demand placed a huge added strain on domestic production. The need for goods 
educated the American farmer on the potential advantages of the market and helped to develop a 
commercial orientation in many communities. See, James A. Henretta, The origins of American Capitalism 
– Collected Essays (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1991), 241.  
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stability.8 The ability to control one’s own property in order to provide for one’s own 
well-being fostered not only profit but an honest and incorruptable electorate. That the 
drafters of the constitution held these ideas sacrosanct is not surprising given their origin 
and the fact that they had been paid for in blood.  
The Constitutional View of Patents 
 
The Constitution’s section on patents reflected colonial ideals of private property 
but leaned more heavily toward economic considerations.9 The drafters saw value in new 
ideas and innovations in an economic context more than one of natural rights. Inventions 
made for personal wealth, which contributed to a stable and well rounded society, but 
patents represented a means to that end by offering exclusivity in the marketplace in 
exchange for publication. They were thus an economic tool and not an idealistic one.10  
                                                
8 See, Giovanni Batista Ramello, “Access to vs. Exclusion from Knowledge: Intellectual Property, 
Efficiency and Social Justice,” in Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice, Axel Gosseries, Alain 
Marciano and Alain Strowel, Ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 73. 
9 Historians have long debated the role of wealth and private property in the wording of the United States 
Constitution. Certainly the delegates to the Constitutional convention were men of wealth who saw private 
property and the ability to pursue individual gain as foundational to a politically free society. Private 
property gave men their freedom and protected that freedom from tyranny and corruption. See, Walter B. 
Mead, The United States Constitution: Personalities, Principles and Issues (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1987), 76. Property rights also played a practical role in the debate, forming the basis of 
arguments for and against representation, voting rights and eligibility for office. See, Thornton Anderson, 
Creating the Constitution: The Convention of 1787 and the First Congress (University Park: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 100-101. In short property served both idealistic and practical 
needs. In the case of patents, the need was both practical and immediate. It is not possible in this brief 
overview to explore the entire panoply of political writing that inspired American thinkers and the drafting 
of our enabling documents. My purpose is to suggest that patent laws reflected a measured yielding of 
idealism to economic reality. As I trace the inspirations behind patent laws through the twentieth century, I 
will argue that decisions on intellectual property rights in plants and seeds have been dominated by 
concerns over economic pragmatism more than social, cultural or political idealism. 
10 Political philosopher John Locke, whose writings informed and inspired America’s founding documents, 
did not write about intangible property but historians have commented on the compatibility of Lockean 
philosophy with patent rights. The Lockean basis of property is a natural right to own one’s self and 
therefore the product of one’s labor. When those products satisfy needs for survival, the rights are not 
conditional but are rather a natural entitlement. See, Axel Gossieries, “How (Un)fair is Intellectual 
Property?” in Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice, Axel Gosseries, Alain Marciano and Alain 
Strowel, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 10. When Lockean concepts are extended to 
knowledge and ideas, however, conflicts arise. If I own myself and my labor, then surely I own my ideas, 
which are the labor of my mind. But unlike things needed for survival, information is non-rival. One 
person’s enjoyment of an idea does not prevent another’s enjoyment of the same idea at the same time. 
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 The drafters of the Constitution granted eighteen specific powers to the 
Legislative branch of government. Among them was the power: “To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”11 
Commentators note that the patent language is unique in that it represents the only clause 
in the original Constitution prefaced with an introductory clause to explain its intention.12 
The other seventeen powers granted to Congress are self-explanatory even though their 
import ranges from the routine, such as establishing post roads, to the ominous, such as 
declaring war. Had clause eight on patents followed suit, it likely would have read: “To 
secure for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.” The qualifying language, however, makes clear that the 
drafters viewed the role of Congress within the context of a specific goal, namely to 
promote progress. The language in clause eight did not mandate any specific action on 
the part of Congress or, for that matter, any action at all. To the extent that Congress 
acted, however, it did so subject to the clear mandate that the resulting law must promote 
progress in science and the useful arts. The mandate imposed by the drafters’ qualifying 
language validated the traditional view that exclusivity in ideas and creativity would 
encourage inventive activity and that the lack of ability to make a profit would result in 
                                                                                                                                            
Thus, the knowledge to produce a cancer drug means that all sufferers of cancer can receive it. Granting a 
patent on a cancer drug, however, moves the idea out of the public domain for a period of time. Locke 
focuses on the use value of property (consumption, shelter, etc.) whereas patent law focuses on the 
exchange value of property, which is of use only in an economic context. One man’s rights in a new drug 
might prevent another man from receiving that drug because the owner of the right refuses to license its 
manufacture or prices it too high, thus leaving a survival need unsatisfied. In other words, patents could 
conceivably barricade people from the basic actions that Locke viewed as natural rights. Ramello, “Access 
to vs. Exclusion from Knowledge: Intellectual Property, Efficiency and Social Justice,” 77. This analysis 
suggests that patents were less in the realm of idealism and more in the realm of economic pragmatism.  
11 U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 8. The language is unchanged to the present day and also forms the 
basis for copyright law, which is not a focus of this dissertation. 
12 Jack N. Rakove, ed., The Annotated U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 142. 
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under-production of goods.13 The drafters envisioned the new Congress as one 
empowered to actively encourage development of the arts and sciences via a grant of 
legally enforceable exclusivity in knowledge or a useful art that could be put to some 
valuable or beneficial purpose. In short, the drafters empowered Congress to use reward 
in order to stimulate disclosure of valuable information. The value of knowledge, 
however, lay in its economic potential. Commentators have noted that the constitutional 
language on patents is not limited simply to inspiring inventors to invent but also to 
publish what they invent. They noted use of the word ‘secure’ in the constitutional 
language as opposed to ‘grant.’ In other words, Congress could not give anything to 
inventors that they did not already possess. Inventors already controlled their discoveries. 
They were clearly free to hide away their inventions, produce them in secret or donate 
them for the betterment of humankind. If inventors chose to produce their inventions in 
for-profit ventures, however, their control extended only as far as the time when someone 
else conceived or copied the same idea. The drafters of the Constitution recognized that 
the ideal place for new information was the public sphere, where it could generate still 
more progress.14 With the patent clause and supporting laws, Congress had the power to 
help inventors secure their inventions under a legal cloak of temporary exclusivity.15 
Therefore, patent rights served to promote progress by giving inventors an incentive to 
publish in exchange for a few years of legally enforceable exclusivity. The bargain 
between the public and the inventor took on meaning only when economic interests were 
                                                
13 Ramello, “Access to vs. Exclusion from Knowledge,” 75. 
14 Patents represented a short term strategy of economic benefit in order to realize the long-term benefit of 
making valuable information available to more people. See, Gregory S. Alexander, Commodity and 
Property: Competing Visions of Property in American Legal Thought 1776-1970 (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1997), 27. 
15 For a legal analysis of the patent clause, see, Roger Sherman Hoar, Patent Tactics and Law (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1950), 4.  
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at stake, a concept supported the United States Supreme Court, which consistently 
viewed patent laws as embracing an economic philosophy and operating exclusively 
within that realm.16  
The Law of Patents 
 
Congress quickly exercised its grant of authority to promote progress in science 
and the useful arts by enacting the first patent law in 1790, followed closely by the Patent 
Act of 1793.17 Administration of the early patent laws reflected varied philosophies. 
Patents carried a strong whiff of privilege, which came uncomfortably close to the stench 
of monarchy and so the law’s keepers were cautious and sometimes downright stingy in 
granting them. Their reticence soon inflamed an already powerful industrial lobby, which 
succeeded for a time in turning the new patent system into a government sponsored profit 
machine. In general, however, patent law and its administrators embraced the idea of 
government use of incentives to stimulate economic growth.18 This philosophy echoed 
loudly in the debate over plants and patents. 
Thomas Jefferson drafted the 1790 Act in a manner that balanced the twin goals 
of promoting invention in a fledgling economy while, at the same time, protecting against 
abuse of monopolies among a populace already skittish about unchecked power.19 
Jefferson’s patent law likely offered something acceptable to everyone. Creation of a 
                                                
16 The United States Supreme Court summarized the patent philosophy succinctly in 1954: “The economic 
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the 
talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
Similarly, in 1966, the Supreme Court stated that the patent system must be related to the world of 
commerce rather than the realm of philosophy. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966). 
17 1 Stat. 109, ch. 7 (1790), cited in Michael S. Greenfield, “Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science 
Struggling with the Patent Law,” Stanford Law Review, no. 5 (May 1992), 1057; Act of Feb 21, 1793, sec. 
1, 1 Stat. 319, cited in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
18 Greenfield, “Recombinant DNA Technology,” 1057. 
19 See the Supreme Court’s commentary in, Graham v. John Deere Co. 383 US 1 (1966), 7. 
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property right tied directly to the public good exemplified Jefferson’s philosophy of 
property as a social concept that could be properly adjusted to accommodate the 
country’s needs.20 The law also should have created little conflict with the Federalist 
view that innovation, creativity and ambition were inherently virtuous and consistent with 
a self-interested pursuit of wealth.21 Jefferson’s efforts seem to have been pre-emptive 
rather than promotional, however, since he questioned the premise that ingenuity had to 
be helped along with an economic carrot and doubted that the potential benefits of any 
economic monopoly were preferable to general suppression.22 In commenting on a 
dispute over rights to an improved flour mill, Jefferson offered a broad and passionate 
summary of the place of ideas in society: “If nature has made any one thing less 
susceptible than all others of exclusive property it is the action of the thinking power 
called an idea . . . the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of 
everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is 
that no one can possess the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who 
receives an idea from me, received instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who 
lights his taper at mine receives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely 
spread from one to another over the globe . . . seems to have been peculiarly and 
benevolently designed by nature when she made them . . . incapable of confinement or 
exclusive appropriation.”23 The mere existence of a patent clause in the Constitution and 
                                                
20 See, Gregory S. Alexander, Commodity and Property: Competing Visions of Property in American Legal 
Thought 1776-1970 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 27. 
21 Ibid., 76. 
22 Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 
450.  
23 Quoted in Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation, 938. Jefferson lived what he preached. He 
refused to seek a patent on his well-received and brilliant improvement of the moldboard plow, which 
improved furrow depth by two inches. The design garnered him honorary membership in the English Board 
of Agriculture and a gold medal from the Agricultural Society of Paris. Competitors widely copied his 
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the immediate enactment of a patent statue suggests that Jefferson represented the 
minority view in placing ideas in the realm of philosophy rather than economics. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, Jefferson named himself by virtue of title as one of the patent 
commissioners, a role in which he served with diligence and enthusiasm.24 Jefferson 
clearly did not abhor or work against patents or the idea that monopoly was an ideal tool 
for jumpstarting an economy. He was pragmatic enough to recognize their worth to a new 
country. Jefferson, however, was perhaps naïve in his assumption that three members of 
Washington’s cabinet would have time to review patent applications while trying to nurse 
a new and deeply divided nation through its infancy. 
The 1790 Act required inventors to petition a three-person executive branch 
committee consisting of the Secretary of State (Jefferson), the Secretary for the 
Department of War (Henry Knox) and the Attorney General (Edmund Randolf). This 
tribunal possessed absolute and final discretion, by a simple majority of two votes, as to 
approval or disapproval of submissions for patents. Having so approved an invention, the 
committee forwarded its decision to the President who certified a letter patent to the 
applicant. The President, as drafter of the letter patent, was responsible for describing the 
invention. Upon receipt of the letter patent, the inventor enjoyed for fourteen years “the 
sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using, and vending to others 
                                                                                                                                            
design but the idea of a monopoly on a useful idea held no interest for Jefferson, who not only published 
his idea but also shared it with Europe. Ibid., 589-590. 
24 Daniel Preston, “The Administration and Reform of the U. S. Patent Office, 1790-1836,” Journal of the 
Early Republic, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn, 1985), 334. One can imagine the endlessly inquisitive Jefferson 
delighting in examination of new machines. Jefferson took a keen and personal interest in the inventive 
process and, in contrast to his own prodigal financial habits, was stingy in granting patents to ideas. In one 
case, Jefferson had a mechanism for distilling fresh water from seawater fully assembled in his office, 
including a still and furnace. He called in expert observers and required the inventor to put the apparatus 
through its paces on five separate occasions before denying the patent. Ibid., 450. 
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to be used, the said invention or discovery.”25  The Act then required patent recipients to 
deliver to the Secretary of State full descriptions of the invention with drafts and, if 
possible, models exact enough to allow workmen or others skilled in the art to make, 
construct and use the same “to the end that the public may have the full benefit 
thereof.”26  
Although the historiography describes the number of patent submissions as ‘few,’ 
all were likely subjected to a detailed and critical review. The committee approved only 
thirty-seven patents during Jefferson’s tenure as a Commissioner, perhaps reflecting his 
determination that economic monopolies not be granted lightly despite the Constitutional 
references to promotion and progress. Almost immediately, inventors began a drumbeat 
for economic vigor in the halls of government. Inventors complained that Jefferson, Knox 
and Randolf were overly strict and unfriendly toward the industrial class.27  
Congress responded to the call for more liberal use of patents by enacting extreme 
revisions to the law on February 21, 1793. Congress replaced the high-level examination 
commission with a simple registration system. The amended law provided that once the 
Secretary of State received the petition and a sworn statement from the inventor that he 
was indeed the true inventor, “it may and shall be lawful for the said Secretary of State to 
                                                
25 United States Code, Chapter VII., Section 1, April 10, 1790, re-printed in List of Patents for Inventions 
and Designs Issued by the United States, from 1790 to 1847, compiled and Published under the direction of 
Edmund Burke, Commissioner of Patents, (Washington: J. & G.S. Gideon, 1847), v. 
26 Ibid., vi. The law also established procedures, remedies and fees. Persons desiring a copy of the model 
could take or make one at their own expense. Any person making an unauthorized copy of the patented 
item was liable for damages and surrender to the patent holder of the offending manufactures. The law 
established filing fees of fifty cents for the petition plus ten cents per page of specifications. Issue fees were 
two dollars for the patent letter plus one dollar for the presidential seal and twenty cents for delivery.   
27 George W. Evans, “The Birth and Growth of the Patent Office,” Records of the Columbia Historical 
Society, Washington, D.C., Vol. 22 (1919), 108. 
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cause letters patent to be made out.”28 From 1793 to 1836 inventors petitioned the 
Secretary of State who had no obligation or explicit authority to judge an invention 
sufficiently useful or important to warrant issuance of patent. With no regulations and no 
guidelines beyond the bare wording of the statute, the patent office became little more 
than a processor of paperwork.29  
Loathe to spend money unnecessarily, Congress largely ignored the ‘new’ patent 
office which enjoyed an advantage over many other federal offices simply by performing 
its statutory function. Inventors and entrepreneurs, not to mention rogues, were also quite 
content with the state of affairs. With little discretion on the part of patent clerks and the 
only right of challenge or enforcement within the seldom used court system, applicants 
attempted to patent items that did not work or had been well known and used for years.30 
The thirty dollars filing fee was a small price for a virtual guarantee of exclusivity on 
anything filed.31 In fact, on occasion, the patent clerks went so far as to waive fees for 
those who could not pay, showing more loyalty to the spirit of encouraging invention 
rather than generating revenue.32  
                                                
28 United States Code, Chapter IX, Section 1, February 21, 1793, re-printed in List of Patents for Inventions 
and Designs Issued by the United States, from 1790 to 1847: viii. The new law was not an inventor’s free-
for-all, however. Congress inserted standards declaring that one who improved a patented machine could 
not thereby manufacture the machine, nor could the original patent holder manufacture the machine with 
the improvement. Further, simply changing the form or proportions of a machine was not a patentable 
discovery. Congress also fixed damages at treble the price charged per violating unit. They raised the filing 
fee to thirty dollars (up from fifty cents) with copies costing twenty cents per written sheet and two dollars 
for drawings. 
29 Robert C. Post, “ ‘Liberalizers’ versus ‘Scientific Men’ in the Antebellum Patent Office,” Technology 
and Culture, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Jan., 1976), 26. 
30 Daniel Preston, “The Administration and Reform of the U. S. Patent Office, 1790-1836,” Journal of the 
Early Republic, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn, 1985), 343.  
31 Ibid., 336.  
32 George W. Evans, “The Birth and Growth of the Patent Office,” Records of the Columbia Historical 
Society, Washington, D.C., Vol. 22 (1919), XXX 
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Thomas Jefferson supported the 1793 revisions but ultimately came to abhor the 
new system and blamed it for a proliferation of questionable patents.33 For all his careful 
stewardship early on, Jefferson did not use his new office of Vice-President or his 
subsequent presidency as a bully pulpit to push revisions to the greatly streamlined and 
inventor-friendly patent process. Congress and the Executive branch essentially blocked 
open the patent door from 1793 to 1836. They let the paper flow and the private market 
sort it all out.34  
The lack of statutory substance in the patent act made the patent office a 
malleable thing, subject largely to the Superintendent’s personality. In 1802, James 
Madison awarded the Superintendentship of Patents to his close friend, William 
Thornton, who served in the role for twenty-six years. At that time the Superintendent of 
Patents was essentially a forgotten clerk within the State Department, ignored by 
Congress and with no staff, guidelines or discretion. Thornton thus exercised free reign 
over the process. He hired his own family members to help process the paper that flowed 
through the office. Unfortunately, the office kept poor records and maintained no patent 
registry. In 1810, Congress allocated Thornton a suite of offices in the Post Office 
building but the rooms quickly became an ad hoc museum as the staff filled them with 
                                                
33 Preston, “The Administration and Reform of the U. S. Patent Office, 334. 
34 Additional patent law revisions arrived with the new century. In 1800, Congress amended the law to 
allow aliens having resided in the US for at least two years to seek U.S. patents. In 1832, Congress waived 
the two-year requirement so long as the alien inventor then resided in and expressed an intention to become 
a U.S. citizen. In 1819, Congress gave federal circuit courts original jurisdiction over patent cases. During 
this time, it appears that Congress was trying to create incentive for foreign inventors to come to the United 
States with their valuable ideas. Introduction of federal court jurisdiction suggests an increase in patent 
litigation, which is not surprising given the low standards at the time. See,  United States Code, Chapter 
XXV, Section 1, April 17, 1800, and Unites States Code Chapter CCIII, July 13, 1832,  re-printed in List of 
Patents for Inventions and Designs Issued by the United States, from 1790 to 1847, compiled and Published 
under the direction of Edmund Burke, Commissioner of Patents, (Washington: J. & G.S. Gideon, 1847), xii 
- xiii. 
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models filed as exhibits with patent applications. The building burned down in 1836 and, 
with it, whatever meager records existed prior to that date.35   
The 1836 blaze signaled the end of more than the post office building. It also 
served as a symbolic purging of the old patent system. Congress overhauled the patent 
statute in 1836. It established the Patent Office as a stand-alone bureau within the State 
Department, elevated the Superintendent to Commissioner of Patents and funded new 
positions for a chief clerk, an examining clerk, two additional clerks, a machinist and a 
messenger. Congress also granted the patent office its own seal, obviating the need for 
direct presidential involvement with approved applications.36 Most significant, Congress 
also re-established the examination function, this time avoiding the President’s cabinet 
and instead elevating clerks to patent examiners with authority to review and approve 
applications.37 Congress basically inserted an initial lower level review with a right to 
challenge. Under the new law, a three-person board of disinterested persons appointed by 
the Secretary of State reviewed all challenges to rejected applications.38 The newly re-
tooled office also established a search system to help the examiners in establishing the 
novelty of new applications.39 Public demand for access to patent records was growing as 
well, a sign that the system was beginning to develop some economic energy. Thornton 
opposed the idea of allowing private citizens to sift through patent files, apparently 
                                                
35 Preston, “The Administration and Reform of the U. S. Patent Office, 1790-1836,” 336. 
36 United States Code, Chapter CCCLVII, Sections 2-4, July 4, 1836, re-printed in List of Patents for 
Inventions and Designs Issued by the United States, from 1790 to 1847, compiled and Published under the 
direction of Edmund Burke, Commissioner of Patents, (Washington: J. & G.S. Gideon, 1847), vi. 
37 Post, “ ‘Liberalizers’ versus ‘Scientific Men’ in the Antebellum Patent Office,” 26. 
38 United States Code, Chapter CCCLVII, Sections 7, July 4, 1836, re-printed in List of Patents for 
Inventions and Designs Issued by the United States, from 1790 to 1847, compiled and Published under the 
direction of Edmund Burke, Commissioner of Patents, (Washington: J. & G.S. Gideon, 1847), vi. Congress 
supplemented the review function 1870 with the obligation of the applicant to submit a detailed claim.  
39 George W. Evans, “The Birth and Growth of the Patent Office,” Records of the Columbia Historical 
Society, Washington, D.C., Vol. 22 (1919), 114. 
  
34 
worried that patent holders might suffer as a result, but Henry Clay, Secretary of State 
and therefore Thornton’s boss, overrode the objection. The office commenced providing 
copies of patents to the public for a fee.40  
In forty-six years, patent rights had evolved from commanding the attention of the 
primary overseers of state, war and law, to commanding no one’s attention and finally 
settling where they still rest today, in the hands of executive branch examiners. Clearly 
the new nation struggled with the questions of how important patents were and whose 
attention they warranted. Whether the 1836 revisions were simply part of a Jacksonian 
era housecleaning is not entirely clear. The result, however, was a process whereby 
bureaucrats of lower title and greater subject matter knowledge took control, a common 
dynamic as government grew beyond the ability of executive branch secretaries and 
legislative bodies to ponder and decide routine and voluminous matters.   
Following the 1836 revisions, the spirit of Jefferson re-emerged within the patent 
office. Patent examiners, mindful that one purpose behind reinstating the review process 
was to stem the flow of junk inventions being foisted on the American public, became 
cautious. They took to heart their duty to see to it that the public got its end of the patent 
‘bargain’ memorialized in the Constitution and now re-born in the federal law. As men of 
scientific background, they played devil’s advocate when reviewing applications, actively 
looking for reasons to reject them. From the law’s 1836 revision up to 1843, the approval 
rate in the Patent Office was approximately sixty percent, a shocking decline for an 
inventing class long accustomed to getting nearly anything it fancied simply by filing the 
forms.41  
                                                
40 Preston, “The Administration and Reform of the U. S. Patent Office, 1790-1836,” 339-342. 
41 Post, “ ‘Liberalizers’ versus ‘Scientific Men’ in the Antebellum Patent Office,” 29.  
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The varied early history of patent administration suggests uncertainty as to the 
role of patent rights in America. Regardless of the administrative procedures, however, 
patents clearly operated within a capitalist system. Although Jefferson favored 
farmer/producers, artisans, credit for families and small affordable sections of land over 
Alexander Hamilton’s factories, both men assumed that their constituents depended upon 
and would use the ingredients of capitalism: a vibrant market, private property, wage 
labor and financial instruments.42 Congress must have viewed patents as a tool to attract 
the best people to the United States or to keep them there, and also as a tool to create a 
well of public knowledge from which talented people could draw deeply. Patent law 
envisioned a great wall of progress with each inventor’s stone lying atop one set by a 
previous inventor. Getting the stones into the wall required Congress to advance private 
interests. To the extent the patent law represented a value system in action, the value was 
a robust economy made possible in part by unique and driven individuals who took it 
upon themselves to make things happen.43 Congress designed the patent law to strike a 
bargain for the benefit of the public: exclusivity as a means to promote public welfare.44 
These historical antecedents extended to plants when they were drawn into the world of 
                                                
42 James A. Henretta, The Origins of American Capitalism (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1991), 
294.  
43 Patents did not necessarily translate into a panacea for Americans. Researchers estimated in 1932 that as 
few as 1% of patents issued had any practical utility. The act of patenting touched many American lives as 
evidenced by the pages of diverse names in Patent Office records, but it appears that those able to realize 
financial reward from patents were those who worked steadily and were willing to make mistakes. Between 
1916 and 1925, 13% of American patentees accounted for 57.5% of the patents issued. Thomas Edison, for 
example, obtained seventy-eight patents during the decade. These later data suggest that the true 
beneficiaries of patent technology were those with resources in time and money as well as creativity. 
Invention was a scatter gun process, thrown open to everyone with the hope that a few would truly succeed 
for the benefit of society and the rest would not do too much harm. The true visionaries of patents saw 
clearly that profits lay not in eureka moments but in a carefully planned scheme of research, finance, 
manufacture and marketing. See, Lowell Juilliard Carr, “The Patenting Performance of 1,000 Inventors 
During Ten Years,” The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Jan., 1932), 569, 575-576.  
44 Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 Fed. Cases 920 (C.C. Cal 1867).  
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patents in the twentieth century, thus forcing them into an economic model as the criteria 
for justification.  
Agriculture and the Patent Office 
 
The early history of patent law suggests that its drafters and administrators viewed 
it as an economic tool for building a vibrant American economy. The same philosophy 
applied to plants and seeds. Unlike inventions protected by patents, however, no one in 
the nineteenth century viewed plants and seeds as a potential source of profit wanting 
only the grant of exclusivity in order to flourish. Although a clear line of demarcation 
separated plants and patents in a legal sense, both contributed to the economic well being 
of America. As a result, when lobbyists proposed plants as a possible object of 
intellectual property protection and when Congress judged the advisability of such a 
marriage, both sides used practical economic advantage as their primary litmus test. 
Given the dearth of any serious historical commentary on the cultural or ethical 
ramification of patents on living material, as well as the dire economic circumstance of 
the late 1920s, it is not surprising that approval of plant patents by Congress did not delve 
much deeper than the fact that it made good economic sense.  
The manner in which government officials employed seeds in pursuit of a sound 
agricultural economy was the near opposite of that used for patents. In patents, the 
government offered exclusivity in order to acquire public disclosure of inventive 
knowledge. In the case of seeds, the government gave them away in the hope that farmers 
would accept the risk of a failed crop for the possibility of an exceptionally good crop 
and, in the latter case, save and share good seeds with other farmers. In short, the patent 
office reversed its normal process when it came to seeds. Instead of trying to transfer 
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something of value into the public domain by offering exclusivity to its inventor, it gave 
away something of value to farmers in the hope that it would expand into the public 
domain by replication and free sharing. In both cases, the government sought in the long 
run to expand public access to things of economic value, whether tangible or intangible. 
The country generally benefited as a result from better seed stock in the hands of more 
farmers just as it benefited from inventive information in the hands of more inventors and 
entrepreneurs. 
The traditional exclusion of seeds by administrators and courts from the patent-
oriented bargain of exclusivity in exchange for disclosure lay in the fact that seeds were 
already in the public domain as a product of nature. No one ‘invented’ seeds in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and court decisions reflect this philosophy. Court 
rulings generally erected and maintained a barrier between invention and nature. Some 
carefully crafted exceptions, however, recognized that inventors could and did use the 
creative process with products of nature. The key to bridging the gap was bringing 
something of value to the fore through human intervention.45    
The United States Supreme Court consistently held that if something existed in 
nature, its mere discovery did not add anything new to the body of public knowledge. 
                                                
45 A 1948 Supreme Court case involving Funk Brothers Seed Company illustrates the dominant thinking 
that survived well into the twentieth century. A Funk Brothers employee discovered that certain strains of 
plant inoculants did not inhibit each other when mixed together. The company therefore combined the 
strains and marketed them in a single product suitable for multiple plants, greatly decreasing the company’s 
packaging costs. Funk Brothers obtained a patent for the new mixed-plant inoculant but the Supreme Court 
ultimately rejected the patent on challenge. Funk Brothers had done nothing to the bacteria in question. It 
had simply discovered their respective properties and used this knowledge to mix them together in a way 
that enhanced their commercial value. The Court stated: “[P]atents cannot issue for the discovery of the 
phenomena of nature. The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of 
metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free 
to all men and reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomena of nature 
has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a 
discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.” Funk Brothers 
Seed Company v. Kalo Inoculant Company, 333 U.S. 127 (1948), 130. This ruling reflects the justification 
for the Plant Patent Act of 1930, discussed below. 
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Worse, to grant a monopoly in natural products or information would rob society of the 
myriad uses to which that product might be put. Thus, one might employ a natural 
product in a new and useful process, and seek patent protection for the process, but this 
protection did not grant exclusivity in the natural product itself. This rule held for both 
principles and products found in nature. To grant a patent on a scientific or mathematical 
principle would not hold because such principles existed, and had always existed and 
therefore could only be discovered and not invented. 46 This same logic informed court 
cases on tangible products as well. A product of nature could be used within an invention 
but could not stand alone as the subject of a patent.47 For example, in 1889 the 
Commissioner of Patents rejected an application for a patent on purified pine needle 
fibers. The Commissioner stated: “[It] cannot be said that the applicant in this case has 
made any discovery, or is entitled to patent the idea, or fact, that fiber can be found in the 
needle of the Pinus australis.” To allow the patent would theoretically open the door to 
patents on elements or principals. The Patent Commissioner prophetically warned that 
                                                
46 For example, in the 1852 case of LeRoy v. Tatham, the United States Supreme Court stated that while a 
scientific principle was a fundamental truth that could not be patented, that same truth could be employed 
in a patentable process. The Court offered an excellent analogy. One could patent the invention of a steam 
engine, but could not patent the principle of steam power. The invention of a machine to extract, modify 
and concentrate the natural agency of steam power clearly constituted a patentable invention. The inventive 
act was not the discovery of the properties of steam power (which had always existed) but rather the 
application of this knowledge in the creation of a machine that was new and useful. See, LeRoy v. Tatham, 
14 How. 156 (1852). Similarly, in the 1887 decision in the Alexander Graham Bell telephone patent case, 
the Court noted that electricity was a force of nature employed by Bell in his invention. If left to itself, 
electricity would not do what Bell needed for it to do. Bell’s invention was a process to control the natural 
force of electricity to make it accomplish the purpose needed. In other words, Bell employed a force of 
nature in a new and practical use. See, Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Company, 126 US 1, 532-33 
(1887). 
47 In the case of American Wood Paper Company, the court ruled that a new process to derive cellulose 
from wood was patentable, but the resulting cellulose was not since it was indistinguishable from cellulose 
found in nature. The court said: “A process to obtain [a valuable substance] from a subject from which it 
has never been taken may be the creature of invention, the thing itself when obtained cannot be called a 
new manufacture.” See, Am. Wood-Paper Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.), 593-94.  
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such broad application of the patent law might lead to patents “upon the trees of the forest 
and the plants of the earth.”48 
A philosophy emerged throughout the life of patent law in which all three 
branches of government carefully protected the bargain between the public and inventors, 
allowing no advantage or reward to those who worked hard and made life-changing 
discoveries, but brought nothing new to the table in exchange for a temporary monopoly.  
Finding something that was always there was simply not part of the bargain. The inventor 
had to also employ it in a new and useful process while leaving the natural ingredient free 
for the next inventor to use. This philosophy underscored the economic mindset of patent 
law in demanding value for value and refusing to give value for things already in the 
public domain, even if revealed only after much human effort and ingenuity.49  
Seeds existed and self replicated through natural processes. The best way to 
discover and exploit their economic potential was to get them into the hands of farmers. 
The public sector took up the mantle of farm support by collecting and distributing seeds 
and plants to farmers to make of them whatever they could. Dr. David Fairchild 
                                                
48 See, Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123 (1889), 125. 
49 This economic mindset would become even clearer by the mid-twentieth century, when courts would 
establish the precedent of patents for products of nature that were isolated and purified in commercial 
quantities. For example, in 1926 researchers discovered that anemics benefited greatly from cattle liver, 
although they did not know why. Liver extract was available by 1947 but it was expensive and hard to 
tolerate for some anemics. After many years of trial and error, scientists succeeded in isolating a useful 
material for treatment of anemia. They identified it as a vitamin of the ‘B’ class and gave it the numeral 
extension of ‘12’ since that was the next number in line. Everyone else had been searching for anemia 
treatment in liver, but those who ultimately discovered the answer in vitamin B12 had found it in other 
substances and applied for patents on the B12 compositions. The applicants did not apply to patent 
crystalline B12 in its natural state nor did they seek patents on B12 derived from other sources. A lower 
Federal Court of Appeals denied the patent, holding that what had been produced was a product of nature. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. There was no question that vitamin B12 occurred in nature. 
It could be found in trace amounts in cattle and was also produced by certain microorganisms. It had no 
utility in its naturally occurring state for two reasons, however. First, not enough B12 was produced in 
nature to be commercially useful. Second, the B12 produced in nature was not pure. The Court ruled that 
the patent applicants had created pure vitamin B12 in commercial quantities, thus making it new and 
useful. The Court further ruled that nothing in the patent law precluded a patent on a composition of natural 
products since, after all, nature provided the source material for everything that was patented. See, Merck v. 
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir 1958). 
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summarized the dynamic in an 1898 Department of Agriculture publication: “Rapid 
development of any new country is due to discovery of soil and climate suitable to 
growth of introduced food plants and seldom to the development of endemic species. So 
thoroughly has this fact been recognized by all colonizing nations that they have 
established botanic gardens in their new colonies, one important function of which is to 
secure and distribute exotic economic plants throughout the colony.”50 Colonial America 
is a case study of this dynamic, being poor in economic crops but rich in fertile land.51 In 
the nineteenth century, the majority of Americans either lived on farms or depended on 
agriculture for their well-being. Farmers routinely sought new and heartier varieties of 
plants in the interest of both subsistence and economic opportunity. Colonial assemblies 
helped by appropriating funds to buy seeds as they were able.52 By 1731, the city of 
Philadelphia had established a botanical garden and a systematic plant and seed 
distribution method. Congress got into the act later on, allocating money in 1817 for the 
introduction of olives.53 Overall, however, seed collection lay within the purview of 
enthusiasts and practical minded bureaucrats who appended the activity onto the primary 
duties of Americans traveling internationally.  
Private enthusiasts such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison used their 
reputation and connections to obtain seeds. Jefferson sent back new varieties of grass, 
rice, peppers and trees from France. Benjamin Franklin similarly took advantage of his 
travels to Europe to collect seeds and cuttings. In 1819 and 1827 respectively, Secretary 
                                                
50 Quoted in Knowles A. Ryerson, “History and Significance of the Foreign Plant Introduction Work of the 
United States Department of Agriculture,” Agricultural History, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Jul., 1933), 111. 
51 Knowles A. Ryerson, “Plant Introductions,” Agricultural History, Vol. 50, No. 1, Bicentennial 
Symposium: Two Centuries of American Agriculture (Jan., 1976), 248. 
52 Ryerson, “History and Significance of the Foreign Plant Introduction Work of the United States 
Department of Agriculture,” 112. 
53 Ibid. 
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of the Treasury William Crawford and President John Quincy Adams issued specific 
instruction to American consuls in foreign countries to send useful new plants back to the 
United States as well as any new inventions.54 Congress authorized naval expeditions for 
the express purpose of seed collection in 1838 and 1849.55 This was work that a simple 
farmer could not perform and which the commercial marketplace had not embraced.  
 Ironically, seed distribution became a prominent feature of the patent office in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. No faction, government or private, sought to connect 
seeds with the primary function of patent administrators. Seeds did not represent a stand-
alone commodity; they were inputs to be combined with sun, water and labor to produce 
something with economic value. That one variety of plant performed better than another 
was economically relevant to farmers only after the harvest, not before.  
 Henry Ellsworth formalized seed distribution through the patent office. Following 
the 1836 revisions to the patent law, President Andrew Jackson named Ellsworth as the 
first Commissioner of Patents.56 Like Jefferson, Ellsworth brought a personal enthusiasm 
for progressive agriculture into his government life and it fit well with his new job in the 
patent office.57 A former Secretary of the Hartford County Agricultural Society and 
owner of large tracts of land stretching from Michigan to Iowa, Ellsworth quickly 
recognized an opportunity to use his position in the Patent Office to assist American 
                                                
54 Ibid., 113. 
55 Jack Ralph Kloppenburg, Jr., First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1492-2000 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 55-56. 
56 Ellsworth was a Connecticut native who came from political stock. His father, Oliver Ellsworth, had 
served as the first United States Chief Justice in the Washington administration. A Yale educated lawyer, 
Ellsworth had previously served as Commissioner of Indian Affairs for Southwest Arkansas. He was also 
an avid farmer and outdoorsman fascinated with the mechanics and science of agriculture. Earle D. Ross, 
“The United States Department of Agriculture during the Commissionership: A Study in Politics, 
Administration, and Technology, 1862-1889,” Agricultural History, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Jul., 1946), 130. 
57 T. Swann Harding, “Henry L. Ellsworth, Commissioner of Patents,” Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 
22, No. 3 (Aug., 1940), 662. 
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farmers in the areas of seeds and statistics.58 To Henry Ellsworth’s way of thinking, the 
Constitutional mandate behind patents - to promote progress in science and the useful arts 
– was naturally linked to the dominant occupation of the day: agriculture. How could one 
comply with the charge of promoting progress and not be an advocate for better 
farming?59 Ellsworth believed that encouraging more use by farmers of novel plants was 
just as important as encouraging new inventions.60  
 Ellsworth had plenty with which to work on this charge. Anything new or 
interesting floating around Washington eventually found its way to the Patent Office by 
default, whether intended as the subject of a patent or not. The office became something 
of a storehouse of random information. Similarly, the patent office became a source of 
information for people with questions who assumed that an office dedicated to new and 
original ideas was the place to obtain information and advice. Ellsworth established an 
informal program within the Patent Office to distribute seeds to farmers free of charge 
using the Congressional franking privilege.61 Farmers represented the only constituency 
with the ability to breed new varieties on a large scale. These farmers bore the risk, 
reaping the benefits of good results and dealing with the impact of failures.62 Their fields 
were the experimental farms that would one day be the turf of commercial and college 
breeders. They did not view themselves as the owners of beneficial new varieties, 
however. They intuitively shared the successes with friends and neighbors through a 
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cultural dynamic that had existed for centuries.  
 Ellsworth quickly took his passion for agriculture to the halls of Congress in an 
attempt to present lawmakers with a new vision of government’s role toward good and 
profitable agriculture. In his 1837 Annual Report, Ellsworth noted that Congress seemed 
to view husbandry as a natural blessing that required no aid from legislation.63 Up to that 
point, those who studied the science of farming did so largely as hobbyists. To most 
people, farming was an act of human nature as natural as walking or giving birth. One 
would no more subsidize it than one would pay people to breathe. Ellsworth disagreed, 
maintaining that government policy, while being kind to commercial manufacturers of 
agricultural machines and implements, had neglected the practice of agriculture. He noted 
significant inventor attention to machines and implements for agriculture.64 Agriculture 
had benefited from many of these inventions, which had displaced laborers while 
increasing yields.65 It was the practice of farming, however, that remained the lifeblood 
of the United States economy and made the commercial and manufacturing sectors 
viable.66 Ellsworth believed that a formal government system of seed selection and 
distribution could improve yields by twenty percent. He estimated that a ten percent 
increase in wheat yields would add twenty million dollars to the national economy by 
decreasing imports and increasing exports.67 
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 By 1839, the patent office budget included funding for collection and distribution 
of seeds, plants and agricultural statistics. Within ten years, the patent office was mailing 
out sixty thousand packets of seeds per year.68 Patent Office employee Joseph Hold took 
the office of Postmaster General and immediately took up the cause to make it simple and 
cheap to send seeds and cuttings through the US mail, thus opening the door to the mail 
order seed business.69 
Patents Office critics questioned the new custodians of agricultural data and 
seeds. They branded ‘Patent Office Agriculture’ as wasteful, inaccurate and 
incompetent.70 Critics did not question the need for such services, only the poor manner 
in which the Patent Office handled them. In spite of its detractors, the Patent Office 
endured as the distributor of seeds and plants, as well as the publisher of agriculture 
statistics, from 1836 to 1862.71 Critics correctly pointed out the need for either more 
funding or else a stand-alone office dedicated to agriculture. Patent Office commissioners 
did not turn the issue into a turf war. In fact, its Agriculture Division advocated vocally 
for a federal bureau of agriculture.72  
Southern Congressmen opposed federal legislation to create a bureau of 
agriculture, claiming it beyond the Constitutional grant of power. The federal 
government, in their estimation, had no business undertaking the care of agriculture, 
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something they saw as being under the banner of state sovereignty. Supporters of more 
federal money for agriculture echoed the patent office view, which was philosophically 
wedded to free labor and scientific farming practices. They wanted to bring a distinctly 
northern personality to southern farming. The combination of science and farmers’ labor 
would, in the words of Representative James Campbell of Pennsylvania, “encourage, 
protect and elevate the noblest race of men god ever placed upon his footstool – the 
laborious, free and independent American farmer.”73 With the country mired in the Civil 
War and southern representation no longer present, Congress established a stand-alone 
Department of Agriculture with passage of the Organic Act of 1862.74 Congress thus 
codified the long informal function of seed gathering and distribution but left it squarely 
in the realm of public aid to farmers. The Organic Act stated in its pre-amble: “Among 
the duties of the new Department of Agriculture are to: procure, propagate and distribute 
among the people new and valuable seeds and plants.” Congress also directed the 
Commissioner of Agriculture to: “collect as he may be able new and valuable seeds and 
plants; to test by cultivation the value of such of them as may require such tests; to 
propagate such as may be worthy of propagation and distribute them among 
agriculturists.”75 With passage of the Organic Act, the government moved from a 
collector and distributor of seeds to a tester and propagator. The federal government had 
entered the business of plant breeding as a public service to America’s farmers.  
Congress acknowledged in a somewhat scolding tone the lack of serious and 
formalized effort in government seed distribution, and in the same breath reinforced the 
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traditional perception that plants had nothing to do with patents: “A small appropriation 
is indeed annually made for the distribution of seeds and plants. This has been done under 
the supervision of the Commissioner of Patents, whose leading and engrossing business 
is in another direction. With this department, agriculture has no necessary or even natural 
connection. It has been tolerated rather than fostered and has suffered often from neglect 
and mismanagement.” Congress also noted that it had largely ignored this critical part of 
the United States economy: “[F]arming interest is the basis of all other interests and the 
primary source of national prosperity”76 Abraham Lincoln appointed a personal friend, 
Isaac Newton, to serve as the first Commissioner of Agriculture. Newton lost no time in 
trying to further educate Congress as to the importance of agriculture in the national 
economy, stressing that it was the nation’s primary source of wealth and that: “there is no 
clearer principal of political economy than – as the farmer is enriched, all other classes 
prosper.”77  
 Despite the Congressional scolding of the Patent Office for doing what no one else 
was willing to do, Congress gave the Department of Agriculture essentially the same 
charge: distribute information and seeds. Southern and western farmers welcomed the 
assistance while eastern farmers and private seed dealers grumbled at the thought of a 
government funded seed store.78 The Department of Agriculture had established direct 
seed exchange programs with Europe, Asia and South America by 1868.79  
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Farmers dominated the seed market thru the nineteenth century, helped along by 
the invention of the refrigerated rail car in 1875, which fostered large-scale commercial 
production of vegetables. Although the private seed market was beginning to flourish, it 
had strong competition. Government seed was not only free but also came with the 
government’s imprimatur guaranteeing the best quality. By 1898, the Department of 
Agriculture under James Wilson had established the Section of Seed and Plant 
Introduction, the first official agricultural organization of its kind whose activities were 
devoted exclusively to plant introduction. By 1901, Congress had folded it into the 
Bureau of Plant Industry.80 Its focus was distribution of seeds to farmers for the purpose 
of growing crops. It did not yield scientific results.81 Still, the Bureau, like the public 
universities and the Department of Agriculture, was an institution government designed 
to spur economic advancement by helping farmers help themselves and thus the 
economy.82  
By the opening of the twentieth century, both patent administration and 
agricultural policy worked to build a strong economy by bringing information and 
products into greater public use. In the case of invention, it did so by exclusivity. In the 
case of agriculture, it did so through free seeds. In the latter case, the seeds began and 
ended in the public domain and so there was no need to seek them out or to connect them 
to exclusivity. This thinking soon changed as the nursery industry gained economic and 
political power and plant breeding became formal and result oriented. Plants and patents 
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came together when breeders began to assert that directed breeding entailed a creative 
spirit no different than that of the inventor and therefore deserved the same economic 
advantages. 
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CHAPTER 2. PLANT BREEDING AND PATENTS IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY: A MATTER OF SEX AND POLITICS 
 
From the birth of patent law in 1790, through the nineteenth century and up to 
1930, American culture painted a clear line between plants and patents. Both represented 
economic value and both formed a part of government policy primarily for that reason. 
Unlike inventions, however, lawmakers, regulators and the courts viewed plants as 
essentially public property. No need existed for Congress to tempt seeds into the public 
domain by offering exclusivity to their owners. Seeds resided in the public domain 
through natural processes and, even if a unique variety had market value, it would self- 
replicate. The challenge for government, therefore, was to get seeds into the hands of 
those who would accept the risk of experimentation in the hope of greater economic 
benefit. The federal government took up this challenge in the new Department of 
Agriculture, continuing and expanding work that began in the patent office.  
This chapter will examine the enactment by Congress of two significant pieces of 
legislation that extended intellectual property protection to plants. The Plant Patent Act of 
1930 extended patent protection to asexually produced plants. It represented the first and 
only successful effort to extend specific patent protection to plants by an Act of 
Congress. The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 extended patent-type protection to 
open-pollinated plants in 1970. The United States Supreme Court made asexually 
produced plants eligible for patent protection in 1985.  
The historical record on the Plant Patent Act of 1930 indicates that the industry 
advocates who lobbied for its passage, the Congress that debated and approved it, and the 
Hoover administration that stood by with no objection all saw within the law not only a 
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new and powerful economic tool for the private sector but also an opportunity to curb 
government expenditures as the Great Depression loomed over the country. The Plant 
Patent Act represented a move to privatize the cost of seed research by improving its 
economic potential. Historically, the government had simply collected and distributed 
new and promising seeds. Later, the government socialized the development cost of seed 
improvement by funding breeding programs in the Department of Agriculture. By  
moving plants partially into the patent system in 1930, the government created an 
incentive for the private sector to take on a greater share of the development cost by 
giving it a tool to better protect marketable results. In other words, the marriage of plants 
and patents was, on multiple levels, an economic solution to an economic problem.  
The historical perception of the meaning and purpose of patents served to guide 
the debate. To the extent that plants and seeds possessed an identity in the halls of 
government, that identity was economic as well. Transferring them to the Patent Act did 
not fundamentally change their identity; it simply changed their strategic use within that 
identity. With patent protection, seeds could not only help farmers economically, but 
private breeders as well. The story begins with the nursery industry and Luther Burbank.    
Asexual Breeding 
Domestication of plants dates back ten thousand years to the Neolithic period. As 
hunter-gatherers became farmers and settled in areas with different weather and soil 
conditions, they began to create unique crops, known as landraces, simply by selecting 
those that performed the best under the given conditions.1 These farmers did not use 
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modern breeding techniques and they cannot be called breeders in the sense that they set 
out to produce new varieties. They nevertheless ‘improved’ plants by selection for 
thousands of years.2 As a result, the earth is full of unique landraces and traditional 
knowledge, which continue to inform farmers and plant breeders.3  
Directed plant breeding originated from the work of Gregor Mendel, a nineteenth 
century cleric who studied rules of heredity in 1865, while the new Department of 
Agriculture was in its infancy. Academia and science, being more enamored at the time 
with Darwin and pangenesis, ignored or forgot about Mendel’s work and Mendel himself 
set it aside to dedicate more time to his church duties. Scientists rediscovered Mendel in 
the early twentieth century as their independent experiments found explanation and 
validation in his writings.4 More important, they began to use Mendel’s laws proactively 
to bring about a paradigm shift in plant breeding, converting it from an observational 
exercise where one looked for a desired trait, to a science where one set out to create a 
desired trait in an orderly manner. Although time intensive, prone to hit and miss results 
and very much an intuitive art, breeding took its first steps away from the realm of nature 
and into the realm of science. A specialized industry began to emerge: the plant breeder 
operating on a large scale to make profit not from yields but from sales of custom 
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designed inputs. Plant breeders enhanced the economic potential of seeds as well as the 
cost of producing those seeds. Breeders transformed the traditional territory of hobbyists 
and gentlemen farmers into a potentially lucrative commercial enterprise. What was once 
a secondary aspect of farming – the farmer’s keen eye for the best looking plants – 
became a stand alone endeavor which, like the most successful works of inventors, 
required time, money and resources. In short, the plant breeder began to take on some 
characteristics of the inventor. As plant breeding re-emerged and evolved from an 
incident of farming to a scientific and commercial enterprise, businessmen began to see 
plants and seeds more naturally within the scope of commercial markets and patent law.  
Commercial seed and plant sales still lagged behind the public sector. Although 
Mendel’s work expanded the commercial potential of plant breeding, it found a more 
natural home within the land grant university system and its dedication to assisting the 
farmer as a matter of public policy. The Organic Act signaled recognition by Congress 
that farming warranted significant attention from the mechanism of government, 
including finding and propagating seeds. Farmers and the government continued to view 
seed varieties and breeding as an agricultural input designed to make crops as robust as 
possible, no different than harrowing and spreading manure. Congress placed research 
within the three-legged stool of land-grant colleges, agricultural experimental stations 
and the cooperative extension service, thus firmly grounding agricultural improvement in 
the public sector.5 One way to close this gap was for private interests to have exclusive 
rights to their unique plant varieties.  
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Lobbyists for the nursery industry drafted and championed the Plant Patent Act of 
1930. Marketing new varieties of trees, fruits, vegetables and flowers was historically 
difficult for nurserymen, who could spend years establishing superior plants only to see 
their work quickly lose its economic value. To sell a new variety of plant that re-
produced itself asexually was to give the buyer not only the plant but also the tools to 
produce an endless supply of identical copies. Upon release of a new variety to the 
public, a competing nurseryman or even a hobbyist could produce an identical copy with 
a clipping or bud from the original. A successful nursery needed to reap its profit quickly 
before its new creation became commonplace. A breeder or nurseryman extracted profit 
from a new variety during an extremely narrow window of opportunity in which he 
accumulated plant stock, guarded it carefully and then sold the first generation of new 
plants for as much as possible. As appreciation for the cost and skills of plant breeding 
grew, and as anger and frustration on the part of plant breeders intensified, the move to 
protect the nursery industry gained momentum. As early as 1906, breeders argued to 
Congress that a new variety of plant was a biological innovation no different than a 
mechanical one in the sense that both derived from human effort and ingenuity.6 Still, 
opponents could argue that a plant was a product of nature, more discovered than 
invented. Given the historical view of plants, the nursery industry found itself in a gray 
area, constantly retreating to an argument foreign to the patent lexicon: fairness. 
Historically, there was nothing fair about the patent bargain. The public struck its bargain 
of exclusivity for information with the person who filed the successful application, not 
the person who did the most work or was most deserving. In order to use fairness to tip 
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the issue in favor of action, the nursery industry needed a victim and an injustice that 
resonated with lawmakers. They found both in Luther Burbank. 
Of Heroes and Horticulture 
 
Between 1873 and 1925, Luther Burbank attached his name to over eight hundred 
varieties of fruit, vegetable, flower, nut and grain. Burbank led horticulture into the arena 
of science and in so doing made it an economic force. As America embraced 
progressivism, Burbank illustrated it by using science not only to understand nature but 
also to manipulate it. A self described ‘infidel’ who favored the church of nature over the 
church of pews and steeples, Luther Burbank longed for the right to seek patent 
protection for his plants, something he thought he deserved and that would give him fair 
compensation for his work.7 He eventually received it posthumously in 1930 in partial 
tribute to his life’s work. Because Burbank was especially gifted in the art of breeding, 
his name and reputation opened doors in both the marketplace and in the halls of 
Congress. Appending his legacy to the Plant Patent Act of 1930 was a masterstroke on 
the part of industry lobbyists. The Plant Patent Act of 1930 not only placed the nursery 
industry on stronger economic footing, it symbolically atoned for the economic injustices 
visited on Luther Burbank.  
In 1875, a seed dealer named J. H. Gregory paid Burbank $250 for the excusive 
right to propagate and sell the new Burbank Seedling potato.8 Burbank retained ten of the 
tubers and continued to breed them. He advertised the results for retail sale in 1878 but 
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met resistance from the public due to their pale color. The public eventually accepted the 
Burbank spuds which became the number one potato grown on the west coast. By that 
time, however, Burbank had long ago lost any ability to compete with his own creation. 
No one needed to buy from him when so many others cultivated the identical potato.9  
Burbank’s talents and methods were unique. In 1904, despite his complete lack of 
academic pedigree, Burbank received the largest individual grant then to date, ten 
thousand dollars annually, from the Carnegie Foundation “for the purpose of fostering 
your experimental investigations in the evolution of plants.”10 The Carnegie trustees 
appointed George Harrison Shull, a geneticist who worked at a Carnegie-supported 
experimental farm, to study Burbank’s methods and reduce them to a scientific process. 
The effort failed when Shull ultimately concluded that the bulk of Burbank’s success was 
due to cross-fertilization, a keen eye for variation and selection and personal habits of 
concentration.11 
Burbank’s talent for self-promotion and drive for success matched his skill at 
breeding. He was ever aware that a national reputation was a good business asset.12 
Burbank was also no stranger to invention and its potential in the business world. In 
1865, at age sixteen, he purchased a book on how to obtain patents.13 On May 1, 1892, 
Burbank wrote a letter to Congressman Thomas J. Geary, ostensibly to comment on a 
piece of pending immigration legislation but that appeared to have been an excuse to talk 
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patents, which dominated the correspondence. In the letter, Burbank complained to Geary 
that the state of horticultural science was at least fifty years behind where it would be 
with the benefit of patent protection.14 In 1911 Burbank wrote in a pamphlet that despite 
having dumped nearly a quarter million dollars of his own money into his work, he had 
reaped back less than ten percent of that amount, despite creating products that generated 
economic value in the millions of dollars. Burbank cryptically professed to be glad that 
patents had never been available, citing the joy of good work as a superior reward to 
financial gain and noting that his good business sense had never left him ‘stranded’ as it 
had most others who tried their hand at the same kind of work.15 
Burbank was no stranger to the halls of Congress, a fact that must have helped 
immensely as Congress debated the Plant Patent Act. Anything to which he lent his name 
had instant credibility among lawmakers, even when his predictions turned out to be pie 
in the sky. The spineless cactus case provided an ideal case study of Burbank’s reputation 
and power in Congress. Burbank was fascinated by the possibility of developing a 
spineless cactus to be used as cattle feed and a water source. For a brief time, Burbank 
captivated the world with his vision of turning arid land into grazing pasture by breeding 
the thorn out of the cactus.16 In 1907, Burbank published a catalogue on plant creations 
for arid regions. In it, Burbank declared not only that there was not the least doubt that he 
could produce a spineless cactus, but also that it “will be the most important plant on 
earth for arid regions.” Burbank’s optimism and reputation set mouths watering and 
started money flowing.17 Without patent protection, however, Burbank faced the threat of 
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losing his work within a few months of releasing it to the world. In an effort to secure his 
profits, he formed The Thornless Cactus Farming Company and sold the rights to twenty-
seven varieties of cacti for $27,000.18  
Congress jumped on the bandwagon as well. In 1912, claiming a desire to rectify 
disparaging comments about Burbank made by “a man connected with the Department of 
Agriculture,” but also perhaps to set the stage for soon-to-be-introduced legislation, 
Representative Everis Anson Hayes of California took the House floor and delivered a 
glowing endorsement of Burbank’s work. He noted that Burbank was no longer in the 
nursery business but simply sold his work to others for mass production and retail sale. 
Despite the fact that Burbank was on the verge of an agreement that would provide him 
thirty thousand dollars down and fifteen thousand dollars a year, Hayes painted Burbank 
as a humble toiler in his experimental gardens, wanting nothing more than to help 
mankind. America, Hayes warned, stood on the verge of losing that largess due to 
Burbank’s lone support of his own work: “A thousand dollars would be a large price for 
him to receive for even the best of his work, so that while the work of Mr. Burbank has 
enriched others and blessed humanity, he himself has received but very scanty 
remuneration. . . . [he] has put all the money he receives . . . about a quarter of a million 
dollars, into his work . . . His habits are plain and he does not wish for more. There are 
important experiments, however . . . which may never be completed owing to lack of 
funds.”19 Following a long recital of Burbank accomplishments, Hayes moved to the 
spineless cactus. Even though the Department of Agriculture had sent its experts around 
the world to find the ideal spineless cactus, and had produced a marginally useful plant, 
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the Department “ . . . in spite of all its organization and its wealth . . .has not obtained a 
cactus that is in any respect the equal of the cactus produced by Mr. Burbank single 
handed.” Hayes concluded by quoting Burbank’s own outrageous statement that the 
spineless cactus “is worth more than the Burbank potatoes and all my other productions 
combined.”20  
Four months later, sponsors placed H.R. 23043 on the House Calendar. The bill 
authorized Burbank to select, with certain exceptions, up to twelve sections (7680 acres) 
of federal land in the western United States with payment of between $1.25 and $2.50 per 
acre to be deferred for five years. The land had to be semiarid, nonmineral, nonirrigable 
and unsuitable for agricultural purposes under its then present condition. In order to 
purchase the land, Burbank had to establish at least one hundred thousand growing 
spineless cacti plants on the land for at least two years. The House summarily passed the 
bill with minor committee amendments and without debate or comment.21 The bill 
arrived on the Senate floor two months later. Senator McCumber of North Dakota 
objected to the special privilege granted Burbank. He noted with some curiosity that the 
Committee on Public Lands, rather than the Committee on Agriculture, had shepherded 
the bill. Senator Fall noted that Burbank had set up a corporation to conduct the work that 
he was alleged to be doing “at his own expense.” He also noted that attempts in New 
Mexico to obtain Burbank specimens for propagation were unsuccessful as “someone 
claims to have the right to handle the spineless cactus under propagation by Mr. Burbank; 
and we can get it only by paying a royalty of so much a year.” He also noted that the 
Department of Agriculture claimed at least partial authorship of the Burbank spineless 
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cacti by having worked in partnership with Burbank on its propagation. Despite these 
allegations, the time allotted for floor debate expired and the bill passed without further 
comment.22 While the spineless cacti enjoyed some success overseas, they failed in the 
United States for a number of reasons. Cattlemen with high demand and little patience 
did not like the slow growth and were not equipped to provide the irrigation the plants 
required. Even worse, Burbank had transferred responsibilities for his retail sales 
operation to businessmen hoping to cash in on his name. These men knew little about 
marketing live plants. Unable to keep up with demand for Burbank products, they simply 
acquired cacti from any source, including spined cacti that they smoothed by hand and 
sold as spineless. The combination of growing demands and fraud sank the program.23     
This series of events, eighteen years before passage of the Plant Patent Act, demonstrate 
the power of the name Burbank in matters of agriculture policy.  
Stark Brothers Nursery took up the scientific and financial legacy left to them by 
Luther Burbank and parlayed it into the Plant Patent Act of 1930. Stark Brothers was the 
largest seed breeder in the United States in the early twentieth century and the founder’s 
grandson, Paul Stark, counted Luther Burbank as a friend and peer. The Stark family had 
been in the nursery business ever since James Stark left Kentucky with a saddlebag full 
of apple tree shoots and planted them in his first nursery in Louisiana, Missouri.24 The 
shoot, or scion, from a tree produced an identical tree for generations on end. The Stark 
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family built its nursery empire through tireless searching for what grandson Paul Stark 
called bud sports or single freak limbs that produced one branch of freak fruit on an 
otherwise unremarkable tree.25 For example, Paul’s father, Clarence Stark mass-produced 
the Delicious apple from a single tree found in Winterset, Iowa. His use of sports from 
the apple tree resulted in nineteen million descendent trees around the world.26 Paul Stark 
followed suit with the Golden Delicious Apple, which he tracked in 1915 to a single tree 
in Odessa, West Virginia. He promptly offered five thousand dollars for the tree and had 
a metal cage built around it with guarded access limited to certified representatives of 
Stark Brothers Nursery.27 From that single tree, Stark Brothers produced a new line of 
fruit. These examples illustrate the advantages and pitfalls of asexual reproduction. Since 
a competent breeder could use a single tree to produce an endless succession of progeny, 
profit lay in control and secrecy.  
Following his death in 1926, Luther Burbank’s widow leased Burbank’s 
experimental farms, including all of the secrets growing there, to the Stark family. 
Included in the lease was the nurseryman’s holy grail: Luther Burbank’s seed trunk, 
which contained seeds for hundreds of Burbank’s creations, all of which he had 
developed alone and in complete secrecy. The Starks established a new experimental 
garden and, in one season, in addition to hundreds of rare fruits, produced 1,671 
vegetables, flowers and grains, many of which had been previously unknown in the world 
of horticulture, let alone within the general public.28 The varieties were worth a fortune if 
Stark could secure exclusive rights to them.  
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A Man Honored and a Problem Solved 
 
American nurserymen had talked up patents for new plant varieties since the 
1860s, always bumping up against the twin barriers of patenting a product of nature, 
which the courts abhorred, and the inability to comply with the patent application 
requirement of submitting an adequate description of the invention.29 Luther Burbank 
arguably suffered more than anyone from this barrier. Between 1893 and the time of his 
death, Burbank had introduced hundreds of new varieties of tree, vegetables, fruits and 
flowers, but had never received a patent.30 Burbank went public with his frustrations in 
1898 with a letter stating that pirates and imitators were driving him out of business.31 In 
1906 the horticulture industry tried to generate Congressional interest in a plant patent 
bill but the effort died quietly.32 
In 1929, Paul Stark formed and served as president of a lobbying group called 
The National Committee on Plant Patents, an offshoot of the American Association of 
Nurserymen. From this vantage point, Stark drafted and served as the prime catalyst 
behind the Plant Patent Act of 1930.33 Advocates for the Plant Patent Act conceived and 
executed an impressive strategy of wrapping the issue of plant patents around the 
economic well-being of the nursery industry, relief from government support and righting 
a wrong perpetrated on an American icon. The law, coming six months after the 1929 
stock market crash, was a combination of Depression-era relief, well-organized lobbying 
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and tribute to Luther Burbank.34 By 1930, the United States was beginning its long 
struggle through the Great Depression. Droughts in 1930 and 1931 compounded issues of 
hunger and government relief. Observers viewed the Plant Patent bill as a farmer relief 
act that would stimulate private investment in plant breeding and reduce the need for 
government assistance in that particular field.35 The bill was a perfect fit for Herbert 
Hoover who, both as Secretary of Commerce and as President, adamantly opposed 
government relief and price controls. The Plant Patent Act complimented Hoover’s view 
that farming in America was inefficient but could be corrected if farmers would act more 
like businessmen.36 
Senator John Townsend, Jr. of Delaware introduced the bill in February of 1930. 
In addition to being a United States Senator, Townsend also owned thirteen thousand 
acres of apple orchards.37 The American Farm Bureau Federation and the National 
Grange voiced support for the bill.38 The Secretary of Agriculture responded favorably 
while the Secretary of Commerce referred the bill to the Commissioner of Patents.39 
Luther Burbank provided a natural and sentimental focus for the lobbying effort. 
The Plant Patent Act became, in large part, a tribute to the man who had famously said 
before his death: “A man can patent a mousetrap or copyright a nasty song, bit if he gives 
the word a new fruit . . . he will be fortunate if he is rewarded by so much as having his 
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name connected with the result.”40 Burbank’s pristine image reflected on the breeding 
industry, which Congress and the media portrayed as “plant loving fanatics,” “zealots” 
who worked for “insulting wages” and freely gave their discoveries to the world.41  
The House Committee on Patents conducted a hearing prior to issuing its report. 
Representative Fred Purnell of Indiana reiterated the desire to put agriculture on complete 
parity insofar as possible with industry and labor. No less a giant than Thomas Edison 
voiced support for the bill, a fact that Purnell used to great effect: “we are all particularly 
proud to have the endorsement of one of America’s, one of the world’s, foremost 
inventors, Thomas A. Edison.”42 In his message, Edison urged Congress to “Give plant 
breeders the same status as mechanical and chemical inventors now have through the 
patent law.”43 Edison added: “Nothing that Congress could do to help farming would be 
of greater value and permanence than to give the plant breeder the same status as the 
mechanical and chemical inventors now have through the patent law. There are but few 
plant breeders. The bill will, I feel sure, give us many Burbanks.”44 Jumping on Edison’s 
prediction that the bill would give the nation many new Burbanks, Purnell segued into an 
adoring summary of Burbank’s life “known to almost every schoolboy” and a eulogy to 
others who tried to follow in his footsteps but “died in comparative poverty.”45 Perhaps 
the most sobering comment entered into the record were the words of Burbank himself, 
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provided courtesy of his widow who forwarded a manuscript page authored by her late 
husband in which he observed “I would hesitate to advise a young man, no matter how 
gifted or devoted, to adopt plant breeding as a life work until America takes some action 
to protect his unquestioned rights to some benefit from his achievements.”46 
Burbank’s widow added her own thoughts to those of her husband: “Have just 
received welcome news of political activity looking into protection of plant breeders and 
producers of new fruit by patent. As you probably know, this was one of Luther 
Burbank’s most cherished hopes. He said repeatedly that until the government made 
some such provision for ensuring experimenter or breeder reasonable protection, the 
incentive to creative work with plants was slight and independent plant breeding would 
be held back to the great detriment of horticulture.”47 Commenting on the new law in 
1930 a few months before its enactment, Science magazine pounded the drum of fair 
compensation for hard effort: “occasionally a good size fortune will be paid for a half-
dozen strawberry plants but this is a rare exception; usually the plant originator gets little 
or nothing. . . . the first price is all he ever receives. In a few years, the plant is anybody’s 
plant . . .”48  
An elephant remained in the living room, however. The patent law was, by design 
and interpretation, a cold-blooded creature. Concepts of fairness, tribute and reward were 
anathema to patent law. The public demanded something new and useful for its grant of 
temporary exclusivity. The courts had repeatedly admonished that effort alone did not 
warrant exclusive rights when it merely uncovered what nature had produced. The 
Commissioner of Patents, Thomas Robertson, aptly summarized this problem in his 
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comments on the proposed bill. Although he pledged support for the bill, Robertson 
warned that it could be found unconstitutional if it were used to grant patents to 
applicants who simply discovered a new variety of plant growing in nature and 
reproduced it asexually via the well-known art of grafting.49 Robertson, in his comments, 
had in fact described the precise methodology of nurserymen for which they sought 
patent protection. The House Committee report on the Plant Patent Act nevertheless 
supported patentability of plants by claiming that a new plant variety from cultivation, 
having been created through human agency, was a ‘discovery’ within the meaning of 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.50 Unlike discovery of a wholly formed and useful 
mineral in the earth, nature would not necessarily re-produce a mutant plant or limb 
absent careful human cultivation, which ‘corrects’ the natural process to reproduce the 
desired result in large numbers.51   
The Senate Committee report was more pragmatic, stating that the purpose of the 
Act was to place agriculture “on a basis of economic equality with industry.”52 The 
Senate report also suggested that the bill would essentially privatize the nursery industry, 
theretofore dependent for the most part on government support for its survival. The bill 
would also bring down plant prices for buying public because breeders would no longer 
need to recoup all of their costs in a year or two but instead would enjoy seventeen years 
of exclusivity. An earlier draft had proposed a five-year plant patent. Those who were 
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well aware of the time and effort required to produce a new variety for market quickly 
rejected the idea.53  
A few members of Congress expressed doubts about the wisdom of allowing a 
patent on something produced in nature, particularly a plant that produced food. Echoing 
the philosophy of Paul Stark, the First Assistant Commissioner of Patents conceded that 
the Act could set the value of a twig at one million dollars.54  
In floor debate, lawmakers referred to the bill as “remarkable” and a “departure 
from anything we have ever done.”55 Senator Clarence Dill of Washington expressed 
grave doubts about the constitutionality of the bill’s provisions and the practical ability of 
humankind to “lay our hand on nature and say ‘You can go only this way and that 
way’”56 Representative Fiorello LaGuardia of New York voiced strong objection to the 
bill. His floor comments suggest that he was convinced that the language of the bill 
permitted seed patents and could be used to prevent a farmer from harvesting his own 
crops.57 Ultimately, however, the bill passed on a voice vote, framed primarily as 
economic stimulus legislation.58  
The bill contained limitations beyond asexual reproduction and the authors were 
vague in describing how plant patents would be administered by the Patent Office. The 
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bill applied to sports (bud variations), mutants (seed variations) and hybrids (breeding) if 
achieved through asexual reproduction. The qualities that made the plant new and useful 
came under the heading of distinctness, which could be found in habit, immunity, 
resistance, color, flavor, productivity, storage, perfume, form or ease of reproduction. 
Congress appears to have drawn a line at the idea of a patent on food per se. The bill 
excluded tubers, specifically potatoes and artichokes, since in those cases the thing sold 
as food was also the thing used to propagate the plant.59 Key to the debate that would 
ensue nearly fifty years later was new Section 162, which provided: “No plant patent 
shall be declared invalid for noncompliance with Section 112 of this title if the 
description is as complete as reasonably possible.”60 In other words, Congress 
acknowledged the fact that a plant breeder could not possibly provide specifications for a 
plant in the same way that an engineer could provide schematics for a steam engine.61 
The Hoover Administration viewed the Plant Patent Act as a non-event.62 On May 
16, 1930 the President’s Secretary forwarded the bill (S. 4015) to Hoover’s Commerce 
Secretary, Robert P. Lamont, who replied the next day stating, “I do not know of any 
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objections to its approval” and indicating that the Budget office would be investigating 
additional costs to the Patent Office for implementation and administration.63  
The new law re-united the Patent Office with the Department of Agriculture. The 
law provided that the President could direct the Secretary of Agriculture to furnish the 
Commissioner of Patents with information or to conduct research on his behalf in order to 
carry the law into effect.64 By October 13, the Patent Office was in need of that 
assistance. About eight weeks after issuance of the first plant patent, Lamont advised 
Hoover that “The Patent Office has received several applications under the new law and 
Commissioner Robertson feels that he should have the benefit of the assistance of the 
appropriate bureau or division of the Department of Agriculture.” The President signed 
an executive order to that effect five days later.65 In practice, patent applicants filed in 
duplicate with one copy going to the Patent Office and the other to the Department of 
Agriculture’s Horticultural Crops Research Branch, which reported on the novelty of the 
plant.66 It is perhaps not surprising that the Patent Office in the Hoover Administration 
did not immerse itself in the policy question of plant patents. As Secretary of Commerce, 
Hoover had sent a clear warning to the Patent Commissioner in 1928 stating that it was 
“possible that out of zeal and personal loyalty some of the members of your Bureau are 
engaged in political activities . . . I feel it is desirable that you pass out the word 
cautioning employees about any possible suspicion in this matter.”67 
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Reaction to the New Law 
The media generally viewed the new plant patent law with skepticism or 
disinterest, but also with little doubt as to its purpose. The law, good or bad, was designed 
to help an industry become more profitable. Both advocates and critics evaluated the law 
largely from the standpoint of its economic viability.  
In 1934, attorney Robert Starr Allyn published an abstract of the new law, which 
he called “a timely gesture of sympathy to the farmer and plant breeder, following closely 
on the heels of the decline of prices in 1929.”68 Even in 1934, the idea of a farmer having 
a role in patents was humorous to some. Starr, after noting the significant patent 
contributions of machinists, electricians, mechanics and engineers stated: “Even farmers 
are rewarded for implements and processes,” apparently forgetting that the Patent Office 
granted a significant number of early patents for agricultural implements likely invented 
by farmers or agricultural enthusiasts.69 
Despite the adulation of Burbank, critics did not envision the plant patent system 
working nearly so smoothly as predicted. Business Week magazine viewed the new law 
with trepidation. Patent law was designed for machines, which were precise and could be 
controlled. The combination of a complex patent system with “the variable mysteries of 
plant germination” and the potentially large profit now offered, created a potentially 
litigious debut for the new law.70 The Patent Office and the Department of Agriculture 
fully expected litigation over the matter and the magazine author agreed: “Nature isn’t 
going to alter her complex process just because Congress passes a law.”71 Another critic 
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noted that “The sudden passage of the Plant Patent Act of 1930 with very hasty 
consideration of the problems involved has created a situation which will require some 
time to clear.”72 According to those who damned with faint praise, Congress had righted 
an injustice in perfunctory manner. They had “enjoyed a momentary glow of 
righteousness and promptly forgot the matter.”73 In short, Congress had thrown a 
Depression-era bone to plant breeders in order to keep them away from government’s 
kitchen door, using posthumous tribute to Luther Burbank as a justification. As is often 
the case, Congress left the prickly details to the administrators in the Patent Office which 
likely wished that Burbank was still around to breed them out. 
Criticism of the new plant patents joined with leftist criticism of the entire patent 
system based on its growing penchant for red tape and approval of worthless inventions. 
In 1932, for example, World’s Work magazine took the patent office to task for its 
wasteful approach to fostering “the keen American instinct for contrivance.”74 It cited 
three significant problems. First, the process for obtaining a patent was slow. A 
potentially useful invention could be checked against a patent search, but the search 
would not include the thousands of applications pending at any given time, thus a patent 
application might infringe on a patent applied for and not yet granted but well ahead in 
the queue.75 Second was the tendency of the patent office to issue patents on inventions 
of dubious worth. Great Britain had granted 360,000 patents in 300 years where as the 
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United States had granted 1.8 million patents in 140 years.76 The patent-glut led to the 
third criticism. Since it fell to the patent holder to enforce his rights, the costly American 
system of jurisprudence favored the large corporation over the individual inventor. The 
1.8 million patents issued in the United States had generated fifteen thousand trial 
verdicts in addition to the estimated thirty thousand lawsuits that had been commenced 
but ultimately resolved prior to or during trial – a litigation rate of approximately 2.5%. 
Critics estimated that the American patent process, in addition to favoring the resource 
heavy corporation, transferred approximately one hundred million dollars in resources 
out of the field of invention and into the legal system.77  
The process was not only bulky and expensive but also decidedly industrial. Of 
the fifty-five outstanding American patents noted between 1791 and 1930, only three (the 
cotton gin, the reaper and barbed wire) had any direct connection to agriculture. The rest 
were industrial and technological, reflecting the course American had taken.78 In sum, by 
the time Congress added plant patents to the system, it was already heavily dominated by 
industrial sciences and showing its weakness as a driver of economic development.  
Other publications, however, expressed excitement about the possibilities for the 
new law, especially for deserving breeders. Writers in Popular Mechanics Magazine 
pointed out the delicate balance in creating new economic possibilities while preventing 
total disruption of the market, noting that the Plant Patent Act excluded plants reproduced 
by seeds and tubers - thus eliminating potatoes, wheat, corn, rye and oats - because “these 
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plants are such standard products that to grant the right to use any new varieties of them 
exclusively might so monopolize the market that skyrocket prices would prevail.”79   
The Patent Office issued Plant Patent No. 1 to Henry Bosenberg on August 18, 
1931 for a plant characterized as a “climbing or trailing rose.” The unique quality of the 
plant, as reflected in the published patent, consisted of nothing more than an assertion 
that the plant was “characterized by its everblooming habit.”80 Mr. Bosenberg disclaimed 
any right to the plant’s color or other physical characteristics, making claim only on its 
blooming capacity which he stated “provides a succession of blossoms on a single plant 
from about the end of May to the middle of November or until stopped by frost.”81 
Bosenberg conceded that he had developed the plant only in the latitude of New 
Brunswick, New Jersey by graftings from the then-famous Van Fleet Rose. Critics 
expressed skepticism and reiterated their concerns that the law’s vagueness, now evident 
in Plant Patent No. 1, begged for litigation.  
Orson D. Munn, editor of Scientific American and a member of the New York 
Bar, posed myriad questions about the enforceability of the patent based solely on the 
“everblooming” quality of a plant grown in only one place to date. Munn claimed that 
“the true value of a plant patent can be determined only after a legal battle has been 
fought and decided by the Supreme Court.”82 Others agreed, noting that the economic 
viability of a plant patent was far from settled. Any challenge would go to the United 
States Supreme Court only by writ of certiorari and then only if the case posed a 
significant legal issue subject to conflicting rulings in two or more of the ten federal 
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circuit courts of appeal.83 In other words, a safe and secure patent emerged only at the 
end of a long and costly road of litigation.    
The Patent Commissioner’s 1932 report to Congress contained a new data section 
entitled “Plant Patents” which, in its debut, listed seventeen plant patents issued out of 
68,585 total patents granted for the year.84 The Commissioner offered no comment on 
passage of the law in his narrative, despite the presence of a dedicated section entitled 
‘Aiding Industry.’85 
The nursery industry did not appear to harness the power of patents to the extent 
projected leading up to passage of the new law. By 1936, the patent office had issued 167 
plant patents, of which seventy-seven were for roses.86 Nor had the industry achieved an 
economic boom. The New York Times noted “the fear that patents might enable 
introducers to obtain exorbitant prices for new varieties has not been born out by the 
facts. Such a policy, with any article not an absolute necessity, would of course be 
suicidal.”87 The commercial nursery industry was also not the only constituency to 
exploit the law. In 1938, as the nation noted issuance by the patent office of the 300th 
plant patent, one of the leading plant ‘inventors’ was a New York chemist who had 
developed a valuable line of poplar trees, as well as General Electric which had 
developed a pure white lily by bombarding it with x-rays.88    
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The first court decision on a plant patent held that the patent could not be 
enforced against the producer of an identical plant if the plant was not produced from the 
patent holder’s stock.89 In essence the court permitted another breeder to discover another 
freak spur and use it to produce the same plant. Such was not possible for two inventors 
who happen to invent the same machine. The first one to the patent office won and the 
other lost. The opinion was consistent, however, with granting a patent for an alternate 
process that produced an identical object. In the case of the Plant Patent Act, the process 
(grafting) was not patented. The result (the plant itself) was the subject of the patent. 
Already one could observe the court struggling with difficulty of comparing two plants 
with the same appearance and trying to determine if one breeder infringed on another’s 
patent because the two plants looked alike.  
The Value of Silence: Henry Wallace and Hybrid Corn 
 
The potential economic impact of plant patents carried the day when Congress 
passed the new law in 1930. The historical record reveals a process by which supporters 
and skeptics evaluated the law primarily in terms of its impact on the marketplace. Even 
those who harbored doubts about the law focused their commentary on the time and cost 
of litigation as a potential foil to increased profit. A voice is missing in the historical 
record, however.    
                                                                                                                                            
Have Constitutional Rights,” New York Times, January 3, 1954, X31. See also, Bess Furman, “Behind The 
Scenes,” New York Times, March 14, 1954, X29. By 1963, the number of plant patents stood at 2,150, a 
miniscule number compared to the millions of patents issued, but the long term advantages to plant 
patenting was noted. Before the Act, the United States lagged in plant breeding with most new varieties 
coming from Europe. By 1963, over half of the best plant breeders, especially those who bred roses, resided 
in the United Sates. See, George M. Hart, “The Plant Patent Story,” New York Times, April 14, 1963, 128.    
89 Roger Sherman Hoar, Patent Tactics and Law (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1950), 36. 
(Citing Cole v. Youdath, 31 P.Q. 95, March 1937) 
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An issue of agriculture policy in the late 1920s should have drawn the attention 
and comment of Henry A. Wallace and Wallace’s Farmer magazine.90 Henry Wallace 
possessed not only the scientific knowledge but also the public reputation and mass 
media platform to be a significant voice on any agricultural issue, but commentary from 
the seed-corn sector on plant patents was minimal and disinterested. The history of 
sexually bred hybrid seeds during this same era sheds light on why this may have been 
the case. First, breeders of open pollinated plants saw no economic advantage to spending 
political capital in pursuit of patents. The science of hybrid breeding carried its own tools 
for maintaining exclusivity. Second, the process of sexual plant breeding operated within 
a completely different procedural paradigm then asexual breeding, one that required 
significant sharing of materials among the breeding community. Finally, the scientific 
structure and performance of hybrid seeds made them unlikely candidates for patent 
protection because of their ever-changing nature. Therefore, the same economic 
motivations that pushed asexual breeding into the halls of Congress in 1930, acted to 
keep sexual breeding out. Both constituencies wanted the same thing: a robust private 
market where the product of long, expensive and creative work could be sold for profit. 
The nursery industry required a law to achieve this goal; the seed corn industry did not. 
What Henry Wallace and other breeders wanted to accomplish as businessmen, they 
could accomplish without patents. This distinction worked to the great advantage of the 
                                                
90 There were three prominent members of the Wallace family: “Uncle” Henry Wallace, the founder of 
Wallace’s Farmer and grandfather of Henry A. Wallace; Henry C. Wallace, son of “Uncle” Henry and 
father of Henry A. Wallace, who served as Secretary of Agriculture from 1921 to 1924; and Henry A. 
Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, Vice President of the United States and founder of Pioneer Hi-Bred Seed 
Company. Henry A. Wallace is the primary focus of this discussion and, for convenience and simplicity, all 
references to ‘Henry Wallace’ or ‘Wallace’ are to Henry A. Wallace. Any reference to Uncle Henry or 
Henry C. are specifically noted as such.  
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nursery industry.91 As will be seen in the next chapter, this fact also allowed the hybrid 
seed industry to expand globally under its traditional methodology, absent any 
intellectual property protection until 1970 and patent protection until 1985. As new laws, 
scientific breakthroughs and Supreme Court decisions continually pushed sexually bred 
seeds into the intellectual property arena in the1970s and 1980s, the upheaval was larger 
and more complex than with the nursery industry in 1930. An understanding of the 
origins of hybrid seed and the reasons for its seclusion from patent law helps put these 
later events into perspective.   
Sexual breeding, such as with corn, is accomplished by cross (or open) pollination 
rather than self-fertilization. Plants that reproduce in this fashion do not reproduce true to 
form. For example, the male part, located in the tassel, pollinates the female silk, which 
feeds each individual kernel of the ear. Which pollen fertilizes which seed is a matter of 
random drift. Breeders had to segregate their hybrids from other varieties in the fields as 
the qualities that make the hybrid valuable could be ruined in one year if pollinated 
openly by a genetically diverse plant.92 Thus, each plant is potentially different in terms 
                                                
91 A bill in Congress can suffer from direct opposition aimed at its defeat as well as the ‘Christmas tree’ 
syndrome in which opportunists ‘hang’ amendments on a bill like so many ornaments. Each amendment 
potentially opens the debate to a new set of issues and constituencies, often turning the bill into a 
monstrosity that fails to make it out of committee or dies quietly on a list of bills ready for floor debate that 
are never called up. The Plant Patent Act of 1930 avoided this dynamic. Asexual plant production came 
into the patent arena a full forty years before Congress gave sexual plant production patent-like treatment in 
the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 (discussed in the next chapter.) The breeders who worked with 
open pollinated plants could have easily mounted their own charge on the Plant Patent Act to demand some 
type of accommodation for their efforts as well. That they did not do so reflects the fact that they did not 
need plant patents as badly as asexual breeders and saw no other reason to challenge the basic premises of 
the Act. This conclusion is not to suggest that Henry Wallace bore the burden of pursuing debate on plant 
patents for sexually produced plants (although he would have been an ideal candidate given his background 
and interests) but to argue that that both sides of the breeding industry saw the issue in purely economic 
terms.    
92 Kloppenburg, Jr., First the Seed, 95. Systematic breeding involves planting alternate rows of two 
different varieties (A & B) and detasseling the ‘A’ rows to make them the female recipients of the male 
pollen from the ‘B’ rows, thus producing an AB corn variety. By 1918, breeders were experimenting with 
double-crossed varieties in which a second round of breeding took place.  A & B corn had been bred to 
produce AB corn, which was then planted with CD corn to produce ABCD corn. Yields improved in the 
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of its genetic make-up. In fact, each kernel on a single cob of corn could be pollinated 
from a different plant. A degree of variation emerges with each new generation and so it 
is difficult to hold a patent on something that will change in its later iterations.93 
Although a barrier to patent protection in 1930, this biological fact compensated breeders 
by providing an alternate and built-in protection. Unlike grafts from Burbank plants, 
hybrid seed could not be used to produce identical copies in successive generations, and 
so a holder of hybrid seed could not mass-produce it and become the breeder’s 
competitor. In fact, breeders needed each other’s seeds and data. Henry Wallace could 
not work in isolation like Burbank or Stark. 
There is no record of friendship or collaboration between Henry Wallace and Paul 
Stark.94 As to Luther Burbank, Wallace exchanged brief correspondence with another 
plant breeder working on a Burbank biography who sought Wallace’s recollection about 
the genealogy of the Ross family name, which appeared in both the Wallace and Burbank 
family trees. As for plant patents, Wallace offered a brief but significant observation in a 
1930 letter to Donald Jones: “Referring to Burbank, I was much interested when George 
                                                                                                                                            
first year of planting but subsequent yields from saved seed declined sharply. As a result, farmers using 
these experimental hybrids had to buy new seed every year in order to maintain high yields. See, Paul 
Raeburn, The Last Harvest: The Genetic Gamble that Threatens to Destroy American Agriculture (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 127-131. Even if a quality variety can be established, hybrid corn 
traits are in constant flux. Pests and disease evolve over time in response to their changing environment and 
a new variety of corn is certainly a change for the pests that feed on it. Thus, breeders require constant 
sources of new germplasm from outside extant stock in order to stay ahead of disease or to maintain and 
improve yields. The Department of Agriculture estimates that new crop varieties are resistant to pests and 
disease for an average of five years. “Agricultural Resources and Environmental Indicators,” Chapter 3.2, 
USDA Publication (1990), 1.  
93 Kloppenburg, Jr., First the Seed, 95.  
94 The only record of contact reveals a warm request from Stark to Wallace in 1946. Stark requested from 
Wallace a transcript of comments Wallace had made before the National Garden Conference for insertion 
by Clarence Gannon into the Congressional Record along with those of other government officials who had 
spoken. Stark enclosed reporters notes with some underlining of his own and suggested that Wallace could 
enlarge on them. Paul Stark to Henry A. Wallace, 30 March 1946, Henry A. Wallace Papers, Iowa State 
University Microfilm Collection, Reel 39, Frame 892, Iowa State University Library. Wallace made 
multiple changes to the notes and returned them to Stark for transcription. Undated secretary’s note, Henry 
A. Wallace Papers, Reel 39, Frame 894. 
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H. Shull was in Des Moines last December in hearing his telling of his annual visits to 
Burbank. It seems that Shull was much interested in the way in which Burbank was 
exploited.”95  
Wallace’s Farmer magazine similarly reflected the relative disinterest of its 
editor. A 1930 edition of the magazine contained a blurb indicating that President Hoover 
had signed the Plant Patent Act for those who produce “a new variety of apple or 
strawberry or gladiolas.” The magazine saw no significant angle for grain farmers in the 
new law although it indicated some of them might find a prize waiting in the garden: 
“Most corn belt farmers will not be interested in the bill but there are a few of them who 
have discovered varieties of fruit which are worthy of a patent.”96  
While Wallace’s correspondence suggests general disinterest in plant patents, it 
also provides clear insight into the culture of free sharing of both seeds and information 
that dominated hybrid corn research in the 1920s. For example, E. N. Bressman, like 
Wallace an Iowa State College graduate, who worked at an Oregon agricultural college, 
wrote to Wallace in 1926 to request crossed inbreds from Iowa as well as a “few kernels” 
of the inbred parent lines.97 Wallace not only provided the seed but also its history: “The 
corn which I sent you is a cross of the C16 . . . with the Lancaster 24 with an inbred 2 
eared strain and an inbred Reid Yellow Dent . . . It stands up well without blowing 
down.”98 The courtesy was reciprocal. On September 17, 1930, Bressmen wrote to 
                                                
95 Henry A. Wallace to D.F. Jones, 17 February 1930, Henry A. Wallace Papers, Reel 57, Frame 696. 
Whether Wallace was referring to the patent issue is not clear but, given the date of the letter and 
Burbank’s public comments, it is the most likely assumption. Clearly, Wallace had the opportunity to 
expound on the issue at any length and chose not to, at least not to Jones in this particular letter. The remark 
was given as an aside and Wallace quickly moved on to a completely different topic. If the subject 
captivated or even interested him, it is not evident. 
96 “Patenting Plants,” Wallace’s Farmer, June 7, 1930: 2. 
97 E.N. Bressman to Henry A. Wallace, 20 April 1926, Henry A. Wallace Papers, Reel 56, Frame 566. 
98 Henry A. Wallace to E.N. Bressman, 15 May 1926, Henry A. Wallace Papers, Reel 56, Frame 597. 
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Wallace stating: “I have about 25 ten-kernel samples of corn from Siberia, Russia and 
Baltic regions. Would you be interested in having these? If so, I would be glad to mail 
them to you.”99 Perhaps more telling is Bressman’s follow-up, which states that all of the 
seeds had been posted to Wallace and “If you do not want the Flint variety you can send 
them on to someone else or discard them.”100  
The notion of plants and seeds as freely available inputs in economic endeavors 
dominated Wallace’s correspondence. In July of 1930, Wallace wrote to New Jersey 
breeder George Shull, the same man who had tried in vain to study Luther Burbank’s 
methods for documentation and reproduction, about a plant he could not locate but 
wished to grow, the Valerian Officianalis: “If it happens to grow anywhere near where 
you live, I wonder if I could ask you to ask one of your students to dig up several plants 
and express them to me.” The letter concluded with some free sharing of shop talk: “You 
may be interested in knowing that we are growing 180 acres of corn this year in which 
we are using an inbred as a male parent.”101 In a similar letter to breeder Donald Jones in 
Connecticut, Wallace made no bones about his desire to profit from the seeds of another 
breeder: “I have just read your Bulletin 310 on Canada-Leaming corn . . . If such seed 
may be obtained year after year I wish you would give me the name of the grower . . . I 
would like to try it in some of our crosses and in case it combines well I would like to be 
able to go back and get fresh seed each year.”102    
Wallace approached breeding like an academic, with open communication and 
free sharing, but he approached the commercial marketplace like a businessman. There is 
                                                
99 E.N. Bressman to Henry A. Wallace, 17 September 1930, Henry A. Wallace Papers, Reel 3, Frame 381. 
100 E.N. Bressman to Henry A. Wallace, 29 September 1930, Henry A. Wallace Papers, Reel 3, Frame 464. 
101 Henry A. Wallace to George H. Shull, 22 July 1930,  Henry A. Wallace Papers, Reel 3, Frame 84. 
102 Henry A. Wallace to D.F. Jones, 18 February 1930, Henry A. Wallace Papers, Reel 57, Frame 701. 
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no question that he saw his hybrids as something that would help farmers improve their 
yields, but also as a valuable commodity. When it came to his inbred parental lines, he 
secured their value through exclusivity, just as with the patent law. He did not, however, 
need a patent because he could distribute his hybrids while simultaneously protecting the 
parent lines, something that the asexual breeders could not do. Wallace’s outlook was no 
less economic than that of nurserymen, it was simply more independent of government 
intervention.   
Prior to hybrids, the only market for commercial seed sales was first-time 
planting. The seed business in the early 20th century was comprised of small family 
owned businesses that took public seeds developed by land grant universities and 
essentially mass produced them by planting and harvesting them. One seed yielded a 
stalk of corn with several ears and several hundred seeds. Pre-hybrid farming consisted of 
planting non-hybrid, open pollinated varieties that yielded re-usable seeds. Thus, after a 
purchase and successful growing season, the farmer reaped seeds to sell or use for feed, 
as well as enough to hold back for replanting the following spring and perhaps to share 
with a neighbor. This dynamic had ecological as well as social consequences. Wide 
planting of seeds in different areas helped to create a diverse set of seed characteristics.103 
Public excitement over hybrid corn came only after decades of work and 
promotion. George Shull delivered a paper on pure-line corn breeding in 1908 but it was 
1920 before commercial seed was ready.104 Double cross hybrids had been around since 
                                                
103 H.G. Wilkes, “Plant Genetic Resources: Why Privatize a Public Good?” BioScience, Vol. 37, No. 3, 
Whence Seeds for the Future? Biologists Address Global Agricultural Issues (Mar., 1987), 215. 
104 Smith, The Garden of Invention, 232. Even as late as 1936, however, farmers were still in need of 
education on the basics of hybrid use. A writer to Wallace’s Farmer that year asked whether he could re-
plant his hybrid yields in the subsequent year. The reader was directed to USDA Farmer’s Bulletin No. 
1744 stating that only the first generation of seed should be used for planting. Second generation yields 
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1921 but the farm community was slow to embrace them. Nudging farmers in the right 
direction was where Wallace’s media power became important. In 1924, Wallace’s 
Farmer put out the call to its readership to help form an experimental pool for the use of 
crossed inbred strains. Wallace sought volunteers in a manner similar to the precedent set 
by Henry Ellsworth at the Patent Office: “We have a small quantity of seed corn 
produced by crossing two inbred strains, which we will distribute in fourth-pound lots to 
those who send in a dime or ten cents in stamps. . . . The kernels are badly shaped and 
would be discarded by the poorest farmer in Iowa . . . At tasseling time, pull its tassels 
out and you will get some crossed seed for planting in 1925. . . . please report the yield of 
100 hills of the hybrid and 100 hills of your home corn next fall, so that we can begin to 
find out if this new fashion in corn breeding has progressed far enough yet to mean 
anything. . . . [we] would be glad if some of our experimentally minded readers would 
help us.”105  
At that time, public institutions still performed much of the research but Wallace 
acted as cheerleader: “This method is so new that no one knows much about it as yet, but 
the corn professors at the experiment stations think that it is full of promise.”106 Wallace 
clearly saw the promise as well, being only two years away from establishing the Hi-Bred 
company and three years from winning the Iowa Corn Yield Test, a competition invented 
by Wallace because of his disdain for contests based on the best looking ear of corn. The 
true test, in Wallace’s mind, was yield and his sickly looking inbreds proved superior to 
the big robust ears that won blue ribbons on looks alone. By shifting the contest to yield 
                                                                                                                                            
would be ten to twenty-five percent less. “It is this fact that necessitates producing the hybrid anew for each 
season’s use.” “Second-Year Hybrid Seed,” Wallace’s Farmer, February 1, 1936: 11. 
105 “Hybrid Seed Corn for Distribution,” Wallace’s Farmer, May 16, 1924: 4. 
106 Ibid. 
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rather than looks, Wallace created a contest he would win and Iowa farmers would help 
to promote. In the Iowa Corn Yield Test following the fall 1926 harvest, hybrid corn 
consistently defeated open-pollinated corn in every section of the state. The test, an 
annual event since 1920, had never featured hybrids. Notably, every hybrid that produced 
the highest yields was a Hi-Bred variety produced by Henry Wallace working with other 
breeders.107 Wallace stressed the need for farmers to continue working in open pollinated 
strains, however, as the best performing ones formed the base for breeding lines. Such 
strains would, in Wallace’s opinion, increase the wealth producing power of Iowa by at 
least half a million dollars annually.108 
As editor of a respected farm journal, not only could Wallace bang the drum for 
hybrids, which he often did, he could simultaneously market his own company. In a 1926 
letter to corn breeder Donald Jones, Wallace stated: “I think advertising in Wallace’s 
Farmer might be of some value because of the fact that our readers have been trained to 
some extent in this idea.”109 Wallace remained unconvinced, however, that the naturally 
independent and skeptical farmer would alter his planting regimen simply by reading an 
article in a magazine. Direct mail or “a salesman traveling through the country in a Ford” 
were also possibilities. Salesmen and mail order were expensive but that played into 
Wallace’s clever strategy of over pricing the corn initially both to draw attention to it and 
then to add the final carrot for skeptics by reducing the price in the future.110  
One of Wallace’s key salesmen, Roswell Garst, agreed with Wallace that seeds, 
like insurance, had to be sold face to face. His 1931 letter to Wallace outlined an ideal 
                                                
107 H. A. Wallace, “Hybrid Corn Wins Iowa Yield Test”, Wallace’s Farmer, February 11, 1927: 1.  
108 Ibid., 14. 
109 Henry A. Wallace to D.F. Jones, 22 April 1926, Henry A. Wallace Papers, Reel 56, Frame 570. 
110 Ibid. 
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blend of government and trade association support for hybrid corn, specifically Pioneer 
Hi-Bred corn. Wallace would tap into institutions farmers already trusted and used them 
to sell a private, for profit product.111 Garst also recognized that the true asset of hybrid 
corn production was the parent lines, which were stable and formed the basis for the 
valuable hybrid seed. That was where Wallace needed to exercise his power of 
exclusivity.112    
Given the state of farming in the 1920s, hybrids clearly demanded commercial 
development. Creating a quality hybrid was not easy, fast or cheap. Breeders established 
quality inbred lines by trial and error, discarding multiple cross attempts in the process. 
Even a good inbred variety was hard to mass-produce because its yields were so poor. 
Breeders required over 61,000 acres to produce seed stock sufficient for nine million 
acres of planting.113 These data roughly equate to one acre of seed stock for each 147 
acres of planting. According to the 1920 census, the vast majority of Iowa farms (40.1%) 
were between 100 and 174 acres in size with an average income of $20.94 per acre. In 
1920 only 137 farms in Iowa (0.1 %) were 1000 acres or larger. The vast majority of 
                                                
111 Garst summed up the strategy and his enthusiasm for it: “I think I never saw such cooperation as we are 
going to get from various county agents. . . . The county agents are going to line up group meetings for me 
with my lantern and slides . . . I am going to spend four days giving 3 talks a day. . . I am sure no 
commercial outfit ever had so find [sic] cooperation between a semi-official body like the Farm Bureau as 
we will have and think we will establish a sales basis this winter for more Hi-Bred corn that we can 
possibly produce. If times return to even 40 or 50¢ corn, the demand for Hi-Bred seed is going to astound 
you.” Roswell Garst to Henry A. Wallace, 14 December 1931, Henry A. Wallace Papers, Reel 59, Frame 
30-31. 
112 Garst did not, however, believe that Wallace should try to grow the market hybrids on his own property:  
“[I] . . . think it might be well to keep the Hi-Bred corn company in a position where it furnishes the parent 
stock on a royalty basis with a definite control of production method and handling. This would give you the 
cream of the profit in the form of royalty and yet would allow for a rapid expansion without endangering 
your control of the company in any way. . . If times pick up between now and spring, of which I have no 
expectations, I would produce it one a really large scale. I will produce it up to 10,000 bushel if times stay 
only as good as they are.” Roswell Garst to Henry A. Wallace, 23 December 1931, Henry A. Wallace 
Papers, Reel 59, Frame 123.  
113 “The Story of Hybrid Corn,” Wallace’s Farmer, August 13, 1938: 10. 
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farms (87.5%) fell into the range of 50 to 499 acres.114 In raw numbers, a farmer might 
benefit from dedicating one acre to developing his own hybrids for the benefit of 
increasing yields by several bushels per acre. The time required to tend the hybrid acre, 
however, in addition to the years required to develop stable parent lines, not to mention 
the knowledge required to recognize and exploit desired traits, made it clear that large-
scale introduction of hybrids was possible only as a commercial or publicly funded 
venture. By the decade of the 1930s, breeders and investors had established 
approximately 150 seed corn companies for the purpose of producing hybrid seeds and 
forty already existing companies had expanded their operations.115  Private industry had 
begun to overshadow the Department of Agriculture. Funk Brothers, Pfister, De Kalb, 
Northrup King and Moews all rated mention along with Pioneer Hi-Bred as established 
giants or up-and-comers by 1938.  
Unlike nurserymen and their asexual varieties, intellectual property rights did not 
present the most significant hurdle to hybrid corn breeders. Hybrids rendered seed 
sharing among farmers virtually impossible. Saved seed from hybrid yields diminished 
with each subsequent generation, ensured a continuing need for new seeds. Breeders 
maintained their monopoly through a combination of secrecy and licensing agreements. 
The private seed corn industry managed to do what the nurserymen could not because the 
end user of their products, the farmers, could not re-produce the hybrid plants in the same 
way as the purchaser of a Burbank plant. Assuming their breeding lines were properly 
                                                
114 Iowa Data from Census of 1920, "Agriculture-Legislation-McNary-Haugen Misc."; Commerce Papers; 
Box 8; Hoover Papers; Hoover Library. 
115 Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo, “The seed industry in U.S. agriculture,” Agriculture information bulletin no. 
786, United States Department of Agriculture (2004), 25. 
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handled, hybrid corn growers offered investors assurance of a yearly demand for the 
product. These factors led to commercialization of the seed corn business.116  
As the demand for quality seed stock became greater and the seeds more 
expensive, fraud emerged. Burbank copies were perfect replicas but many corn farmers 
ended up with low quality seed from dubious sources. Experimental stations responded 
by forming crop improvement associations comprised of local farmers who inspected and 
certified crops and seeds to provide some degree of quality assurance through patronage 
of participating dealer. Hybrid corn certification proved to be a nightmare. Breeders were 
loath to disclose trade secrets, their primary security in a patent-free market, for purposes 
of certification. Said Henry Wallace in 1938: “. . . with a multitude of men working on 
certification, it is hard to keep anything secret for long.”117 On a more practical level, it 
was nearly impossible for even the savviest farmer to certify four different parent lines, 
two inbred lines and a finished variety throughout thousands of acres.118 Wallace 
summed up the problem and its logical, not to mention self-serving, solution in market 
terms: “. . . about all that can be done is to certify that the producer is honest, which the 
big companies have to be anyway if they want to stay in business very long. They have 
everything invested in their hybrids, they say, and have a far greater stake in seeing that 
they are properly produced and handled than any certifying agency could have.”119  
In summary, the hybrid seed industry pursued the same ultimate goal of the 
nursery industry, which was to create economic value in its products by improving their 
quality, and to protect that enhanced value through exclusive control of the product. The 
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asexual plant breeders sought out a legal tool to establish exclusivity while the sexual 
plant breeders found it within the biology of the plants with which they worked. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the historical record reflects a nursery industry that proposed 
and wrote the plant patent law in 1930 and a hybrid industry that took no public stand on 
the bill when it came before Congress. 
Biological processes aside, the grain farming community remained far more 
concerned with federal trade policy than patent policy, as did Henry Wallace and his 
family publication. As Secretary of Agriculture in the Harding administration, Henry’s 
father, Henry C. Wallace, battled constantly with Harding’s other cabinet members, 
particularly Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover and Treasury Secretary Andrew 
Mellon, who viewed Wallace’s agriculture policy as too unfriendly to business and 
industry. To the extent the Wallace family could muster political fire, they aimed it at 
government price supports and tariffs. To the extent Henry Wallace dedicated time to 
politics in the late 1920s it was taken up by the McNary-Haugen legislation, not patents. 
If there was an economic benefit to be gained for grain farmers, it would be in the area of 
outputs rather than inputs.120 Similarly, in May, 1930 as Congress debated the Plant 
                                                
120 The Wallace family cause for farmers is well-illustrated by the many lives of the McNary-Haugen farm 
relief bill to create a federal farm board to purchase surplus U.S. commodities and sell (or, some claimed, 
dump) them on the world market. Debate on the bill was intense and emotional, including allegations of 
ignorance, stupidity and, worst of all, communist leanings hurled against the bill’s supporters. Reaction 
against the bill was swift and vitriolic when it was first introduced in 1924. A letter to Calvin Coolidge 
described the bill as “unsound in principle, unworkable in practice, destructive in effect and 
unconstitutional as well.” It was also described as vicious, ineffective and potentially disastrous and 
humiliating for the United States. See, Unsigned letter to Calvin Coolidge, 27 March 1924; "Agriculture-
Legislation-McNary-Haugen Misc."; Commerce Papers; Box 8; Hoover Papers; Hoover Library. The 
proposal even pitted congressmen against their own constituents. Rep. Henry T. Rainey lashed out at the 
Illinois Agricultural Association regarding its “demand” that he support the legislation as well as his 
perception that the Association was attempting to force his support through the media rather than deal with 
him directly. Personal affronts aside, Rainey served up a damning criticism of the bill. Accusing the 
association’s president as being either “densely ignorant” or “willfully false” as to the level of government 
involvement in the private business sector: “As a result of the Russian Revolution, Lenine [sic] and Trotsky 
never attained greater powers than you demand that Congress shall confer in this bill . . . will it not easily 
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Patent Act, Wallace’s Farmer was consumed with the Hawley-Smoot bill, dedicating the 
magazine to regular updates and conducting a reader survey to document farmer 
opposition.121  
In addition to the science of sexual breeding and the political priorities of grain 
farmers in the late 1920s, a third factor warrants acknowledgement. Henry A. Wallace 
was a man defined by his search for meaning in life. Very much his grandfather’s 
grandson, Wallace sought that meaning within two related outlets: agriculture and 
spirituality. As Uncle Henry had taught him, keeping agriculture alive and well was a 
                                                                                                                                            
follow that the government will take over also the land as the Soviets of Russia did after the Revolution? 
The Bolshevik organizations in Chicago, which plan the overthrow of this Government, and are financed 
with Russian gold for that purpose, must be delighted with the things you expect to accomplish in this bill. 
No reign of terrorism they can ever initiate, with its attendant murders and burnings, could ever accomplish 
more than you seek to accomplish in this bill.” See,  Henry T. Rainey to S. H. Thompson, 9 April 1924; 
"Agriculture-Legislation-McNary-Haugen Misc."; Commerce Papers; Box 8; Hoover Papers; Hoover 
Library. When finally the bill came to the desk of Calvin Coolidge after many years and iterations, his veto 
message was somewhat more subtle in content but no less scathing in conclusion: “The difficulty with this 
particular measure is that it is not framed to aid farmers as a whole, and it is, furthermore, calculated to 
injure rather than promote the general public welfare.” See, Calvin Coolidge to The United States Senate,  
veto message regarding S.4808, 25 February 1927; "Agriculture-Legislation-McNary-Haugen Misc."; 
Commerce Papers; Box 9; Hoover Papers; Hoover Library. The result was doubly bitter for Wallace. By 
1932, Wallace would be forced to sell his interests in Wallace’s Farmer to Dante Pierce of the Iowa 
Homestead. See, John C. Culver and John Hyde, American Dreamer: The Life and Times of Henry A. 
Wallace (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2000), 93. This must have been galling not only for the loss of 
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The Iowa Homestead  came out strongly against McNary-Haugen in editorials on March 13 and March 27, 
1924. Further, Dante Pierce supplied Hoover with clippings of Wallace’s Farmer Editorials on DC tariff 
policy while Congress debated the McNary-Haugen bill. See, Dante M. Pierce to Herbert Hoover, 
September 11, 1925; "Agriculture-Legislation-McNary-Haugen Misc."; Commerce Papers; Box 9; Hoover 
Papers; Hoover Library. In 1929, Pierce was notified by President Hoover of his selection to serve on The 
Commission on Conservation and Administration of the Public Domain. See, Memo to File, 17 October 
1929; "Congress of the United States-Correspondence-1929"; Presidential Papers; Box 110; Hoover 
Papers; Hoover Library. 
121 “Vote on the New Tariff Bill,” Wallace’s Farmer, May 10, 1930: 8. Wallace’s Farmer participated with 
The Standard Farm Papers and Capper Press to conduct a reader survey. The papers invited readers to cut 
out and complete a ballot indicating ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on whether Hoover should veto the Hawley-Smoot bill. 
The article’s tone was somewhat fatalistic but nevertheless sought to present the issue in a balanced 
manner: “Our readers probably have their minds already made up if they have been following the 
discussion. We are quoting here, however, statements on both sides so that readers can make a final 
comparison.” Ibid. Two weeks later, however, the publication came out in full advocacy mode. The new 
printed ballot included the heading “They Say He Should Veto” and included the current vote tally of 391 
for veto and 24 for passage. “Is the Senate Going to Back Down?” Wallace’s Farmer, May 24, 1930: 6. 
The ultimate outcome of the poll, not surprisingly, was that 95% of the 1,763 Iowa respondents opposed 
the bill. Wallace’s Farmer, June 7, 1930: 3. 
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way to serve both man and God.122 It is tempting to dismiss or marginalize Wallace’s 
spirituality in the context of patents but the fact is worth mention because Wallace’s own 
correspondence makes clear that he drew no such line between his spiritual life and 
secular business dealings. It is telling, for example, that Wallace readily discussed 
business matters with an astrologer.123 
Historians have cited numerous influences on Wallace’s spirituality, including 
psychologist and philosopher William James.124 That Wallace was willing to publicly 
                                                
122 Wallace’s grandfather, “Uncle Henry” Wallace was the early motivator of both outlets. Uncle Henry, a 
Presbyterian minister, established Wallace’s Farmer as both an agricultural and spiritual primer, filling 
with farm information and bible lessons. John C. Culver and John Hyde, American Dreamer: The Life and 
Times of Henry A. Wallace (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2000), 20 
123 In 1931, Wallace stated in a letter to astrologer L. E. Johndro: “I am vice president of a publishing 
company. Am an editor. I am a corn breeder and am president of the Hi Bred Corn company. This may 
eventually bring me more money than my editorial connection . . . fundamentally I am neither a corn 
breeder nor an editor but a searcher for methods of bringing the inner light to outward manifestation and 
raising outward manifestation to the inner light. . . . If the publishing business does not blow up in the next 
year or two I shall doubtless continue as editor for at least 10 years but giving much attention to my seed 
corn business and supervising statistical studies of weather and economic cycles. But most important I shall 
be seeking an opportunity to find the religious keynote of the new age.” Henry A. Wallace to L.E. Johndro, 
22 October 1931, Henry A. Wallace Papers, Reel 10, Frame 237-238. (Emphasis in original). Jhondro 
responded: “it ought to be clear to all that all terrestrial phenomena – events, prices, cycles, etc, etc – are 
EQUALLY EFFECTS of this law of invisible force [of electromagnetic cycles of every celestially charged 
body in space] and that consequently to rummage around in the data of world events in the usual statistical 
way of economists to the end of setting up certain sets of these EFFECTS as the CAUSE of the other world 
conditions is the crowning folly of the observational approach that admits of no cause that is not immediate 
and present of earth confined. . . . it is possible to lay down a curve of (for example) commodity prices for 
the past hundred years (whether baded [sic] on American or British prices) and over this lay down a curve 
based on nothing but the alternate electric angles of certain major planets as they circle about the sun and 
get an almost perfect correspondence of the two.” L.E. Johndro to Henry A. Wallace, 16 January 1931, 
Henry A. Wallace Papers, Reel 5, Frame 149-153. (Emphasis in original)  
124 John C. Culver and John Hyde, American Dreamer: The Life and Times of Henry A. Wallace , 32, 78. 
Wallace was so taken with James that he elected to leave the Presbyterian church rather than heed the 
conclusions of the elders that James’ writings were not appropriate for his Sunday School class. Ibid., 50. 
Wallace must have found in James a man who, like himself, found connection between his passion for 
science and God. James saw religion as a tool used by people to bring order to their lives and give them a 
sense of greater purpose. God is not known or understood by this process but rather used, and if this use 
proves beneficial, then God’s actual existence is irrelevant. That the end result is a very real change in 
personality and action makes the phenomenon ‘real’ by virtue of both its cause and effect. James couched 
this process in the popular scientific terms of the day: “The Gods we stand by are the Gods we need and 
can use . . . All without reference to anything but human working principles. It is but the elimination of the 
humanly unfit and the survival of the humanly fittest, applied to religious beliefs.” See, William James, The 
Varieties of Religious Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 266, 399-400, 403, 406. 
James saw religion as inspiring men to be less self-centered. Although wealth allowed a few people to 
pursue higher ideals, it by and large caused people to simply pursue more of it and fear its loss, two 
qualities that James saw as “the chief breeders of cowardice and propagators of corruption.” Similarly, 
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associate with fringe thinkers is further evident in active participation in the Theosophical 
Society, including his help in establishing the Liberal Catholic Church in Des Moines, an 
offshoot of the Theosophist church, and even considered ordination.125  
During this time of intense exploration of his spirituality, Wallace began to take a 
more universal view of the world but did not abandon the common sense view that 
economic success in business was generally a good result for what ailed the planet. In 
1931, Wallace shared his universal outlook on the nation’s ills with Gifford Pinchot, first 
Chief of the United States Forestry Service under William Howard Taft and later 
Governor of Pennsylvania: “As a matter of fact, the cornbelt problem is now very little 
different from the agricultural problem, and the general agricultural problem is very little 
different from the problem of all the people, while the problem of all the people in the 
United States is not so very much different from the problem of the entire world.”126 
Wallace, however, was far from hostile to business, being a successful publisher and corn 
breeder himself. In a second letter to Pinchot commenting on a speech from the 
                                                                                                                                            
poverty freed people to pursue a higher life: “Liberation from material attachment, the unbribed soul, the 
manlier indifference, the paying our way by what we are or do, and not by what we have . . . the more 
athletic trim . . . the moral fighting shape.” See, Ibid., 256-57, 291-93. 
125 John C. Culver and John Hyde, American Dreamer: The Life and Times of Henry A. Wallace, 78-80. In 
a hand-written addendum to a 1927 letter, the U.S. Regionary Bishop of the church asks Wallace: “Are 
your domestic affairs that [sic] same so that it is still impossible for you to consider ordination? If so is 
there anyone else you can heartily recommend to lead the movement in Des Moines?” Irving S. Cooper to 
Henry A. Wallace, 12 July 1927, Henry A. Wallace Papers, Reel 1, Frame 171. The organization proved to 
be much more controversial than an astrologer trying to predict market trends with planetary movements. 
Wallace was presumably an Adyar Theosophists as that is the branch that established the Liberal Catholic 
Church. Charles Leadbeater, a leading member of the Society, was a minister and active in leading 
Theosophy to the more ritualized worship of Old Catholics, a group that split from the church following the 
First Vatican Council in 1870. Leadbeater was allegedly ordained an Old Catholic Bishop by Josiah 
Wedgewood, whose own legitimacy as an Old Catholic was later challenged after six liberal catholic 
priests were subjected to charges of perversion in 1919. In 1906, Leadbeater himself had been accused of 
advocating, and likely participating in, masturbation for boys. During an investigation, Leadbeater 
confessed to his views and to giving the boys ‘indicative action’. He resigned from the Theosophical 
Society but returned as a member in 1908 without official position. See, Bruce F. Campbell, Ancient 
Wisdom Revived: A History of the Theosophical Movement (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 
1980), 116-118, 125-126. It is hard to believe that Wallace was unaware of this controversy as he is known 
to have attended meetings that same year. 
126 Henry A. Wallace to Gifford Pinchot, 25 July 1931, Henry A. Wallace Papers, Reel 8, Frame 420. 
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Pennsylvania governor, Wallace said “I thought you waived the red flag just a little too 
much at the business man . . . At the present time, I am not so certain as you seem to be 
that there is much to be gained by setting off the common people on the one hand against 
the wealthy people on the other hand. It seems to me that all of us are suffering from a 
lack of confidence between classes and confidence between nations, and that what we 
now need is not more strife but more unity. We are all of us in trouble now and anything 
that will help the business man will also help the farmer and the laboring man and vice 
versa.”127 
By 1938, with the Plant Patent Act eight years in existence, Wallace’s Farmer 
hailed non-patentable hybrids as “The most dramatic agricultural event of this 
generation.”128 Farmers had planted fifteen million acres in hybrids in 1938 and yields 
from those acres would exceed the yield of fifteen million acres of open pollinated corn 
by 120 million bushels.129 Telling the story in “simple farm language” the magazine 
trumpeted the wonder of hybrids, not to mention the fact that Pioneer Hi-Bred and Henry 
Wallace were on the ground floor of this new innovation. 
In conclusion, the history of plants and patents in the early twentieth century 
reveal two market segments involved in commercialization of plants and seeds. Both 
segments pursued the same goal: to create higher quality products and profit from sale of 
those products through exclusive control in the marketplace. One segment, the nursery 
industry, obtained exclusive rights to its products by securing their eligibility for patent 
protection. The other segment, the hybrid seed industry, maintained exclusive rights 
through a combination of secrecy and the natural characteristics and behavior of open 
                                                
127 Ibid., 13 October 1931, Henry A. Wallace Papers, Reel 10, Frame 99.  
128 “The Story of Hybrid Corn,” Wallace’s Farmer, August 13, 1938: 1. 
129 Ibid. 
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pollinated seeds. Although hybrid seeds remained outside of intellectual property laws, 
they retained a similar economic identity in terms of production methods and exclusive 
control of parent lines. The nurseryman could patent the asexually produced fruit tree; the 
hybrid seed developer could keep his parent lines under strict control. In both cases, 
exclusivity created commercial value. Within the boundaries of the United States, this 
philosophy held firm for both patents and plants from the colonial era into the twentieth 
century. Outside of the United States, a new paradigm emerged.  
As the United States moved through the Great Depression and the Second World 
War, its dominant role in foreign policy emerged with ever-increasing urgency. Overseas 
aid turned from military supplies to food production. Feeding the world became a key 
factor in America’s battle against the spread of communism, world hunger and 
unchecked population growth. Public and private money flowed into these causes. Cold 
war warriors and millionaire philanthropists controlled most of those funds and they 
looked upon modern farming with its fertilizers, irrigation and hybrid seeds as the ideal 
tool to feed the world and ‘Americanize’ it at the same time. As this movement grew, 
non-profit aid organizations attained a new and prominent position in the acquisition, 
transfer, use and storage of raw germplasm which represented the critical input for hybrid 
seeds. On a world stage, however, values and agendas were more diverse and would put 
to the test the historical American economic mindset of intellectual property rights.  
 
  
92 
CHAPTER 3. AGRICULTURE AND PHILANTHROPY IN THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD: WHO OWNS THE WISDOM IN THE 
EARTH?  
 
The ramifications of exclusive economic rights in plants and seeds became wider 
in both scope and consequence in the second half of the twentieth century. Issues that 
evolved within the United States began to concern a world growing in population and 
hunger. As the United States clung to its traditional views of plants and patents, the 
economic pillars on which those views rested strained under the weight of a global 
culture that did not operate under the same set of assumptions. Ultimately, however, they 
held. Even philanthropic organizations packaged agricultural aid in a way that rewarded 
size, technology and a market orientation. American philanthropies partnered closely 
with governments and scientists that believed in modern agriculture. As a result, those 
who provided funding and scientific expertise for agricultural development gauged 
success in economic terms. Saving the developing world involved changing it as well.  
As the Second World War gave way to The Cold War, the United States 
government emerged on the global stage as a dominant political and economic force 
determined to rebuild the world economy in a way that would simultaneously create new 
economic opportunities and contain communism. Private philanthropy also entered its 
heyday during this era as the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations expanded their visions 
for a better world. The two institutions often worked arm in arm to address global issues 
in ways that resolved local needs while advancing American interests and ideals. 
Agriculture in developing countries represented one area in which philanthropies made 
significant advancements. Providing agricultural aid to developing nations through the 
introduction of improved seeds was inexorably linked to collection and storage of 
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germplasm, a critical component of breeding operations. In the early years of these 
efforts, open pollinated seed was still outside the realm of intellectual property laws and 
so the processes and networks of free sharing entered the developing world along with 
the new farming methods. This state of affairs suited the philanthropic model because its 
breeders needed a rich supply of germplasm and the developing world certainly had one. 
Developing nations gladly partnered with aid organizations by donating local seed in 
return for improved seed, training and local outreach. Keeping germplasm free and 
accessible suited all parties.  
Intellectual property laws began to catch up to open pollinated plants in the 1960s 
and 1970s when the European nations collectively established the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) in 1961 and passage of 
the Plant Variety Protection Act in the United States (PVPA).1 Environmentalists also 
gained credence by pointing out the troubling shrinkage of both plant diversity and its 
natural habitat. As the industrial world’s economic view honed in on seeds, the 
developing world and its foundation partners remained aloof and non-threatening. The 
developing world had no intellectual property laws for plants, nor the bureaucratic 
infrastructure to evaluate and enforce them. Moreover, they provided no marketplace for 
the type of seed likely come under intellectual property protection. In order to preserve 
the status quo, the Rockefeller Foundation spearheaded a coalition of industrial nations, 
private foundations and the United Nations to create the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Resources (CGIAR). This informal association of donors and 
                                                
1 UPOV is an international convention that allows for registration and patent-like protection of seeds. It 
contains critical exceptions, however, most notably the right of farmers to save seeds of a protected variety 
for self-planting or sale to others for reasons other than duplication. It has been modified numerous times. 
As of 2004, fifty-five countries had adopted some version of the convention. Robert J. Jondle and Elizabeth 
Bennett-Jarvis, “Legal Protection for Plant Intellectual Property,” Seed World (July/August 2005): 6-7.  
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managers worked to establish a series of agricultural research centers based on the 
Rockefeller models in Mexico and the Philippines.   
By the time genetics ushered in a new level of private ownership of living 
material, the philanthropic quarter had amassed one of the largest seed collections in the 
world courtesy largely of developing countries that shared them freely. As science 
progressed and biodiversity declined, those seeds became increasingly more valuable. 
Changing circumstances forced the custodians of those freely donated and shared seeds to 
re-examine how and by whom those seeds should be used and maintained, especially in 
light of their source.  
This chapter will trace the arc of agriculture and philanthropy in the developing 
world from the 1940s to 1980. It will examine the Rockefeller agricultural program in 
Mexico, which served as a template for development of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Resources. It will also summarize the Plant Patent Act of 1970 
which set the stage for a new view of the economic value of open pollinated plants. As 
these events unfolded, the clear economic motivations, even in connection with 
humanitarian aid, emerged. In addition, concerns over unchecked population growth 
exacerbated aggressive use of commercial agriculture as an immediate solution to the 
challenge of feeding the world at the expense of more long-term concerns over the 
environment and culture of farming in the developing world. Finally, the ambitious and 
well-intentioned goals of agricultural aid fell prey to severe economic strains within a 
decade, forcing those who wanted to continue their work to look for new sources of 
income just as the 1980s ushered in the genetic revolution and an entirely new economic 
status for plants and seeds. 
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The Rockefeller Model for Agricultural Aid 
 
American philanthropy blossomed in the early twentieth century. Men who had 
made their fortunes in industry established foundations for myriad reasons. Those 
foundations sought to improve the lives of others in the United States and, in many ways, 
throughout the world. The manner in which they operated, the subjects of and 
motivations behind their actions suggested fealty to the same economic factors that 
allowed them to amass their fortunes. The aid that foundations offered, including 
agricultural aid, came with, and as the result of, a capitalistic mindset that advanced both 
economic and political ideals. Foundations reflected these goals and values in the way 
they operated and in the people who worked for them.  
Historians have observed that foundations reflected the systems that created their 
underlying wealth: efficiency, organization and large-scale production. These qualities 
were hallmarks of American capitalism, an ideal that philanthropists readily shared along 
with money, supplies and knowledge.2 Since the Progressive Era, those wishing to help 
the less fortunate nearly always equated help with instruction in the American way of 
doing things. Aid was not so much shared as handed down and often the only way to 
make use of American aid was to adopt the culture to which it came attached. To improve 
the lives of the less fortunate was to broaden their scale of production and make them 
participants in markets. Philanthropy did not raise the standard of living for the whole 
population so much as it rewarded that portion willing and able to adopt a new type of 
thinking.3   
                                                
2 Edward H. Berman, The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations on American 
Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 13. 
3 Ibid, 27. 
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Motives ranged from a genuine desire to help the less fortunate to fear that failure 
to do so might erode the American fabric domestically or threaten it abroad. Great men 
and women used their fortunes to create foundations and they selected other great men 
and women to run them. These visionaries often limited their hires to an exclusive class 
that perpetuated and cross-fertilized itself in the halls of academia, government and 
commerce. Foundations were a bastion for Ivy Leaguers and the upper echelons of the 
corporate, government and academic world.4 The worldview bred in this rare air was 
nationalistic and patriarchal; it meted out aid designed to expand and perpetuate those 
values. Foundation boards were system oriented, believing that advancement was a 
matter of systemic processes that were naturally capitalistic.5 To help someone was not to 
give him what he needed in order to survive but to teach him how to produce it for 
himself. Foundations did not operate with the primary goal of preserving culture, except 
perhaps American culture. For them, the world presented threat and opportunity. To 
prevent the latter and take advantage of the former involved exporting an economic 
system that reflected American values.6 Within this philosophy lay the double-edged 
sword of philanthropy. Technology developed within a cultural context and it reflected 
the needs and ideals of that culture. Intellectual property and agriculture in America were 
two examples, both serving specific needs relating to a strong economy. When 
governments and philanthropies exported agricultural systems, they could not divorce 
those systems from the context in which they had been developed. Therefore, to the 
extent the recipient differed from the donor, the technology became less efficient or even 
                                                
4 Ibid., 32. According to Berman, foundation boards are essentially self-replicating. He cites a study that 
found that over half of the trustees of the 13 largest American foundations attended Harvard, Princeton or 
Yale. In addition, most were white, Protestant males. Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 161- 62. 
6 Ibid., 16-17. 
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unworkable. Something had to give and it was often the cultural dynamics of the 
developing world.7  
Agricultural aid fit firmly into this historical analysis. Economics and politics are 
closely tied to food. Myriad agendas and motivations emerged in the effort to modernize 
farming in developing countries. Some donors feared unsustainable increases in 
population and the resulting demand on food supplies. Others feared ignoring a potential 
breeding ground for Communism. Inevitably, along with help came an economic mindset 
with a long historical pedigree. Large-scale farming stabilized societies in terms of 
hunger but also in terms of politics and economics. Large-scale farming also fostered 
industrial capitalism, something commentators saw as a key Cold War goal of the Ford 
and Rockefeller Foundations appended to their humanitarian aims.8  
The species of aid that embraced advancement through science and technology 
was not unique or new to developing countries. The United States navigated a similar 
process as agriculture progressed into the twentieth century. Subsistence farming gave 
way to commercial farming under the careful hand of farmers, scientists and politicians 
who approached the land grant system with a decidedly commercial bent. The farmers 
who would succeed were those able, intellectually and financially, to break from old 
routines and risk failure for reward.9 Philanthropists exported a truly ‘American’ system 
that ran from the bank to the field to the commercial market place. The system 
‘Americanized’ its recipients coming in and going out. The Rockefeller Foundation and 
                                                
7 Deborah Fitzgerald, “Exporting American Agriculture: The Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, 1943-
1953,” Social Studies of Science, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Aug., 1986), 458. 
8 Felicia Wu and William P. Butz, The Future of Genetically Modified Crops: Lessons from the Green 
Revolution (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2004), 29. 
9 Deborah Fitzgerald, “Exporting American Agriculture: The Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, 1943-
1953,” 76.  
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its agricultural programs is a case study in these dynamics, as well as a precursor to the 
system of agricultural aid that exists today.  
According to Raymond Fosdick, former chair of the Rockefeller Foundation, John 
D. Rockefeller, Sr. became a rich man “not infrequently by methods which, if permissible 
at the time, no longer accord with social conscience or the requirements of law.”10 
Despite his business methods, Rockefeller Sr. donated a portion of his income to charity 
since his first job as teenage clerk in Ohio. His lifelong habit culminated in The 
Rockefeller Foundation, which came into being in June of 1909 with $50 million of 
Standard Oil stock as its seed capital. Like many of his peers, Rockefeller was a self-
made man of humble beginnings who achieved his success through a combination of 
fortunate timing, hard work, determination and self-discipline. The foundation therefore 
espoused large-scale enablement rather than charity. It frowned upon personal or 
immediately remedial efforts in favor of  “those which go to the root of individual or 
social ill-being or misery.”11 One did not give a poor man a meal, but rather created an 
economic environment through which he could obtain a job and a paycheck with which 
he could buy his own meal.12  
Early in its existence, the Rockefeller Foundation became impressed with the 
power of private money to work a positive change in agriculture. Positive, in this case, 
meant economic improvement. Helping a farmer to produce more and better crops 
resulted in more income for that farmer and therefore a higher standard of living. From 
1906 to 1919, the Foundation worked in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture 
                                                
10 Raymond B. Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), 5.  
11 Ibid., 23. 
12 E. Richard Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1979), 33.  
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in the American south to address the boll weevil problem in cotton production.13 The 
foundation also sponsored a wheat improvement program in China in the 1920s.14  
Philanthropy soon merged with foreign policy. The Rockefeller Foundation began 
funding the War-Peace Studies Project in 1939. The study ultimately concluded what the 
World Wars had highlighted: national and economic security depended in part on access 
to and protection of food, staples, minerals, petroleum and other raw materials. The clear 
goal of foreign policy, therefore, was to preserve those goods, within a non-communist, 
capital-oriented world.15  Seeds, being the primary input for agricultural research, soon 
became a factor in the global tug-of-war between capitalism and communism. Crop 
improvement relied heavily on access to a diverse base of raw materials, necessitating a 
seed storage program that offered free seeds to researchers. Healthy seed banks 
necessitated collection of germplasm from all over the world. When war and diplomacy 
shut off traditional roads of exploration in the mid-twentieth century, seed collectors 
found it too difficult to obtain samples from unfriendly or dangerous places. Seed banks 
suffered, underscoring the critical need for American activism in global issues of hunger 
and agriculture. Friendly international relationships not only allowed America to export 
its economic way of life, but also permitted access to badly needed germplasm. 
Rockefeller Foundation support for international crop research illustrated this point by 
quickly expanding to include collecting, classifying and preserving germplasm from 
other countries. Between seed collection and crop research, the Rockefeller Foundation 
created a body of knowledge in plant breeding that was unparalleled by mid-century. It 
                                                
13 Fitzgerald, “Exporting American Agriculture: The Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, 1943-1953,” 75. 
14 Wu and Butz, The Future of Genetically Modified Crops, 16. 
15 Berman, The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy, 
41-42. 
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led the world in knowledge about maize in developing countries due to its work in 
Mexico in 1943 and Columbia in 1950.16  
Mexico and its agriculture had been a topic of discussion among the foundation 
board as early as 1933. Franklin Roosevelt sent Henry Wallace to the inauguration of 
Mexico’s new president, Abelardo L. Rodriguiz in 1932. The trip sparked Wallace’s 
interest in agriculture as a way to help the Mexican people.17 Breeders had been working 
on corn improvement in Mexico at the urging of Henry Wallace but they had little 
success with American varieties in Mexican soil and climate.18 Wallace commented to 
Rockefeller Foundation president Raymond Fosdick that the best way to improve the 
conditions for people in Mexico was to increase the yield per acre of corn and beans. The 
Foundation responded by sending three academic advisors to Mexico: E.C. Stakman from 
the University of Minnesota, Paul Mangelsdorf from Harvard and Richard Bradfield from 
Cornell. These men eventually recommended a special program of agricultural research 
and development.  By 1943, the Rockefeller Foundation was working with the Mexican 
Department of Agriculture. This move signaled a major shift in the Rockefeller 
Foundation strategy. For the first time in its history, the Foundation became not only a 
source of funds but also an operational director, providing and supervising on-site staff to 
implement its program. J.George Harrar, a plant pathologist and future president of the 
Foundation, headed up the project. He was soon joined by geneticists, soil scientists and 
entomologists. By 1950, eleven American scientists were working on site in Mexico. 
                                                
16 Uma Lele and Arthur A. Goldsmith, “The Development of National Agricultural Research Capacity: 
India's Experience with the Rockefeller Foundation and Its Significance for Africa,” Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Jan., 1989), 314. 
17 John H. Perkins, “The Rockefeller Foundation and the Green Revolution,” Agriculture and Human 
Values, Vol. VII, (Summer-Fall 1990), 8. 
18 Fitzgerald, “Exporting American Agriculture,” 465-466. 
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Wheat soon followed corn as a target of improvement. Mexico became the largest 
Rockefeller agricultural program to date.19  
Harrar’s staff included Norman Borlaug, an Iowa-born plant pathologist who had 
studied at the University of Minnesota and done agricultural research for the for the 
duPont Nemours Foundation.20 Borlaug and the other Rockefeller sponsored scientists 
were all products of the land-grant university system and its model of agricultural 
practice.21 Critically, these academic consultants steered the focus of the Rockefeller 
Program toward scientific agriculture and increased yields.22 These men made no bones 
about the need to bring significant change to Mexico in order for it to succeed 
agriculturally. Significant change, in this case, was a decidedly commercial approach to 
agricultural production. Foundation personnel went to Mexico in order to transform a 
select group of farmers into modern, commercially oriented producers.  
Harrar realized early on that the road would not be smooth: “We were foreigners 
in a country which was suspicious of the motives of the United States.”23 Mexican 
suspicion toward American motives went all the way back to the Mexican-American 
War. Harrar’s team wanted to minimize these problems but not at the cost of losing 
                                                
19 Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, 182-186.  
20 Norman Borlaug biography, Official Website of the Nobel Prize, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1970/borlaug-bio.html (accessed August 25, 
2011). Borlaug won the Nobel prize in 1970. His official biography described him as a “pragmatic, goal-
oriented scientists” and a “practical humanitarian.” Ibid. This mind set is evident in his work for the 
Rockefeller Foundation.   
21 Fitzgerald, “Exporting American Agriculture,” 461-463. In her article, Fitzgerald quotes Eugene 
Davenport, Dean of the Agricultural College at the University of Illinois (1895-1922) as representative of 
the prevailing attitudes under which men such as Harrar and Borlaug matriculated: “I do not agree with the 
proposition that the college... should... take the message to every individual, on the principle of letting no 
guilty man escape. There will always be lost souls in farming... and there will be men not worth saving; for 
this is public business and not charity.” Ibid. 
22 John H. Perkins, “The Rockefeller Foundation and the Green Revolution,” Agriculture and Human 
Values, Vol. VII, (Summer-Fall 1990), 8-9. 
23 Dr. J. George Harrar, interviewed by Barbara Lane, April 1961 to February 1962, Record Group 13, Oral 
History, box 17, Special Collections, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy 
Hollow, New York, 45. 
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control of the program. The Rockefeller group readily acknowledged the need to work 
with foreign governments in terms of funding, education and promotion of the American 
brand of agriculture, but were loathe to do so on any terms but their own. They even used 
the Foundation’s tax-exempt status as a tool to steer clear of bureaucracies as noted in a 
1969 letter from Harrar to Dean Rusk: “[W]e operate in foreign countries as a tax-exempt 
institution. In fact, we so advertise in making our arrangements with those countries and 
in requiring concessions from them which enable us to work effectively and outside of 
the bureaucratic structure.”24 
The Rockefeller Foundation brought an American mindset to agriculture not only 
in terms of economics but also in terms of aggressiveness. Norman Borlaug zealously 
advocated a steamroller approach that brought swift and recognizable change to a 
receptive audience. Borlaug’s philosophy was to overwhelm his audience with success: 
“One of the most basic ingredients of change is capturing the imagination of the 
traditional farmer, the politician, the scientist, and the only way to do this is to make 
tremendous differences at the outset.”25 In Borlaug’s view, crop scientists had to forget 
about teaching old dogs new tricks and instead forge genuine relationships with 
progressive thinking locals. He wanted to link up with young people and treat them as 
peers, not as a “consultant looking down from on high.”26 The equality of the relationship 
only went so far in Borlaug’s mind, however. He was willing to be a co-worker but 
determined to be an aggressive one as well. His strategy was to “insist, prod, push until 
                                                
24 John G. Harrar to Dean Rusk, 2 September 1969, Record Group IV 2A26, folder 11, box 2, Special 
Collections, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York. 
25 Norman E. Borlaug, interviewed by William C. Cobb, June 1967, Record Group 13 Oral History, box 15, 
special collections, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, 44-45. 
26 Ibid., 46-47. 
  
103 
you get them there.”27 Harrar offered a similar but slightly less harsh assessment: “We 
realized quite soon that if we were going to introduce scientific methods into Mexico on 
the scale which would be necessary to make any significant progress, we would have to 
try to enlist our Mexican friends to work with us, to accept our philosophies and our 
judgments, and to progress together.” The Foundation staff found senior Mexican 
scientists to be apathetic so they had to “revert to the soil” and prove themselves with 
results.28  
Progress was not always fast. For example, it required nearly ten years of slow 
incremental increases to convince Mexican farmers to apply 120 pounds of fertilizer per 
acre. The starting point had been twenty pounds per acre. George Harrar recalled the 
extreme skepticism of Mexican farmers, who at first called the fertilizer ‘venemo’ but, 
after seeing its results, began to ask where they could get the ‘medicina.’29 This 
recollection illustrates the challenges of bringing an American style of crop production to 
an indigenous population that equated chemical fertilizer first with poison and later with 
medicine, rather than a tool for enhancing soil and crop nutrition. Critics who expressed 
disapproval at such significant uses of fertilizer infuriated Borlaug: “This made my blood 
boil.”30 Borlaug’s similarly had no patience for economists and politicians, especially 
those in embassies and the United Nations, who he viewed as operating within a false 
sense of reality.31  
As a result of the myriad cultural, political and scientific challenges, pragmatism 
and progress were the watchwords in Mexico. Foundation employee Sterling Wortman 
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recalled warnings form George Harrar that Central American agricultural programs 
would be rife with problems and that his job was to figure out a way to get over, around 
or under them so long as he put them in his rear view.32 Harrar’s attitude was to “[L]et 
nature tell us what our problems were.”33 In other words, grow Mexican crops and 
determine what kills them. Hybrids, in Wortman’s view, were not the answer to the 
problems faced by Mexican farmers. By that time, double-crossed hybrid corn was all the 
rage in the United States, but it was not necessarily the answer to agricultural issues in 
developing countries. Hybrids required intense oversight and complete segregation from 
planting through detasseling, harvesting, drying, storing, shelling and sacking. These 
requirements placed a high demand on technical competence not always found in 
developing countries. Wortman blamed mechanical pickers, among other things, as 
contributing to an over emphasis on hybrid uniformity, even to the point of height and 
angle of ears. But, as one researcher warned him: “Do not take this breeding program to a 
point of high uniformity. We have just gotten to the point in the United States at which 
our farmers are judging the worth of a hybrid not so much by what it will yield, but by 
how uniform it is. We’re getting to the point where we’re worrying about the chrome on 
the vehicle instead of the engine that’s in it.”34 Other options existed for improving 
yields. The Rockefeller Foundation tested five to eight thousand varieties of wheat and a 
similar amount of corn, eventually producing two to three dozen viable lines. Cultural 
obstacles emerged in addition to Wortman’s concerns about the technical challenges of 
hybrid production. Despite improved results, locals rejected some varieties of beans and 
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maize based solely on color.35 Ultimately, hybrid corn accounted for less than twelve 
percent of Mexican corn acreage by 1963 while improved wheat accounted for ninety 
percent of wheat acreage as early as 1957. Researchers account for this by pointing out 
that the Mexican corn farmers were subsistence farmers working on an average of three 
hectares, while wheat farmers worked on an average of seventeen hectares. The latter 
were more suited and eager to adopt the American commercial model.36 Wortman 
concluded that hybrids worked only when managed by private companies with sales 
incentives, and not government monopolies. He believed that open pollinated varieties 
improved by mass selection were preferable: “I think we have to defeat the idea that a 
hybrid corn program is necessary, because I think it is neither necessary nor good.”37 
Wortman’s views and the practices that resulted in Mexico reflect a focus on pragmatism 
and the bottom line. The program directed farmers toward hybrids or, in the alternative, 
gave them the best seeds and more modern practices. In either case, the end result was to 
increase yield and profit.   
The Rockefeller strategy to avoid political distractions was not misplaced. Despite 
the Foundation’s best efforts, politicians hovered over the operation, particularly those 
who saw agricultural progress as a public relations tool for personal advancement. The 
Foundation personnel soon found themselves in the middle of partisan political battles. 
Senator Ramos Milan chaired the National Corn Commission and used it to further his 
goal of becoming Mexico’s president. The Rockefeller Foundation work was, for him, a 
stream of photo opportunities. Nazario Ortiz Garza served as Minister of Agriculture and 
also placed his sights on the Office of the President. The two men competed for control 
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of the most valuable asset issuing from the Rockefeller Foundation’s research: improved 
seeds. Mexico’s president directed the Foundation to give its seeds to the Corn 
Commission under Milan, but Garza directed the Foundation to place the seeds in his 
custody, an order he refused to put in writing. The foundation dodged the controversy by 
providing duplicate seeds to both men.38 The positive results also brought attention from 
politicians who sought immediate expansion before they had the technical staff to make it 
worth while or worse, in order to create jobs for political allies.  
The first and most lasting installation in the Rockefeller Foundation’s Mexican 
program was the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, better known by 
its Spanish acronym, CIMMYT. The Mexican government and the Rockefeller 
Foundation led a multi-party effort that gave the new entity it legal status via a civil 
partnership agreement. The parties established the facility in 1963 and formalized it in 
1966. The concept of free sharing of research results was reflected in the entity’s 
purposes under Article 5(f) of its enabling document: “To publish and divulge the results 
obtained from research programs and carry out what may be necessary to promote the 
immediate and efficient application of these results to the improvement of quality and 
quantity of maize, wheat and other important food crops on a local and international 
level.”39 Profit on the new hybrids was not an option, although it appears that profit could 
be made by the sale of breeding stock. Articles 9(a) & (b) referenced commercial sales 
from research as well as “[T]he fees which may be collected to pay the cost of production 
of certain genetic materials that will be supplied to parties interested in the promoting of 
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cereal production.”40 This vague reference did not indicate the parameters of such sales 
but they were clearly contemplated. 
 The Rockefeller Foundation program in Mexico demonstrated a clear philosophy 
that national well-being in the long run was found in commercial opportunity.41 The 
Green Revolution wrapped this idea in the gift of free information and assistance but the 
information given away carried with it an expensive way of farming.42 The people who 
represented the Foundation in Mexico were wholly dedicated to the idea of changing 
agriculture to a more economic and market-oriented process and anyone who disagreed 
was simply in the way. In addition to Borlaug and Harrar, the Rockefeller philosophy is 
found in the writings of John A. Pino, an animal husbandry expert and Rockefeller 
Foundation employee who went to Mexico and eventually assumed a leadership role. 
When the Mexican government placed restrictions on imported chicks, Pino advised 
American poultry producers in Mexico on how to set up breeder flocks and poultry 
hatcheries in Mexico, which allowed them to remain in business in that country. Pino’s 
attitude reflected a clear interest and pride in keeping the American poultry industry alive 
and well in Mexico: “I think our advice, as far as these commercial companies were 
concerned, was invaluable to them. They wouldn’t go anywhere and pay for this kind of 
advice because it wasn’t available.”43 This mindset of economic pragmatism was well- 
preserved as many of the same people who made the Rockefeller program in Mexico a 
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success played central roles during formation of the Consultative Group for International 
Agricultural Resources (CGIAR). As CGIAR was taking shape, however, European 
nations and the United States Congress were taking critical steps to expand concepts of 
intellectual property to include open pollinated seeds. These steps placed the type of work 
done by the Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico in a new economic light. Adjustment to 
the new status of open pollinated seeds was not fast or easy.  
Intellectual Property Rights for Open Pollinated Plants 
From 1930 to 1970, the crop breeding business matured and took up a central 
place in global agricultural development efforts. Those efforts are discussed in Chapter 
three and began well before the final critical steps took place. Congress took a major step 
toward enhancing the value of sexually produced plants in 1970. The Plant Variety 
Protection Act (PVPA) complemented the Plant Patent Act by granting limited non-
patent intellectual property protection to sexually produced plants.44 Like the Plant Patent 
Act of 1930, the PVPA found its political legs in an economic argument: helping the 
United States breeders complete with their European counterparts by giving them 
economic incentive to expand their research and development.  
European nations took steps to establish an international union for the protection 
of plant varieties in 1961. Its standards for intellectual property protection on plant 
varieties became effective in 1968 when the requisite minimum of three states - 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom - ratified and adopted them.45 
American seed sellers responded by urging Congress to amend the Plant Patent Act of 
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1930 to include sexually produced plant varieties. Critics raised numerous objections, 
including the fact that crop plants changed genetically from year to year. A plant patented 
one year would no longer fit its patent description after one or two generations.46 
Congress removed the final version of the law from the Patent title of the United States 
Code and placed it in the Agriculture title. It mimicked the international standard by 
setting up a system of seventeen-year protection certificates issued through the United 
States Department of Agriculture.47  
As with the 1930 law, economics drove the 1970 law. Industry trade associations 
dominated subcommittee hearings and for the most part spoke strongly in favor of the 
legislation, with the primary emphasis being economic development. The companies 
almost universally claimed that they would invest more funds in their operations with the 
benefit of exclusive rights in their plants. Senator Jack Miller of Iowa, a co-sponsor of the 
bill, stated that private companies could not afford to invest in breeding programs without 
the opportunity to make a profit and that the drafters had designed the legislation to 
“serve as a stimulus for investment of private funds in variety research and development 
of seed.”48 In relation to UPOV, Miller stated that without the PVPA, “people can go 
around us in other countries that compete which us in world markets.”49  
The significant time and cost of breeding drove the economic argument. The 
successful transfer of a specific plant trait to a specific local plant variety required 
multiple generations of breeding, a time estimated by the Department of Agriculture to be 
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twelve years.50 Evaluations of a new plant introduction could require an additional 
decade.51 The potential pay-off, however, was also significant. Raw materials collected in 
Asia in the early 1930s at a cost of about fifty thousand dollars resulted, twenty-five years 
later, in a 1956 soy bean worth one billion dollars per year in revenue.52  
Testimony at the Senate Subcommittee hearings was varied but generally favored 
the proposed law for economic reasons. The American Seed Trade Association presented 
itself to the subcommittee as a growing, dominant and profitable business that did not 
really need the protections the law offered. It conceded, however, that the PVPA would 
permit the government to conduct basic research and private industry to do applied 
research.53 Responding to a claim that the PVPA would hamper the free flow of 
germplasm, the Association claimed that the decision to hold valuable seed for financial 
gain “will be determined by the policy of the individual experiment station” but that had 
not been the case with hybrid corn and sorghum, even though the biological protections 
built into the seed were more theft proof than legal protection.54  
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In a similar vein, the National Council of Commercial Plant Breeders advised that 
“considerable investment” would be made if legal protection provided profitable 
opportunities in plant breeding, citing the green revolution and crediting its success with 
improved varieties made possible through such breeding.55 Stoneville Pedigreed Seed 
Company flatly committed to increase its research expenditures for cotton by over 50% 
should Congress pass the bill.56 Similarly, the cotton industry reported that ten of its 
producers representing 65% of cotton acreage would “at least double” their expenditures 
on cotton varietal development with the establishment of a protection system.57     
Echoes of the 1930 law appeared as well. Coker’s Pedigree Seed Company 
claimed that its Hampton 266 variety of soybean accounted for 83% of the soybean 
acreage of South Carolina, but the company had nevertheless lost hundreds of thousands 
of dollars on the product since many seed growers simply purchased the variety from 
Coker and reproduced it.58  
In a crowning move, Paul Stark, the father of the 1930 law, came forward to 
testify on behalf of his counterparts working in sexually produced varieties, although his 
comments before the Committee were perfunctory and seemed to border on disinterest. 
He stated that work on a law to protect sexually produced varieties had been going on for 
forty years following passage of the Plant Patent Act in 1930: “[S]ince that time we have 
been working on this sexually produced thing, and all these people have worked out 
something. It is the first time we have ever gotten all to seem to agree on something.” 
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Stark highlighted the benefit of increased plant production due to the “requirements of 
our increasing national and world population.”59  
A significant voice of protest emerged in the Campbell Soup Company. 
Campbell’s objected to the impact of the bill on free exchange and ready availability of 
germplasm. They claimed that mere work on the new law had had a chilling effect within 
the scientific community: “As a result of activity in recent years leading up to the present 
proposed Plant Variety Protection Act there has been a perceptible reluctance among 
plant breeders to exchange genetic material.” Final enactment of the law “would 
essentially eliminate exchange of valuable germplasm and severely curtail the 
development of new varieties.” Moreover, those qualities that made plants unique – 
acidity, vitamin content, flavor – required sophisticated equipment and highly trained 
personnel to establish in a plant line. The same result could easily be obtained via control 
of parental material by the breeder.60  
The American Frozen Food Institute also opposed the bill as special interest 
legislation that would allow the private sector to cash in on publicly funded breeding. In 
his testimony, Thomas House claimed that the United States allocated $400 million 
annually, fully half of the USDA’s agricultural research budget, to public breeding either 
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at the USDA or at public universities. Even if a private breeder crossed two varieties to 
produce something new, he argued, those two starting point varieties represented 
“perhaps fifty man years of genetic research by the Department of Agriculture and one of 
our great universities.”61 Under such circumstances, he asserted, the resulting variety 
should not be the subject of a private monopoly.  
The comments of Representative Thomas Kleppe of North Dakota illustrate the 
economic mindset of the Congress during the House Subcommittee hearing: “It seems to 
me that the spirit of competition is what comes into play here. If you develop a better 
seed and the farmers want to buy it, fine, then they will pay a little higher price for it. If 
they will not pay that price for it they will not buy it, so we are getting right back to the 
spirit of competition which is really the basis for our whole system of life in the United 
States. I think that is what is involved here.”62 Another example from floor debate is the 
comments of Representative William Poage of Texas who spoke of a “tremendous 
blight” affecting that year’s corn crop and averred that more and better plant breeding 
would alleviate the blight. The proposed bill would enable people to “get some research 
done in a hurry.”63  
In both 1930 and 1970 Congress was attempting to create financial incentives for 
private investment to replace government support in the plant breeding industry. 
Although there was certainly some comment in 1930 on the wisdom of granting patents 
to things that grew in the soil, there does not appear to have been a conscious decision by 
Congress in either 1930 or 1970 to take up and resolve the question of patentability of 
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living material on any grounds other than economic. This is the landscape in which 
CGIAR emerged and began to wrestle with its own attitude toward material that was 
eligible for intellectual property protection.  
The Birth of CGIAR 
By 1946, Rockefeller Foundation concern about improving agriculture bumped up 
against growing Foundation concerns with over-population. The new Rockefeller 
Foundation President, Chester I. Barnard, linked the population issue to the Mexican 
agricultural program, questioning whether the foundation was acting responsibly by 
helping to improve life expectancy through greater food production while doing nothing 
to address the consequences of a dangerously overpopulated planet.64 By 1951, the 
Rockefeller Foundation had produced a white paper concluding that global tensions were 
the direct result of both overpopulation and inequitable distribution of resources. The 
authors also concluded that: “Agitators from Communist countries are making the most 
of the situation.”65 At a 1965 conference on subsistence and peasant economics, John D. 
Rockefeller III ranked population growth ahead of nuclear arms control in terms of its 
threat to the world. Rockefeller made clear that agricultural improvement was merely a 
‘holding action’ or ‘buying time’ until the population problem could be addressed. The 
link between the two was the subsistence farmer who controlled forty percent of the 
cultivated land in the world. Rockefeller’s comments make clear that the aggressive 
approach to agriculture in Mexico that Borlaug and Harrar exhibited came from the top 
down. The challenge, according to Rockefeller, was to help the farmer use seed, 
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insecticides and machines and to induce him to put aside centuries old methods of 
farming to experiment with total strangers in a way that would risk his very survival.66  
In 1970, the Ford Foundation coordinated a white paper based on a meeting of 
agricultural assistance agencies. The authors noted that a “new vitality” of agriculture had 
reached “farms usually considered traditional, even subsistence, in their production 
patterns.” Such practices, however, had the potential for myriad disruptions, including 
“strains on marketing systems and older patterns of trade; disparities in per capita 
income; rural unemployment and urban migration; and even political unrest.” The authors 
characterized all of these potential negatives as “short-run difficulties” compared to the 
problem of addressed world population growth. The challenge, they concluded, lay in 
creating incentives for profitability and the answer to that challenge was “more modern 
farm technology.”67  
 Controlling hunger through improved agriculture was never far from the issue 
national security. The major foundations and relief organizations were sensitive to the 
political impact of philanthropy, which is not surprising given the pedigrees of men like 
McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara. A 1969 letter from John Harrar to Ford 
Foundation President McGeorge Bundy illustrated this concept on the eve of CGIAR’s 
creation: “Thank you for your letter of February 18 with respect to your conversation 
with Averell Harriman with respect to miracle rice. I have been rather intrigued by the 
rumors that both mainland China and North Vietnam have been trying to get seed and, as 
you know, a recent report states that some has reached Cuba. I would agree with you that 
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we ought to continue to watch future developments and at the right moment learn the 
thinking of the new administration. I am sure you are right also that there are two points 
of view involved and that there may be strong feeling on one side or the other.”68 
 The diverse agendas merged within a group of power brokers who wanted to 
alleviate hunger not only by producing more food but also fewer people. Population 
control grounded the Rockefeller Foundation’s long standing view that helping 
developing nations involved educating them on how to feed themselves and how to 
control their populations. In November of 1969, John D. Rockefeller, III and Robert 
McNamara solicited numerous individuals to participate in “[A] high level meeting of 
major international, national and private agencies concerned with population growth and 
stabilization.” John Harrar described the meeting as informal and off-the-record in his 
invitation to McGeorge Bundy, President of the Ford Foundation.69  
 Those involved in agriculture certainly saw the potential for disaster in unchecked 
population growth and the resulting need for extreme action. John G. Harrar pointed this 
out to John D. Rockefeller, 3rd in his comments on a population conference held in 1970: 
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“I would certainly agree in principal that ‘the end objective of family planning is the 
quality of life.’ The fact is, however, that the quality of life is so unsatisfactory for so 
many millions of people now that unless population stabilization can be brought about in 
some reasonable time dimension, survival will become the major concern … I think that 
realistically it has to be made clear that the only approach to this goal is through the 
establishment of massive and effective efforts toward ZPG.”70  
Given Harrar’s bleak outlook and his sense of urgency regarding the solution, it is 
not surprising that the Rockefeller agricultural team pursued change so aggressively and 
with a focus on economic improvement of the developing world’s agriculture, even at the 
cost of farmers who would not or could not change.  
While it was wrestling with the population issues, the Rockefeller Foundation also 
organized two meetings, in April 1969 and a year later in April 1970, to discuss a more 
formal and coordinated effort at agricultural assistance for the developing world using the 
model of its operations in Mexico and the Philippines. Despite its aversion to bureaucracy 
and red tape, the Rockefeller Foundation recruited entities that had the reputation and the 
funds to grow its two successful agricultural projects into a global network of crop 
improvement. Attendees represented the World Bank, the Ford and Rockefeller 
Foundations, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the United 
States Agency for International Development.   
Robert McNamara attended for the World Bank and served as a key figure for the 
upstart group in terms of both financing and credibility. McNamara embodied the 
melding of philanthropy and American exceptionalism that defined agricultural 
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assistance to developing countries in industrial and capitalistic terms. McNamara had 
assumed the helm of the World Bank in 1968 after seven years as United States Secretary 
of Defense. In that earlier role, McNamara developed a belief that standards of living 
trumped military strength in issues of global stability, thus explaining his interest in the 
idea of agricultural assistance.71 Standards of living related closely to population stability, 
which McNamara also viewed as a contributing factor in preventing the rise of 
authoritarian governments.72  
Financial commitment was key to getting the new program off the ground and the 
Rockefeller Foundation recruited participants for their purse strings as well as their 
commitment to world hunger.73 The parties discussed the extensive work already done by 
the Rockefeller Foundation and the potential for expansion under an umbrella of private 
and public support. McNamara estimated that existing agricultural research institutes 
would require operating capital of  $14 million per year by 1975. Five new research 
centers would require an additional $50 million of capital investment and another $20 
                                                
71 See, William Clark, “Robert McNamara at the World Bank,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Fall, 1981), 
167. 
72 For an excellent summary of McNamara’s view of population and political stability in his own words, 
see, Robert S. McNamara, “Time Bomb or Myth: The Population Problem,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 
5 (Summer, 1984), 1119. 
73 The financial needs were real and immediate, even for the existing program. For example, Rockefeller’s 
CIMMYT facility in Mexico was looking at a deficit of $225,000 in 1970. Lowell Hardin of the 
Rockefeller Foundation thought that USAID could pick up the underage but it did not have the funds. 
According to Hardin, USAID “Pushed the notion that the World Bank should get its feet wet by picking up 
this $225,000.”  Hardin agreed that the World Bank “as the lead horse in the consortium [should be 
encouraged to] pick up CIMMYT’s deficit as an act of good faith.” Lowell Hardin, “Background Notes on 
Consultative Group Meeting,” May 8, 1970, Discussions Re Establishment of Consortium on International 
Agricultural Research 1970-1971, box CG I, Record Group CGIAR, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, 
Rockefeller Archive Center, 1. Hardin speculated on the players in the new consortium in addition to the 
World Bank, which he clearly viewed more as a funding source than a manager: “Based on discussions 
thus far, I would assume that the Scandinavians, the West Germans, the Dutch, possibly the Japanese, 
possibly the Australians would be among those invited to the first meeting. This assumes that the French, 
the British, like the Canadians and the Americans, will proceed on a bilateral basis.” Ibid., 3.  
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million per year for operations. McNamara and others stressed that the foundations would 
have to take the lead in planning, organizing and managing the institutes.74  
McNamara took a lead role in garnering support of his Board of Directors at the 
World Bank and providing its endorsement. McNamara’s memo to the board 
demonstrated the pragmatic and economic approach shared by the other players. 
McNamara stressed the need to bring the developing world into modern agricultural 
practices: “[F]arming and ranching methods based on new technology must take the place 
of the traditional low yield approaches characteristic of a considerable part of the areas 
where there is most need for greater productivity.” As far as crops were concerned, a 
“package” of technology had to be made available in which “improved water and 
fertilizer usage is supplemented by higher yielding varieties, pest and disease control, and 
better husbandry.”75 Regarding his attendance at the Rockefeller-sponsored agricultural 
conferences, McNamara stated that: “It was made plain to me … that an active role for 
the Bank Group would be warmly welcomed.”76 McNamara even claimed a share of 
credit for the CGIAR concept: “I have been tentatively thinking that something along the 
lines of the consultative groups which we have organized for the coordination of 
development assistance might be an appropriate vehicle.”77 McNamara had no desire to 
get into the business of agriculture, however: “The existing institutes have their own 
                                                
74 Sterling Wortman, “Funding of International Agricultural Institutes,” meeting notes, April 8-9, 1970, 
Discussions Re Establishment of Consortium on International Agricultural Research 1970-1971, box CG I, 
Record Group CGIAR, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center. Interestingly, 
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Group CGIAR, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center: 4. 
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76 Ibid., 3. 
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boards of trustees … while some representation of new donors might well be appropriate 
– just as the foundations are now represented on the institutes’ boards – it would be 
extremely important to preserve the independent character of the existing institutes.”78 
World Bank participation would not be in the form of a development loan: “[T]he 
Executive Directors agreed that that the Bank Group should be prepared, while applying 
its normal lending standards and procedures, to finance high priority agricultural 
research, to the extent possible in cooperation with other institutions, national and 
international. … assistance we provide for international institutes … might have to take 
the form of a grant … directly out of net earnings in excess of reserve requirements.”79 
The World Bank board adopted McNamara’s recommendation of funding in the 
form of grants rather than loans and set the figure at three million dollars for 1972, “if the 
requisite funds are not available from other sources.”80 Funding was extremely informal 
given the magnitude of the project. Eight participants pledged amounts ranging from $1 
million to $7 million, with the latter being from the United States. Membership in 
CGIAR, however, did not require a financial commitment and there would be no central 
fund. Participants would be allowed to fund specific projects on a project-by-project 
basis.81 
The Rockefeller Foundation convened a follow-up meeting in February of 1971. 
The general theme of changing farm practices in the developing world from subsistence 
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to commercial, even at the expense of some small operations, dominated the 
conversation. McNamara did not attend a follow-up meeting but sent a message that 
touted the “brilliant results” of the green revolution, adding: “[W]e have learned that the 
traditional farmer is not at all an immovable block to progress; with the right kind of 
incentives and support, he shows himself to be as adaptive and venturesome as any 
man.”82 Paul Hoffman, Administrator of the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) also sent his personal message of economic reorientation. He claimed that 
“[U]nless the improvement we propose makes production much larger, or a great deal 
better in quality, we are unable to persuade the farmer to change from his own known 
way of doing things. This is especially true when the proposed changes involve spending 
more than the farmer is accustomed to spend and more money than he has readily 
available to him. A small change is all very well, but if it doesn’t double, or multiply by 
many times the present yields, we shall get nowhere.” Like the foundations, the UNDP 
was well aware of the fact that population growth exacerbated the problem: “[T]he ever-
new crop of children who are entering the population cycle, whose very numbers are 
predicted, put a newly realized element in the farming problem in all its aspects.”83 
Similarly, both the World Bank and even the United Nations cast the effort in terms of 
aggressively demonstrating to the developing world the potential of new methods of 
farming and doing so ahead of growing population trend. By this time, the organizers had 
toned down financial estimates from McNamara’s initial estimate of $50 million to 
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“something on the order of $32 million in 1975.” That number was not insignificant, 
however, as the participants estimated the funding gap it would create at $21.8 million.84 
Organizational work on the CGIAR progressed steadily to the point of an 
organizational meeting to create the new entity in mid-1971. Despite the hard preliminary 
work, the Rockefeller Foundation promoters took nothing for granted. Two weeks before 
the event, Sterling Wortman urged George Harrar to attend personally: “I would urge you 
to attend this meeting if you possibly can, since it should be the crucial one. We should 
know by the end of that day whether the Consultative Group will get underway in an 
effective way … it seems to me that it is most important that you be present, not only 
because of our need for your judgment regarding arrangements proposed there but to 
gauge the degree of commitment of other donors.”85 That Wortman viewed the attendees 
as ‘donors’ rather than participants or members shines a light on the Rockefeller view 
that governments and bureaucracies were things to be gotten over, under or around. 
Funding was lacking but the vision was solidly in place.  
If funding was a primary concern, economic potential was not far behind. In May 
1971, the Agency for International Development sent a letter to the Ford Foundation with 
“views widely held in the Agency” regarding the pending and expected meeting to 
establish the CGIAR. The agency’s clear desire was to shine a brighter light on the 
potential for the agricultural research centers to foster economic growth as sponsors of 
developing technologies: “[W]e believe it essential to take greater account of the social 
and economic impact of the new agricultural technologies which the International 
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Centers have been so important in developing and disseminating. This should influence 
the choice of alternative technologies to research.”86  
 The organizers of CGIAR met on May 19, 1971 in Washington, DC. Twenty-four 
delegations attended and twenty-eight delegates participated. Delegates from Canada, the 
United States and the United Kingdom, as well as the Ford, Rockefeller and Kellogg 
Foundations came ready to join. Australia, France and Germany required further 
permissions.87 The meeting summary did not list or mention any private entities.  
David Bell of the Ford Foundation described the new entity as “[A]n interesting 
new invention which offers the hope of tying together first-class scientific judgment and 
major sources of financing.”88 If there was any question as to which of the two roles was 
to be served by the invited attendees, the foundations quickly dispelled it. In typical 
Rockefeller fashion, the foundations reported on “agreements reached in earlier informal 
meetings” regarding high priority research.89 One unnamed participant suggested that the 
United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization should simply assume the duties 
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proposed for the new entity but “there was a clear majority in favor of establishing a 
consultative group.”90 
 The first stated objective of CGIAR was: “[T]o examine the needs of developing 
countries for special efforts in agricultural research at the international and regional levels 
in critical subject sectors unlikely otherwise to be adequately covered by existing 
research facilities.”91 Other stated objectives included coordination with other research 
programs and: “[T]o encourage full exchange of information among national, regional 
and international agricultural research centers.”92 Participants authorized the United 
Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization to designate no more than five developing 
nations for not more than two-year membership, each to represent a major region of the 
developing world. 
The participants quickly decided that they were not able or qualified to oversee 
the operations of agricultural research centers around the globe and so they created a 
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) of twelve persons consisting of “distinguished 
international experts” nominated by the sponsors. TAC became the heartbeat of CGIAR. 
Located at the Rome headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization, TAC 
reflected the Rockefeller spirit - a committee of scientific experts, not administrators or 
politicians. CGIAR charged TAC with advising on gaps and priorities in agricultural 
research on behalf of developing countries, establishing and evaluating feasibility studies, 
fostering an international network of research institutions and exchanging of information 
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among them.93 Ironically, despite the strong admonition that TAC would be scientific in 
its membership and outlook, the organizers selected as the TAC chair Sir John Crawford, 
an economist and Chancellor at Australian National University. One other economist 
served on the TAC, Dr. David Hopper, President of the International Development 
Research Center in Canada. The remaining members were scientists in various fields of 
agriculture. The only member of TAC from the United States was John Harrar, President 
of the Rockefeller Foundation and himself a plant pathologist.94 
As CGIAR took shape, the Rockefeller Foundation acted as a coordinator in 
fundraising, even so far as ‘suggesting’ to potential members what their contributions 
should be. On December 13, 1971 Arie Kruithof, Secretary to CGIAR, met with Lowell 
Hardin, John Pino and Sterling Wortmann at the Rockefeller Foundation to review 
pledges for financial support in anticipation of meetings with four new donors for the 
1972 fiscal year: Germany, Belgium, Denmark, and the World Bank. According to the 
meeting notes: “[I]t was agreed that [Mr. Kruithof] might suggest utilization of [financial 
commitments] as follows … ” Two days later, Kruithof advised that Richard Demuth 
preferred to allow the new donors to express their own preferences before receiving 
suggestions. He also asked that the Rockefeller Foundation not publish its proposals for 
giving.95 
With CGIAR established, there existed a coordinated effort of crop research 
aimed at helping developing countries improve agricultural yields through application of 
more modern techniques. The documents surrounding the formation of CGIAR suggest 
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that it came into existence to help foster a more commercial approach to farming in the 
long run and to resolve immediate financial problems in funding crop research in the 
short run. Fashionable predictions of a doomed planet if issues of overpopulation were 
not immediately addressed made all of these concerns more urgent. Using crop 
improvement as a crutch in the interim only accelerated interest in commercial farming 
methods to the exclusion of other concerns. For these reasons, the economic drivers 
behind American agriculture remained firmly in place within CGIAR.  
CGIAR’s Growing Identity Crisis 
 At its inception, CGIAR was little more than an informal group of donors 
interested in financing expansion of the Rockefeller model for agricultural research (i.e., 
aggressive change with minimal obstruction). While the loose structure allowed science 
to dominate over politics, it soon presented structural and legal problems that directly 
affected CGIAR’s most valuable asset: its seeds. Two dynamics emerged. First, diverse 
agendas plagued CGIAR from the start. The United Nations organization brought cultural 
and environmental issues to the table while the governments of the industrial world 
pushed economic pragmatism. These conflicts exposed the lack of strong central 
leadership within CGIAR. Second, CGIAR wrestled for years with the question of how it 
could maintain its key asset, raw germplasm, within a system of free contribution and 
free sharing while operating within a larger paradigm that threatened to punish it for its 
lack of legal identity and protocols. The story of how CGIAR addressed these issues is a 
case study of the relentless advancement of economic interests and the ultimate failure to 
resist them for lack of historical precedent.    
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CGIAR’s centerpiece was its existing and planned agricultural research centers. 
The research center scientists, like the team in Mexico in the 1940s, focused their efforts 
on increased crop yields through introduction of improved plant varieties. Critical to their 
efforts was collection and use of diverse seed samples from developing nations which, as 
cooperative partners with CGIAR, freely donated their germplasm in exchange for 
training, education and return of improved seeds for planting. Over time, this process 
resulted in CGIAR having custodianship of an extensive and enviable collection of 
germplasm. As the value of its seed collections become more apparent, the weaknesses of 
the CGIAR structure became more troublesome. The CGIAR board allocated funds and 
set policy based on the advice of various committees, but its members walked a fine line 
between control and cooperation in terms of the research centers, which had their own 
boards and remained largely independent in terms of day-to-day work and direction of 
research.  
As the program grew in size and value, CGIAR’s board disagreed over objectives 
and strategy. A number of disparate interests sat on and around the CGIAR table and 
when it became clear that CGIAR held a valuable commercial asset, those interests began 
to split along familiar lines. Some saw CGIAR’s seed banks as an economic asset to be 
exploited for profit while others saw them as a trust asset to be preserved and shared in 
the same spirit in which they were donated.96 Numerous questions soon came to the fore, 
most critically: Did CGIAR have a legal identity and who, exactly, owned its vast 
collection of seeds? These questions became increasingly urgent as the ability to claim 
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intellectual property rights in plants expanded around the globe through both UPOV and 
the PVPA, which were both in their infancy as CGIAR came into existence.  
TAC’s Vision: Expansive and Expensive 
Members of TAC quickly set about examining CGIAR in light of their charge to 
identify gaps and priorities in agricultural research on behalf of developing countries. The 
committee immediately recognized the critical role of germplasm in CGIAR’s mission 
and wasted no time in submitting a proposal to establish a network of genetic resource 
centers. The centers’ purpose, according to TAC, would be for: “[E]xploration and 
collection of plant genetic resources, their long-term conservation, their evaluation and 
distribution of information on their characteristics and availability, and the promotion of 
their utilisation on current breeding programmes throughout the world.”97 Describing 
developing world nations as “centres of genetic diversity,” TAC advocated not only for 
collection and conservation, but also for “vigorous plant introduction programmes” in 
those locations. TAC envisioned eleven genetic resource centers in Italy, Turkey, 
Afghanistan, India, the Philippines, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru and 
Nanking. The centers were to be associated with national scientific institutions and 
located only in countries free of any restriction on exchange of plant material, with open 
quarantine policies and with no restrictions on exploration.98 The authors stressed 
conservation of the traditional methods of research and specifically included non-CGIAR 
entities as participants: “To be effective, genetic resources conservation must have a 
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world-wide impact, demanding a completely unrestricted exchange of plant materials and 
data relating to them, between developing and developed countries.”99  
With its aggressive proposal, TAC cast the CGIAR mission in a broader 
perspective and highlighted the problematic nature of agricultural improvement along the 
industrial model. It also made the critical connection between the economic benefit of 
commercial agriculture in the developing world and the economic necessity of 
responsible stewardship of genetic diversity. TAC served a warning to CGIAR that the 
new organization had the potential to be its own worst enemy, particularly if CGIAR 
adopted a shortsighted view of the nature and purpose of plant germplasm. Replacement 
by local farmers of primitive cultivars with advanced varieties exacerbated the challenge 
of maintaining a diverse population of indigenous plants growing and multiplying in 
nature, also known as landraces. Referring to the very regions CGIAR was attempting to 
help with agricultural aid, TAC warned that “[T]he richness in primitive types is fast 
disappearing, as new and superior man-made cultivars replace the old varieties. However, 
it is to these old varieties that the breeders in all countries have to turn to obtain the 
factors of resistance, quality and other characteristics for the further improvement of the 
current cultivars.”100  
TAC members were keenly aware of the culpability of the Rockefeller 
Foundation program, which CGIAR was designed to replicate and perpetuate on a larger 
scale. TAC pulled no punches in its assessment. Use of uniform varieties “wiped out” 
genetic diversity, which opened the door to epidemic, disease and pests. For example, 
Turkish wheat crops were 95% improved varieties, 85% of which was improved Mexican 
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wheat, the very wheat for which the Rockefeller Foundation and Norman Borlaug had 
received worldwide praise. Grain legumes in Indo-Pakistan, the near east and North 
Africa had declined by 2.2 million ha over the seven-year period 1963 to 1970 due to the 
introduction of Mexican varieties. This funneling of genetic diversity had worked to the 
detriment of grain selection and breeding programs. TAC concluded: “We thus need 
desperately to maintain as much genetic variability as possible for our breeding 
programmes – but at the same time the greatest genetic variability occurs in the 
developing countries where it is necessary to replace the old cultivars with others of 
higher quality or yield. This is a challenging paradox to which a solution is urgently 
required.”101 In short, feeding the world in the short term could destroy it in the long 
term.  
TAC readily conceded that expense and multiple international borders threatened 
to hamper the effort: “No country can today support an advanced and competitive 
agriculture based on indigenous plants alone.”102 Even if one found a plant-rich country 
with much valuable diversity, it was invariably a developing country that did not have the 
money or the expertise to select and artificially maintain the resource. The solution, 
according to TAC, was regional or world seed collections that would preserve and 
provide the improved materials to the developing countries that they could not afford to 
create or maintain themselves. Although the TAC members had readily conceded that 
myriad questions remained unanswered as to targeted species for collection, place of 
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storage, manner of evaluation and ultimate use, the committee did not relent in pushing 
the issue before the CGIAR board.103   
 The CGIAR board blanched at the proposal on both economic and policy 
grounds. An internal Ford Foundation memo expressed concern about expanded 
collection and storage of plant genetic resources, which was moving quickly toward an 
annual expenditure of $1.6 million. The memo’s author clearly did not believe that 
CGIAR’s funding members had anticipated such expansion, especially when existing 
facilities seemed to be adequate.104 The Ford Foundation memo illustrated what would 
become a growing division of opinion between the propriety of broad environmental 
projects and those focused on producing more food. In the minds of many, protecting 
endangered landraces was not CGIAR’s primary focus unless those landraces were being 
used to increase crop yields for farmers. The memo also reflected a hint of politics 
creeping into the results-driven model on which CGIAR was based: “This is a difficult 
one. The RF believes this to be much more money than is required given the role that 
existing and prospective international centers can perform – along with the banks in the 
industrialized nations. USAID has reservations too. This is bound up in: (a) the ecology 
movement (b) giving FAO a role (Trust Fund and offices) (c) strong push for Sir John 
Crawford’s Australian colleague, Sir Otto Frankel … Perhaps an out would be to request 
a low priority for it[.]”105 
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The sentiment of the Ford Foundation and others is reflected in the notes of John 
A. Pino from the Rockefeller Foundation regarding CGIAR’s November 1972 meeting to 
discuss the issue: “In discussions which JAP had prior to and during the meeting, it was 
obvious that practically none of the major donors were sympathetic to this proposal.” 
Pino offered a laundry list of concerns from the Rockefeller Foundation including the 
order of priority for preservation and the inappropriate emphasis on preservation of non-
food crops. Pino bristled, however, at any suggestion of wholesale dismissal of seed 
collection, stressing that the research centers definitely required working collections of 
germplasm. In his mind, however, that need was limited to rice, wheat, maize and, 
eventually, sorghum and millet. The question in his mind was what to do about other less 
critical crops that were threatened by modern farming. One representative suggested that 
the entire seed program was a task best left to the FAO and funded “through its regular 
channels.” The FAO representative professed willingness and authority under its charge 
to support the proposal but for a lack of funding, an excuse Pino found to be “rather 
weak.” The CGIAR board, in a prophetic move, ultimately concluded that more 
information was needed.106  
TAC’s aggressiveness toward preservation of bio-diversity and CGIAR’s 
hesitation reflected a disagreement over priority more than vision. The CGIAR Board 
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was not entirely convinced by TAC’s warnings, nor was it ready to subordinate practices 
that addressed more urgent needs. Although the CGIAR board readily welcomed study 
and discussion of environmental issues and the long term need to address them, it did not 
stray from the philosophy of the Mexican project. People primarily concerned about 
population size and starvation founded CGIAR and, along with industrial nations wedded 
to commercial agriculture, controlled its policy decisions and purse strings. By the same 
token, although the TAC members wanted to see more effort toward collection and 
preservation, it was in no way opposed to the manner in which collected germplasm 
should be used. The members of TAC made this plain in their 1973 report to the CGIAR 
Board. Improved crop production would not come from simply giving farmers better 
seeds. Increasing yields involved “intensification” of agriculture. The end game was not 
just full stomachs but economic stability as well: “[A]lthough increasing yields and 
production of basic staple foods must remain a priority goal, the ultimate objective of 
agricultural research development is the economic well-being of the people. We must not 
be so bewitched with the hopes of further spectacular successes of single crops that we 
fail to recognize that other pathways to growth may exist. In some regions, for ecological, 
social, or economic reasons, research of a broader nature – even if it appears more 
complex, may offer the better hope of a solution. Where such an approach seems 
desirable the TAC and the Consultative Group must grasp the nettle boldly.” Technology 
could be “manipulated” to achieve socio-economic goals as well as higher yields.107  
John Pino from the Rockefeller Foundation echoed this philosophy in a speech 
later that year. Pino was well aware of the challenges of bringing modern agriculture to 
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the developing world. Although he was mindful of the cultural aspects, he was also 
absolute in the ultimate rightness of both the cause and the method. Although scientists 
had replaced terms such as ‘equation,’ ‘balance,’ and ‘ZPG’ with the softer ‘quality of 
life,’ there was nevertheless a different end game between the developed world and the 
developing world when it came to such terms: “In the present context, ‘quality of life’ for 
two-thirds of the world’s people must be construed as meaning, first, assurance of the 
material conditions of survival.” To achieve that goal would “[R]equire intensive 
application of the very knowledge and techniques the we in the West have sometimes 
abused, to our disgrace.”108 According to Pino, the cultural problem for agricultural 
reformists in the third world was not quality of life so much as the intractability of 
tradition and the very human frailty of pride and ambition. The third world was rigidly 
stratified between laborers and the intelligentsia. It also suffered from the common 
element of political power over practical solutions. As a result, according to Pino, 
researchers faced the challenge of governments that turned over far more quickly than the 
slow and deliberate machinations of crop breeding. A new political administration from a 
rival party did not always back agricultural programs that recently displaced rivals 
conceived and supported. Thus, a careful breeding program could hit a political brick 
wall in mid-development. Direct experience with this problem accounted for the 
Rockefeller philosophy of, first, establishing and funding autonomous research agencies 
that worked with politicians but did not rely on them financially for survival and, second, 
exciting the local agricultural community with ‘spectacular’ results in the field.109 It is 
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here that the attitudes of Pino and the Foundation were revealed in all of their 
Machiavellian splendor: “Show the farmer that he can make a substantial profit by using 
the new technology, and he will abandon the venerated ways of his fathers without a 
backward glance … In case someone is planning to ask me, isn’t that manipulation? The 
answer is yes.”110  
In a second speech the following year, Pino also warned that no amount of 
agricultural progress could counter unchecked population growth. He was fatalistic on the 
need for change: “Although it may mean a massive effort to upgrade services and 
infrastructure, most of the developing countries are going to be obliged to adopt this so-
called green-revolution strategy.”111 He was also bullish on the opportunity for private 
investment and trade, particularly in the areas of food preservation, storage, processing, 
drying, marketing, transportation, and farm implements, all made possible by the system 
CGIAR established: “The international institutional network is a ready-made bridge 
between the needs of low-income countries for capital and technical assistance and the 
needs of the American investor seeking sound opportunities in agriculture-related fields.” 
Experts would also be needed as middle men with local governments who could “[G]rasp 
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the codes and signals of a different culture so as to interpret the people’s meanings and 
motives, and gauge the extent of their commitment.”112   
Pino reiterated this theme in a statement to CGIAR, reminding it of the need to 
stay focused on results and free of roadblocks. His statement was a manifesto for modern 
agriculture on the grounds that there was simply no price too high to pay for feeding 
hungry people. According to Pino, in 1943 when the Mexico program was established, 
the Rockefeller Board “[C]ould not have foreseen the establishment of a world system 
such as we have here today, which has such an amazing degree of informality, agility, 
and capability to effectively come to grips with the common world condition, and that is 
the nutrition and feeding of the world’s people…We believe the system and we believe in 
it and we feel confident in its effectiveness…as long as we avoid overbearing 
bureaucracy and superstructures at all levels … Theories and studies may be fine but 
people’s stomachs will have to feel the satisfaction of food, perhaps at any cost.”113 
Despite agreeing in general with CGIAR and Rockefeller about the benefits of 
commercial agriculture, the TAC members did not relent on the subject of preservation. 
In 1973, TAC reiterated to CGIAR the urgent need for action to collect, evaluate, 
preserve and exchange the world’s diminishing reserves of crop genetic materials. This 
time, the United Nations Environmental Program members stepped up to echo TAC’s 
call. The UNEP presented a report to CGIAR stressing that success in genetic plant 
research required the use of varied plant materials that crossed national boundaries. The 
fact that no single country could control all species necessary for productive breeding 
necessitated international cooperation. The report included a proposal that would foster 
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debate for years to come. The report proposed “an international agreement, treaty or 
charter to be subscribed to by all countries … built upon the principle that the world’s 
basic genetic resources are the heritage of all mankind; that these invaluable natural 
resources should be available through legitimate channels for the betterment of all 
peoples.”114 The underlying objective of the treaty would include “universal availability 
to bonafide scientists and specialists of the world’s primitive and developed genetic 
resources.”115 Once again, the project’s scope was broader than the basic food crops 
CGIAR supported. The report estimated the cost of collection, study and preservation of 
plant material at two million dollars with half being dedicated to crops and the remainder 
split among four other areas: forest and range ($400,000); animals ($300,000); micro-
organisms ($200,000) and ecological ($100,000).116  
The CGIAR board responded by establishing a Subcommittee on Genetic 
Resources to review the proposal in greater detail.117 The new subcommittee held its first 
meeting in October 1973 in Rome. It concluded that CGIAR, in collaboration with the 
FAO, should create an International Board for Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR). The 
board’s charge would be to explore, collect, evaluate and conserve species of “major 
economic importance” and make them available for breeding, with the work to be carried 
out by a “world wide network of institutions, organizations and programmes.”118  
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The Genetic Resources subcommittee envisioned a fourteen member board with 
CGIAR electing thirteen of those members, including four seats held by nationals of 
developing countries and six seats held by scientists. An ex-officio member the FAO 
appointed would hold the final seat.119 CGIAR agreed to this proposal and established the 
board around those parameters.120  
Although IBPGR membership reflected scientific research and developing 
nations, the funding came from the industrial world. The sub-committee expected its 
initial funding of $300,000 to $500,000, far less than the two million the UNDP 
suggested, to come from Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the Rockefeller 
Foundation with possible future support from the United States and Canada.121  
The plan to form IBPGR was well on its way by late 1973 and TAC saw within it 
the tools to promote a broader view of the CGIAR mission to not only feed the world but 
also guide it in preserving its biodiversity. TAC paired the sense of possibility with a 
sense of urgency as TAC Chair, Dr. M. S. Swaminathan, warned CGIAR of the urgent 
need for exploration, collection and long-term storage of primitive cultivars that were fast 
disappearing in many parts of the world. It was critical that those views be represented in 
whatever governing body was established to address them.122 According to notes of John 
Pino, the FAO “[E]xpressed great satisfaction with the progress which has been made, 
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and assured [CGIAR] of the great interest of the FAO in support of this program.”123 
Support and funding, however, were two different things: “[A] number of nations express 
still some reservation in committing support for this activity until the Board is formed 
and it is known more precisely how it will function. It was clearly apparent that none of 
the potential supporters wanted this is activity to become dominated by the FAO, and that 
they fully expected a rather clear definition of priorities to be established by the 
Board.”124  
IBPGR Joins the Debate 
The IBPGR assumed a low profile at the outset, focusing on nuts and bolts issues 
such as information storage and retrieval. Collecting seeds was not going to be useful if 
they were not property catalogued. The IBPGR Chair, Richard Demuth, warned the 
CGIAR board not to expect headlines from the newly formed group: “[W]e won’t have 
any dramatic breakthroughs to report and we are not likely to have any graphic record of 
results of our work to portray to you on slides. We are a backstopping operation, in a 
sense a piece of infrastructure, designed to develop an action program.”125 Four CGIAR 
members (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) established a 
central fund of $225,000 for the IBPGR. The Rockefeller Foundation committed to 
another $100,000.126 Neither the money nor IBPGRs timidity lasted for long. After one 
year of existence, the IBPGR submitted a proposed budget of $729,000 for 1975. It 
divided the bulk of funds between development of a computer-based records system and 
                                                
123 John Pino, “Summary of CGIAR meeting of November 1-2, 1973,” folder 9, box CG II, Record Group 
CGIAR, Rockefeller Foundation Archives: 2. 
124 Ibid., 3. 
125 “Statement of Richard H. Demuth,” 1974 International Centers Week Meeting, folder 10, box CG II, 
Record Group CGIAR, Rockefeller Foundation Archives: 2.  
126 Ibid., 5.   
  
140 
support for germplasm activities at the CGIAR research centers, particularly those that 
represented special projects for which the centers had no line item in their own 
budgets.127  
 The IBPGR found its advocacy voice as well. Commenting on the one-year 
anniversary of the IBPGR, its Chair reiterated TAC’s comments regarding the inherent 
conflict faced by those who sought to feed the world through commercial farming 
techniques. The very practices the green revolution embraced and CGIAR expanded had 
the potential to work against long-term preservation goals: “[C]ollecting expeditions must 
be mounted to save invaluable genetic diversity which is in danger of loss, and loss 
forever, either as a result of new agricultural practices or changes in land use or in 
climactic conditions.”128 The simple fact was that expanded planting with uniform crop 
varieties worked against natural diversity. The IBPGR Chair also emphasized that merely 
collecting germplasm would not be adequate. Researchers had to use those collections for 
some productive purpose or they would be “dead gene banks.” Key to productive use of 
the seed collections was free exchange, an issue on which the IBPGR was in lockstep 
with the United Nations. “It is a basic principal established by the board that any program 
or institution that we may support should agree that there be a free exchange of 
information about the germplasm that is collected and a free exchange of materials.”129 
Once again, the specter of imminent doom hung over the deliberations, pushing the 
CGIAR board to act quickly in areas of the most potential benefit. “Funds, trained 
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personnel, indeed time, are all so limited that we feel we must concentrate on priority 
crops and on priority regions.” In other words, the IBPGR pushed the CGIAR board to to 
act in a way that created the greatest good for the greatest number of people, or what 
IBPGR Chair Demuth called a “thoroughly pragmatic” approach.130 In the view of the 
IBPGR members in 1975, the crops deserving of priority status for collection and 
preservation were wheat, maize, rice, sorghum, millet and barley. The areas of the globe 
identified for collecting activities were South and Southeast Asia, the Mediterranean, 
Ethiopia and central and south America.  
Demuth continued to view IBPGR as a support organization with a limited life 
span: “[O]nce the major gaps in collections of all the major crops have been filled, the 
program should operate itself … so I hope that in 10 years or so [i.e. by 1985] the 
International Board would be advising the Consultative Group that its functions have 
been completed and the system is operating by itself.”131 In a short period of time, the 
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IBPGR had supported TAC’s call for a broader agenda at CGIAR but had also pushed 
CGIAR to be just as fast and pragmatic in preserving bio-diveristy as it was in trying to 
increase the world’s food supply. In both cases, failure to act quickly spelled disaster for 
the planet.  
Which Disaster Comes First? The Struggle to Prioritize 
Despite the growing chorus of support for long-term preservation of bio-diversity 
in crops, the key players in CGIAR continued to focus on food production and population 
control. Failure to address these issues obviated the need to address issues of bio-
diversity. The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations worked closely with a growing sense 
that the window of opportunity was closing fast, even to the point of abandoning 
philanthropic efforts to feed the world. In a chilling memo, the Ford Foundation 
described a situation with world hunger and population growth that demanded resolution 
within a decade or two if it was going to be resolved at all. Failing a fast and aggressive 
solution, nothing remained but to withdraw and watch the devastation at a distance. 
Sterling Wortman at Rockefeller forwarded the confidential Ford Foundation memo to 
John Pino with the handwritten note: “For your own use. Not for further distribution 
since this is an internal FF document given us in confidence.”132 The document was 
actually two separate internal memos discussing the level of Ford Foundation support for 
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CGIAR research centers in 1975. One of the documents, a May 15 memorandum from 
F.F. Hill of Ford to Lowell Hardin of Rockefeller put forth a dour view of the future and 
the need to push developing countries aggressively: “[T]raditional, low-yield agriculture 
simply cannot produce the food that is going to be needed. Developing countries must 
shift to modern, science-based, high-yield agriculture if their people are to be fed … there 
is no alternative to shifting.” Later on: “The main thrust of the international centers 
program is, of course, to follow the example of advanced countries and help develop 
varieties of food crops suitable for use in [less developed countries] that are capable of 
transforming large amounts of fertilizer into food.”133 Changing agricultural techniques in 
developing nations was a process that required time, as the Rockefeller personnel had 
learned in Mexico: “Radically changing the character of the plant that is grown (e.g., 
hybrid corn, dwarf rice) and the package of practices that must go with it if it is to 
perform as anticipated, and moving the complete new package into the farmers’ fields, is 
something quite different. It is not easy. It takes time, particularly in [less developed 
countries] where the attitudes and operations of governments and other institutions as 
well as farmers, must be changed.”134 Set against the sobering predictions of population 
growth, the race was on: “Like many others, I had been working on the assumption 
(hope) that with all-out effort on the world food front and favourable weather there might 
be another 20-30 years in which [less developed countries] would have an opportunity to 
start reducing birth rates by significant amounts. I am now beginning to wonder (doubt) 
whether some of the heavily populated, land-scarce [less developed countries] (India, 
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Bangladesh) have that much time.”135 If the time was not available, there was little point 
in throwing funding after a lost cause: “If and when this point is reached [10-15 years in 
the future] there will be little justification in continuing to support international centers 
whether the population/food race is being won or lost.”136 
The attitude expressed between the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations justified the 
aggressive nature of agricultural reform at the expense of cultural and environmental 
preservation. The Rockefeller model premised agricultural assistance on raising the 
standard of living by generating more income and greater use of birth control. As with 
intellectual property laws and agricultural policy in the United States from its inception, 
economic pragmatism dominated in global agricultural philanthropy, albeit for different 
reasons. In the United States, the goal was to build a robust and economically healthy 
nation. In the developing world, the goal was to stave off the twin disasters of 
communism and starvation with the latter caused by a combination of too many people 
and too little food production. It is no surprise, therefore, that when the actors in this 
effort came to fully appreciate the true economic value of their seed collections, they 
struggled mightily with how to administer them. 137 
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While CGIAR moved forward on the green revolution model with the attitude that 
it represented the fastest solution to the most pressing issues, a second factor began to 
work against the long-term seed conservation lobby. After a few years of operation, 
CGIAR’s donors began to demand a better understanding of what their donations were 
accomplishing. The Ford Foundation staff observed a clear preference among donor 
nations for identifiable and marketable results that could be used to justify future 
donations and to generate goodwill. The Ford Foundation saw this attitude as 
dangerously short sighted. Mounting pressure from donors on the CGIAR research 
centers to increase their community outreach, perhaps at the expense of research, placed 
the centers “under considerable pressure to comply.”138 In other words, those who 
supplied the money wanted to see tangible results to which they could attach their names. 
Crop yields made for headlines and public interest. Years of quiet research did not. While 
this mentality threw yet another roadblock in front of collection and preservation 
activities, it also posed a distraction to basic research. A movement emerged in 1975 to 
permit donor attendance at board meetings of the research centers, with the clear 
understanding that certain portions of the meeting would be closed.139  
In the meantime, TAC continued to push its own agenda, looking more like an 
autonomous body than an advisory one. In a summary of the October 1975 meeting of 
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CGIAR, TAC Chair Sir John Crawford reported that TAC would henceforth monitor the 
activities of the International Center for Insect Physiology & Ecology (ICIPE). In his 
notes, John Pino simply wrote: “Ugh!”140 Agendas would continue to diverge as the 
decade of the 1970s waned. In 1977, the FAO forestry department proposed expenditure 
of $5 million over five years for preservation of forest genetic resources. CGIAR was to 
provide funding of $870,000. Included in the FAOs justification for forestry research was 
the desire for controlled production of wood used as cooking fuel, forest cover for 
watershed and valley crop protection, and even the production of hoe handles to cultivate 
food, tables on which to eat food and cupboards in which to store it. The FAO summary 
concluded with a bible verse: “Man shall not live by bread alone.”141 Pino’s handwritten 
notes on the cover memo reflected his concern: “Is this Forestry effort to gain inclusion 
in the IBPGR an effort to get a ‘foot in the door?’ The project proposal included as annex 
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1977, folder 14, box TAC II, Record Group CGIAR, Rockefeller Foundation Archives.  
  
147 
IV suggests this. I would be opposed since it is not within current CGIAR guidelines and 
we could easily identify other more worthy activities dealing with crops and animals.”142 
By the mid-1970s, CGIAR was starting to show signs of stress from too many 
agendas and not enough money. In fact, the Rockefeller Foundation had come to the 
conclusion that funding of its agricultural science programs, the largest component of 
which was by far the crop research institutes, would be decreased steadily over the 
remainder of the decade from a then-current $3,050,000 in 1975 to $1,250,000 in 1979, 
with the lower amount representing salaries of Rockefeller Foundation employees on 
assignment at the institutes.143  
In 1975, North American donors to CGIAR met informally with CGIAR to 
discuss likely contributions for 1976 and on how to achieve budget reductions if 
necessary.144 Costs were going up while donations were not. The United States was far in 
the lead with a monetary commitment to CGIAR of $15.1 million followed by the World 
Bank at $6.8 million.145 John Pino’s files reflected concerns on the part of the World 
Bank, however: “While Mr. Cheek was on the phone I asked him what the prospects 
were for 1975. He said that the requirements seem to have skyrocketed over the current 
year.”146  
One year later, the Board trimmed the total budget request for the CGIAR 
research centers from $84.5 million to $79.7 million in the 1977 budget year, the lower 
                                                
142 John Pino, handwritten notes on Executive Secretary to CGIAR members, undated memorandum, folder 
14, box TAC II, Record Group CGIAR, Rockefeller Foundation Archives.  
143 John A. Pino to Misc., memorandum, May 12, 1975, folder 2, box CG V, Record Group CGIAR, 
Rockefeller Foundation Archives: 2.  
144 Michael L. Lejeune to Sterling Wortman, 16 September 1975, folder 14, box CG III, Record Group 
CGIAR, Rockefeller Foundation Archives.  
145 “CGIAR Allocations, 1976,” Summary of CGIAR meeting, October, 1975, folder 10, box CG III, 
Record Group CGIAR, Rockefeller Foundation Archives: Annex IV.  
146 John Pino to file, memorandum re phone call with Bruce Cheek at World Bank on June 3, 1974,  
folder 5, box CG IV, Record Group CGIAR, Rockefeller Foundation Archives. 
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amount still represented a jump from the $63.6 million budget in 1976 and the $47.1 
million budget in 1975.147 Twenty-four donors supported CGIAR in 1977. The largest, by 
far, remained the United States with a commitment that had grown to $20 million. The 
smallest was Denmark at $70,000. The Rockefeller Foundation committed $1.6 
million.148 By 1978, estimates for CGIAR funding had risen to $87.6 million. The United 
States remained the lead donor with a commitment of $21.7 million followed by the 
World Bank at $8.6 million.149  
 Program expansion and budget woes continued to create conflicts as the decade 
came to a close. In 1979, TAC proposed the creation of an International Center for 
Vegetable Research within CGIAR. Pino’s  handwritten notes suggest a chilly reception: 
“[The proposal] Was sent back to TAC with comment that the long list of crops proposed 
could result in unlimited staff expansion. More important reason, however, was the 
reluctance of many donors to take on the cost of a new center.”150 By 1979, budget 
concerns had blossomed into territoriality. John Pino’s notes on the 1979 CGIAR 
meeting reflect the growing reality that a program with no limits as to what its talented 
staff might accomplish was severely limited as to what it could spend. The CGIAR Board 
agreed “in principal” to the CGIAR research centers’ future goals but, according to Pino: 
                                                
147 CGIAR Secretariat, memorandum, folder 2, box CG V, Record Group CGIAR, Rockefeller Foundation 
Archives: appendix.  
148 “Pledges of CGIAR members for 1977,” folder 3, box CG V, Record Group CGIAR, Rockefeller 
Foundation Archives. The order of contribution was: Unites States $20 million; IBRD $7.5 million; Canada 
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149 “CGIAR Tentative Estimated 1978 Financial Allocations,” January 30, 1978, Informal Summary of 
Proceedings of CGIAR Meeting of November 16-17, 1977, folder 14, box CG V, Record Group CGIAR, 
Rockefeller Foundation Archives: Annex IV.  
150 John Pino handwritten note on CGIAR Secretariat, memorandum, March 23, 1979, folder 7, box CG IV, 
Record Group CGIAR, Rockefeller Foundation Archives. 
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“A number of delegations, however, raised questions concerning the capability of the 
donors to continue to meet the expanding needs of the present system, much less the cost 
of new activities.” Only Germany, Switzerland and the United States assured real growth 
in contributions for 1980, although the US representative from USAID indicated that its 
CGIAR contribution would simply remove funds from other projects and stressed “…that 
it was absolutely essential that the growth of the existing centers be curtailed” and that 
their 1980 budget increases were “far too much.” Canada recommended a policy of no 
real growth going forward. John Pino blamed the tepid support on high inflation and the 
fact that “[T]he world food problem is no longer in the headlines and the sense of 
urgency which once existed is no longer felt.” He also bemoaned the: “[T]endency for the 
European donor group to look upon themselves as a separate grouping with their own 
specific interests separate from those of the North American Group. This tendency 
toward fragmentation could have serious repercussions on the future of the CGIAR if it 
continues to develop.”151  
In the midst of CGIAR’s money woes in face of the research centers’ ambitious 
agendas, environmental advocates continued to sound the alarm for a fast-approaching 
day of reckoning. If the urgent calls of TAC and IBPGR for collection and preservation 
of germplasm were not heard and acted upon in less than a decade, they claimed, it could 
be too late to save the world’s plant gene stock in ten critical zones: the Mediterranean 
basin, West Africa, Ethiopia, Central Asia, Southwest Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, 
Mexico and Central America, the Andes, and Brazil.152 The solution was not as simple as 
collecting and housing seeds in one place. Absolute security necessitated duplicate 
                                                
151 John Pino, notes on CGIAR meeting of May 3-4, 1979, folder 7, box CG VI, Record Group CGIAR, 
Rockefeller Foundation Archives. 
152 Norman Myers, “The Exhausted Earth,” Foreign Policy, No. 42 (Spring, 1981), 144. 
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collections and some seeds required specific storage conditions while others demanded 
constant regeneration.153 
According to CGIAR’s Secretariat, the waning financial support for the 
organization derived from a combination of economic decline combined with a fading 
sense of urgency. Generalized panic over unchecked population growth and the specter of 
mass starvation prompted aggressive support for CGIAR in the early 1970s. By 1980, the 
issue had lost some of its impact. In addition, economic inflation of the late 1970s caught 
up to CGIAR by the 1980s. Double digit inflation was cutting into CGIAR budget 
assumptions that factored in nine percent inflation, a sobering figure in itself but still not 
adequate. The aggregate CGIAR budget request for 1980 was $125.7 million, an increase 
of 26% over the 1979 contributions of $100 million.154 Estimated donations from CGIAR 
members for 1980 were between $115 and $116 million, causing a deficit of $11.2 
million.155 In mid-July of 1979, the center directors working with TAC trimmed $8.5 
million from the 1980 budget, reducing it to $118 million but still leaving an overage of 
two million dollars compared to 1980 donations.156 By 1981, CGIAR faced an estimated 
budget of $124.2 million and funding of $118.8 million, a shortfall of $5.4 million. 
Projected budgets estimated that CGIAR’s 1984 expense would be $184 million. The 
Secretariat summarized the issue: “Put bluntly, inflation higher than foreseen means that 
                                                
153 “IBPGR Programme and Budget Proposals for 1981 / 82,” folder 8, box CG VII, Record Group 
CGIAR, Rockefeller Foundation Archives: 20. For example, ‘orthodox’ seeds had to be stored in cold, dry 
conditions while ‘recalcitrant’ seeds lost their viability under all known conditions. 
154 CGIAR Secretariat, memorandum, May 2, 1979, folder 5, box CG VI, Record Group CGIAR, 
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unless substantial new donors can be found or unless present donors can provide more 
than our current estimates indicate, the system has no chance to grow in 1981, and some 
valuable programs may even have to be curtailed.”157 
 Ironically, CGIAR found itself searching for money in a rising price economy 
when it possessed an asset worth a fortune in the private market: its germplasm 
collections. By late 1980, the potential market value of CGIAR’s seed collections had 
become apparent to several key players in terms of both its worth and its exposure. 
Equally apparent was the problem of who, exactly, owned the collections. CGIAR and its 
staff had assembled the collections courtesy of the developing nations that CGIAR had 
been created to help. In order to maintain financial as well as diplomatic credibility, 
therefore, CGIAR had to assure that any use of the germplasm inured to the benefit of the 
supplying nations.  
The IBPGR was keenly aware of the delicate nature of CGIAR’s relationship with 
its developing nation partners and the need to maintain credibility. Recommendations put 
forth by IBPGRs program auditors in 1980 included the following: “In anticipation of 
foreseeable problems of exchange of plant materials, the Board should explore, in 
consultation with FAO, the idea of an international legal framework that would secure 
free access to collections.”158 The auditors report went on in some detail: “A point which 
is emerging clearly and which panel members have noted on several occasions during 
their travels, is the growing awareness in developing countries that genetic resources are 
a kind of wealth, coupled with an understandable unwillingness that they should be 
                                                
157 CGIAR Secretariat, memorandum, June 23, 1980, folder 5, box CG VII, Record Group CGIAR, 
Rockefeller Foundation Archives.  
158 “Report on TAC Review of IBPGR,” International Centers Week, October 27-31, 1980, folder 7, box 
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dispersed to other places without guarantee of return. This is becoming a somewhat 
delicate issue of which the board is well aware and which the Secretariat treats with 
sensitivity. Once again, the importance of influence and awareness presents itself. 
Effective collecting cannot be done without local goodwill. In this connection the great 
value of FAO’s assistance, both influential and practical, can hardly be over-emphasized; 
collecting missions supported by the IBPGR have benefited very greatly from it and, 
indeed, many would probably have been impossible without it.”159  
The issue of CGIAR’s seed collections and their potential use or abuse came to 
light just as John Harrar, a founding participant in the Mexico project and a driving force 
behind CGIAR, stepped down as President of the Rockefeller Foundation. With new 
leadership at Rockefeller came a new focus that was less involved with the seeds in the 
field than it was with the people who were growing them. The new emphasis on cultural 
issues in the developing world would emerge strongly in the 1980’s. Harrar corresponded 
frequently with Norman Borlaug between June and September of 1980. He appeared to 
be preparing Borlaug for a change in focus, despite Borlaug’s apparent lobbying (or at 
least venting) for fundamental research over ‘rhetoric.’ On June 19, Harrar waxed 
philosophically about his and Borlaug’s work in terms that almost seem eulogistic: 
“Although we have never sought credit, I think we can rightly claim that the Rockefeller 
Foundation team which was first established in Mexico, is largely responsible for the 
developments in education, research and extension which have occurred there. It is also 
true that the small beginning grew and flourished and proliferated into many parts of the 
world. I would hope that all of our former and current staff members are aware of the 
                                                
159 Ibid., 21. It was also noted that the board only met once per year and its Executive Committee controlled 
the program for all practical purposes. Ibid., 23. 
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magnitude of their individual and collective contributions to the Agricultural Sciences. 
These have been of inestimable value to production programs throughout much of the 
world.” Harrar also expressed hope, albeit skeptical, that perhaps the Ford Foundation 
would pick up the slack he anticipated as forthcoming at the Rockefeller Foundation: “I 
too hope that the Ford Foundation will continue to emphasize agriculture as that 
organization has an experienced staff and could readily contribute substantially to future 
efforts. As I read the FF monthly report, I find there is still substantial interest in 
agriculture but perhaps less so than in the past.”160 This theme continued in a second 
letter: “[T]he evolving program of the Foundation and changes in the membership of the 
board tend to emphasize shifts in program areas of concentration … I think that there 
may well be a tendency to placed more emphasis on the Social Sciences (economics) and 
the Humanities as major future concerns …We may well be paying for past successes in 
agriculture and public health as new resources have poured into these areas of critical 
concern.”161 The final letter seems to be more fatalistic than the first two: “I think there is 
a warning here that we may have to expect some substantial shift from our previous 
emphasis on the hard sciences to the social sciences and the humanities. I may be wrong 
but it seems to me that the present mood of the board and the new President may well be 
in this direction.”162   
 
 
                                                
160 John J. Harrar to Norman Borlaug, June 19, 1980, folder 34, box 5, Record Group IV 2A26, Special 
Collections, Rockefeller Foundation Archives. 
161 John J. Harrar to Norman Borlaug, August 12, 1980, folder 34, box 5, Record Group IV 2A26, Special 
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A New Decade and A New Option 
Between 1940 and 1980, the philanthropic efforts of the Rockefeller Foundation, 
based firmly in an American style of commercial agriculture, blossomed quickly into an 
international aid association called CGIAR. CGIAR harnessed genuine concerns over 
population growth and food shortages to recruit and lead a cadre of donors who saw 
multiple benefits in feeding the world through improved seeds and farming techniques. 
Predictions of imminent and eventually uncorrectable disaster pushed CGIAR to act 
aggressively in changing the face of farming in the developing world, despite warnings 
about ecological degradation and loss of cultural life-styles. Within a decade, however, 
CGIAR faced a growing chorus of demands from a varied constituency. 
Environmentalists demanded greater responsibility toward the delicate ecosystem of the 
southern hemisphere. Donors demanded results that justified their donations. 
Demographers demanded fast action before it was too late. Sociologists and 
anthropologists demanded a new awareness of the lives and cultures being disrupted by 
all the change. Researchers demanded more dollars for critical research in ever-
broadening fields. By 1980, CGIAR was an organization in need of leadership and 
money. It was also an organization in possession of a premier and envied seed collection. 
In the private sector of the industrial world, the legal norm for seeds had settled on 
exclusive rights through patents or seed registration laws. Just as CGIAR began to 
wrestle with the question of where its seed collections fit in terms of the market place and 
the CGIAR mission, the new decade of the 1980s opened with a significant decision by 
the United States Supreme Court that opened the door for eventual recognition of 
intellectual property rights not only of whole plants and seeds, but also living material at 
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the genetic level. This decision and the subsequent explosion in the field of 
biotechnology made CGIAR’s decisions regarding the proper use of its seed collections 
more critical and more urgent. 
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CHAPTER 4. BIG MONEY IN SMALL THINGS: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND D.N.A.  
 
 
As the diverse interests dedicated to the success of CGIAR worked to change 
agriculture in the developing world, a pair of California scientists worked to change the 
biological structure in the genetic world. The discovery of recombinant DNA technology in 
the1970s created a new set of opportunities and issues in the arena of intellectual property.1 
The wave of excitement generated by rDNA swept over the courts, Congress and Wall Street. 
Advocates for the new technology captioned it in noble terms, especially its potential for 
producing new and cheaper medicines and improved foods. The overriding factor, however, 
was economic. As with patents and agriculture, those with the ability to structure and 
interpret a legal system for addressing the new technology did so from the perspective of 
economic potential. The research generating most of the attention focused on the 
pharmaceutical industry, particularly the potential of improved cancer treatments. 
Recombinant DNA technology also encompassed plants and seeds because they were 
components of certain medicines and also because of the possibility of combining plants and 
non-plant material to create improved food crops.  
This brave new world of science, technology and money exploded on the global scene 
just as the members of CGIAR were beginning to splinter over agendas and money woes. 
The rDNA breakthrough and subsequent actions by the United States Supreme Court and 
Congress presented CGIAR with both a challenge and an opportunity. On one hand, the 
nature of crop improvement became much more complex in terms of expertise and 
                                                
1 DNA is an acronym for deoxyribonucleic acid. Hereafter, recombinant DNA is expressed as rDNA. 
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equipment. Traditional methods of directed plant breeding, in place since the nineteenth 
century, continued to be a mainstay of CGIAR, but rDNA prompted experiments to combine 
genetic material that could not be naturally joined via traditional cross breeding. Upstart 
corporations snatched up the men and women who specialized in these areas, mostly 
academics at research universities. CGIAR’s research centers faced a sobering lack of ability 
to exploit the new technology in pursuit of its mission. On the other hand, CGIAR remained 
in custody of seed collections that were growing in value as the genetic wave swept over 
Wall Street. CGIAR may not have had the expertise to embrace rDNA technology but it 
certainly had the ingredients. This state of affairs placed CGIAR’s board at a cross roads as it 
wrestled with how to best use and protect its valuable seed collections consistent with its 
mission. This chapter explores the critical events in the 1970s and early 1980s that 
exacerbated CGIAR’s already difficult situation. These events are critical to understanding 
the economic pressures brought to bear on CGIAR’s decisions. 
Recombinant DNA 
Recombinant DNA technology, popularly known as ‘gene-splicing’ in the 1970s, is 
the controlled joining of DNA from different organisms. All living things exist according to 
programs encoded in their DNA. Recombinant technology is the process of splicing DNA in 
order to isolate a specific section of genetic information and then recombining that section of 
DNA with the DNA of a simple organism such as a bacteria. The objective is isolation and 
mass production of specific proteins that are, for example, the active ingredients in drugs. For 
the microbiology community, rDNA technology represented a breakthrough on a scale 
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similar to nuclear fission in the physics community.2 The rDNA breakthrough came in March 
of 1973 when Stanley Cohen from Stanford University and Herbert Boyer from the 
University of California, San Francisco (UCSF), established a simple process to isolate and 
amplify any gene or DNA sequence and move it with controlled precision.3 Boyer revealed 
his and Cohen’s work at a conference in November 1973. His announcement immediately 
raised concerns over public safety and also started the clock ticking on a one-year deadline to 
obtain a patent.4 Stanford University hustled to complete and file a patent application before 
the deadline tolled in November 1974, after which time the information would become public 
property. The patent application that Stanford University ultimately filed claimed both the 
rDNA process and the resulting composition, which was new and living biological material.  
Stanford’s rush to secure a patent underscored its view that the academic achievement 
could quickly move into the commercial realm. In 1973, the Boyer-Cohen discovery 
represented a purely academic achievement. No practical use existed for the process they had 
created. The potential uses for which the process could conceivably be employed, however, 
were mind-boggling, a fact not lost on the researchers. In 1976, Boyer joined with venture 
                                                
2 Michael S. Greenfield, “Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science Struggling with the Patent Law,” Stanford 
Law Review, vol. 44, no. 5 (May 1992), 1051.  
3 Sally Smith Hughes, “Making Dollars out of DNA: The First Major Patent in Biotechnology and the 
Commercialization of Molecular Biology 1974-1980,” Isis, vol. 92, no. 3 (September 2001), 542. 
4 Ibid., 556. It is interesting to note the parallels between plants and rDNA in terms of public policy. Just as 
commentators debated the economic value of plants and commercial agriculture versus the culture and heritage 
of farming, the scientific community debated the economic value of rDNA versus its public safety. The 
National Academy of Science responded to the announcement of the rDNA breakthrough by forming a 
committee on rDNA safety. In 1974, the committee called for a voluntary moratorium on rDNA research until 
the risks could be assessed and procedural guidelines established. A Stanford University biologist chaired the 
committee. Boyer and Cohen supported its conclusions. In fact, they were both signatories to a letter calling for 
the moratorium, although Boyer had already begun to share the rDNA plasmid with other researchers if they 
agreed to follow his self-styled safety precautions. Ibid., 554. Eventually, economic considerations dominated.  
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capitalist Robert Swanson to form a new company called Genentech, which quickly 
advanced rDNA research to the threshold of economic viability.5  
Stanford’s patent application and Boyer’s participation in creation of a for-profit 
company soon fostered intense debate and conflict over issues of fairness, propriety and 
professional academic standards. The debate was strikingly similar to the debate over 
ownership of improved plants in which base breeding lines came from landraces improved 
by generations of farmers through their keen eye for selection. For example, Genentech made 
great strides in recombining the human gene containing genetic information for the synthesis 
of interferon, a natural antiviral protein. Touted as an effective tool for battling cancer, 
interferon’s market value for a mass producer was estimated in 1980 to be worth three billion 
dollars by 1987. The materials used by Genentech, however, came to it through a long and 
complicated process of public and academic research that had begun with the voluntary 
acquiescence of a human donor. In other words, Genetech had ‘finished’ the work that had 
been begun with public funding and made the final stage possible. This long and convoluted 
process would have been of little import in the academic world so long as the myriad 
contributing parties had received proper acknowledgement for their respective contributions. 
Genentech, however, was in possession of a valuable commercial product at the end of the 
                                                
5 Nicholas Wade, “Gene Splicing Company Wows Wall Street.” Science, vol. 210 no. 4469 (October 31, 1980), 
506. The entire process of commercializing rDNA technology was fraught with turf battles, egos and 
acrimonious debate over the propriety of Stanford’s patent application and Boyer’s business venture. Stanford 
and Boyer were treading on sacred ground. The scientific community was largely founded on the sharing of 
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actively critiqued, scrutinized and, ultimately, collectively owned new knowledge. The reward to the scientific 
researcher was peer recognition and esteem derived via publication. Attribution to all contributors was common 
in published results. Recombinant DNA threatened to overturn this hallowed process. 
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day, which put the notion of giving credit in an economic light.6 Prior to the Genentech 
breakthrough, informal sharing between researchers had been routine. The interferon cells 
played a major role in the value of Genentech’s initial public offering, which would be 
enhanced by the Supreme Court’s later ruling on ownership of living material.7 Potential 
investors in Genentech would not have been interested in seeing a laundry list of academics 
with the ability to claim credit for the creation of interferon cells. The Genentech 
accomplishments quickly dampened the ethical debate over rDNA in favor of great 
excitement over its commercial possibilities. In 1978 the National Institutes of Health revised 
it guidelines and eased restrictions on rDNA experiments. All bills introduced in Congress to 
                                                
6 Nicholas Wade, “University and Drug Firm Battle Over Billion-Dollar Gene,” Science, 26 September 1980, 
1492-1494. Genentech successfully cloned the gene under a contract with pharmaceutical company Hoffmann-
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7 Ibid. Despite this blow-up, Genentech continued to work closely with UCSF. The biotech start-up shared 
laboratory space and employees with the university. In one case, a noticeable overlap was observed between 
Genentech’s development of a growth hormone and published results from university staff. In that case, 
Genentech paid the university $350,000 in June 1980 to resolve the matter. There is no mention of exactly what 
the payment was intended to represent (damages, costs, royalties, etc). Given the potential market value of a 
growth hormone, it was likely a negotiated settlement to reimburse UCSF for its expenses, possibly reflecting 
the value of UCSFs work relative to the amount if investment yet to be made in order to bring the product to 
market. See, “Investors Dream of Genes,” Time, 20 October 1980, 72. 
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regulate rDNA technology died in one of the largest lobbying campaigns on a technical issue 
in the history of Congress.8  
Old Laws and New Science 
When the dust settled over regulation of rDNA safety, Genentech and its peers were 
poised to become giants in the emerging field of commercial biotechnology. A number of 
issues remained outstanding, however. Foremost among them was whether a patent applicant 
could secure rights not only to the rDNA process, but also the materials it produced. The 
shortcomings of the patent law became increasingly apparent. The law required applicants to 
present an invention that was a new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter. The invention had to be novel and could not be obvious when 
compared with the prior art. It also had to be described in full, clear and concise terms such 
that any person skilled in the same art could make and use the same invention.  
Recombinant DNA technology was certainly novel and was not represented in any 
prior art. Cohen and Boyer’s work had been made possible by discovery of an enzyme called 
‘restriction endonucleases,’ which could cut DNA in specific places, and another enzyme 
called ‘DNA ligases,’ which could join pieces of DNA together to make a single longer 
piece. These discoveries led to the invention of the process to create rDNA, by which 
researchers could create new biological material.9 The patent standards clearly prohibited 
patent protection for discovery of the naturally occurring enzymes just as they clearly 
                                                
8 Sally Smith Hughes, “Making Dollars out of DNA,” 566-68. The effort to stop regulation of rDNA 
experimentation cannot be attributed exclusively to the private sector. The scientific community was an active 
participant as well. While it clearly stood to gain immensely from employment / business opportunities in this 
new commercial field, it was also, no doubt, becoming increasingly confident in its ability to use genetic 
material in a safe and responsible manner.    
9 Li Westerlund, Biotech Patents: Equivalence and Exclusions under European and U.S. Patent Law (New 
York: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 8.  
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allowed patent protection for the new process. The Patent Office readily granted process 
patents for the rDNA process. The thornier issue was the resulting proteins. Were they truly 
new and useful and could their use be adequately described such that the public received its 
end of the patent bargain?10   
On top of these procedural problems was the fundamental question of whether the 
protein produced by the recombinant process was truly new. There was no question that the 
process of natural isolation of a desired strand of DNA was very inefficient and could not 
produce a therapeutic amount of the desired protein. The recombinant process solved this 
problem and was therefore eligible for patent protection. The proteins it produced, however, 
were identical to the same proteins that occurred in nature. That, after all, was the objective - 
to mass-produce a valuable protein identical to its naturally occurring counterpart. This 
begged the question: Should patent protection be available for a protein that was not in any 
way ‘new?’ The purpose of rDNA technology was to create a protein identical to a natural 
protein. The core value embraced by the patent law was to reward something completely 
new. For example, proteins derived from blood plasma and proteins created through 
                                                
10 The problem was that biotechnology was being judged against standards drafted primarily to accommodate 
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patent. Biotechnology is counter to this model. The scientist derives a new compound from a known compound 
and then experiments with it in order to discover what practical use it might have. In other words, structure 
precedes function. The scientist has his new invention before he knows what it can do. These types of 
discoveries require considerable time and resources. Manipulation of genetic materials took years and millions 
of dollars before its potential uses were fully understood. This is one reason why most of the research took place 
at university research facilities. The patent law was not well suited to the scientific model. It was founded on 
economic reward for the inventor. If two inventors were working in the same area, the first one to file a valid 
application was granted the patent. Thus, the law encouraged a patent application at the earliest stage in the 
development of the invention. This was fine when the item at issue was a hay baler. For the biological 
researcher however, it meant having to secure a patent before the claim was fully understood. It also meant less 
ability to amend the patent application as new information was discovered. Another problem was the mandatory 
description. How did one describe a new protein in a way that could enable reproduction? See, Westerlund, 
Biotech Patents, 10. 
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recombinant technology were identical in composition and, more important, had identical 
blood-clotting characteristics. The recombinant protein did not do anything new, nor was it 
intended to. It was valuable precisely because it was identical. This presented the 
biotechnology industry with a conundrum. It had to argue similarity before the Food and 
Drug Administration, convincing it that recombinant products were identical to their 
naturally occurring counterparts, in order to obtain approval for their sale to the public. In 
nearly the same breath, it had to argue dissimilarity before the Patent Office, convincing it 
that the recombinant protein was something new in order to qualify for a patent. Under the 
law as it was interpreted in the 1970s, the inventor could easily patent a process to produce 
the proteins but could not patent the proteins themselves because they were not new.11 As 
long as Genentech had patent protection on the only process for creating recombinant 
proteins, its investment was safe and its profits were assured. Competitors, however, had 
already achieved the same result through a different, albeit less efficient, process. As soon as 
someone else could create the same protein through a more efficient method, and publication 
of the Boyer-Cohen research had certainly laid the groundwork for doing so, Genentech was 
threatened with loss of its most valuable asset.12 Given the time and money required to 
produce recombinant proteins and the fact that the market value lay as much in the proteins 
as the process, the situation was untenable for the marketplace.   
                                                
11 Application of Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1033-34 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
12 Two other options were available to protect the invention: legal trade secrecy and actual secrecy. Actual 
secrecy is as simple as it sounds. Do not let anyone know how you do what you do. This is not ideal for 
machines since they can be reverse engineered. It is exceedingly difficult with microorganisms since they are 
easily stolen and propagate rapidly. Secrecy also frustrates scientific norms of publication. Trade secrecy is a 
state law concept and requires that the owner of the secret maintain and document certain standards of 
confidentiality in order to claim the right. See, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, “Proprietary Rights and the Norms of 
Science in Biotechnology Research,” Yale Law Journal, vol. 97, no. 2 (December 1987), 190-195. 
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Because of the uncertainty over ownership of the resulting product, Stanford 
University amended its patent application to drop the end product and seek rights only to the 
process.13 Stanford, Genentech and all of the others with expertise in the science needed a 
fresh reading of the Patent statute in light of this new science. This task fell to the 1980 term 
of the Burger Court. The road leading to its landmark decision would not involve rDNA 
technology, however. It would begin with an oil spill and a General Electric researcher 
named Ananda Chakrabarty.
                                                
13 Sally Smith Hughes, “Making Dollars out of DNA,” 563. 
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The Case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
 
The case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty reinforced the traditional American view 
that patent laws existed to promote economic advancement. The 1980 decision by the 
United States Supreme Court arrived at a time when the United States was struggling to 
find its economic footing in a global economy where technology represented the future. 
The decision ushered in a series of actions by Congress and the newly elected Reagan 
administration that solidified intellectual property rights in a private for-profit model. 
These actions resonated in the halls of CGIAR as it wrestled with the issue of its seed 
stores.    
Biochemist Ananda Chakrabarty was educated in Calcutta and taught at the 
University of Illinois, Urbana. He joined the environmental division of General Electric 
in 1971 and conducted groundbreaking research in the science of cleaning up oil spills 
including a new form of bacteria that Chakrabarty had created in the laboratory. His 
research resulted in a patent application that included a claim for the new form of 
bacteria.1 The patent examiners approved Chakrabarty’s process claims but denied the 
claim for the new microorganism on the grounds that it was living material and thus not 
within any class of patentable subject matter. The resulting appeals climbed from the 
                                                
1 Nathaniel Sheppard, Jr. “Developer of a New Life Form: Ananda Mohan Chakrabarty,” The New York 
Times, 18 June 1980, 22 (A). Chakrabarty did not work with rDNA technology. His methodology 
employed cross-breeding and fusing of bacterial strains. Stanford University and Genentech were making 
the rDNA headlines and fanning the fires of economic potential. The common denominator in their work, 
however, was that in addition to inventing new processes, they were creating via those processes new and 
potentially valuable living material. As Chakrabarty’s case was moving up the appeal ladder, the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office was accumulating a growing stack of patent applications in the field of 
biotechnology. The Patent Office adopted the policy that product patents for new living material should not 
be issued for any of the mounting applications but elected to hold the applications in suspense rather than 
rejecting them. This maneuver allowed the applicants to preserve their claims and have benefit of their 
filing dates should one of the cases make it to the United States Supreme Court and result in a new 
precedent.  
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Board of Patent Appeals to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, where Chakrabarty 
was the victor. Therefore, when the case ultimately came before the United States 
Supreme Court, it was on appeal by the Patent Office seeking to reverse the lower court 
ruling in favor of patentability of the new microorganism. Various denials and appeals 
propelled the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty to the United States Supreme Court where 
it was argued on March 17, 1980 and decided on June 16, 1980.2 
The legal history of Diamond v. Chakrabarty began with an earlier case, 
Application of Bergy, decided by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The Court 
combined Bergy and Chakrabarty into one case due to similar facts and timing but 
Chakrabarty was appealed to and heard by the United States Supreme Court. Both cases 
must be reviewed in order to understand the evolution of the law in this area.  
In 1977, a five-judge Court of Customs and Patent Appeals decided the case of  
Application of Bergy. 3 The Court’s 3-2 decision presaged the one-vote majority that 
would also characterize Chakrabarty. Malcom Bergy and two colleagues had developed a 
new process for preparing an antibiotic known as lincomycin by using a newly 
discovered microorganism called streptomyces vellosus. The microorganism was found 
in nature but Bergy had purified it for use in the new process. The microorganism 
allowed Bergy to accomplish two new things. First, he was able to prepare lincomycin at 
temperatures ranging from 18 to 45 degrees celcius; second, he was able to prepare 
licomycin without concomitant production of a byproduct known as lincomycin B. 
Overall, the new process greatly increased the efficiency of lincomycin recovery.4  
                                                
2 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). The name ‘Diamond’ appears in the case caption by 
virtue of being Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office at the time.  
3 Application of Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
4 Ibid., 1032.  
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Bergy applied for five patents, four on the process for recovering lyncomycin and 
a fifth for the newly discovered microorganism streptomyces vellosus. Three 
microbiologists at Upjohn Research Laboratory supported the fifth application with 
affidavits stating that streptomyces vellosus did not exist as a biologically pure culture in 
nature and asserting that the applicant had manufactured the substance.5 The patent 
examiner approved the four process applications but rejected the fifth application based 
solely on the fact that it was a claim on a product of nature and therefore not patentable 
subject matter under Section 101 of the patent law. In support of his decision, the patent 
examiner cited three previous appellate decisions: Application of Mancy; Guaranty Trust 
Co. of New York v. Union Solvents Corporation and Funk Brothers v. Kalo, Co.6 All 
three cases contained support for the general rule that a naturally occurring bacteria or a 
property of that bacteria was not eligible for patent protection.7  
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Union Solvents Corporation was a pioneering 
patent case in the field of natural product patents and microbiology.8 Charles Weizmann 
was a scientist who discovered a previously unknown species of bacteria. He used the 
bacteria to create a new process for the fermentation of starch from potatoes for the 
                                                
5 Application of Bergy , 1033. Bergy’s affiliations are not made clear in the opinion, nor does the opinion 
explain why an arm of Upjohn, a large pharmaceutical company, was involved. It can be assumed, 
however, that Bergy and Upjohn had some type of legal relationship and mutual economic interest in the 
research. 
6 Application of Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974); Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Union Solvents 
Corporation, 54 F.2d 400; aff’d 61 F.2d 1041 (D. Del. 1932); Funk Brothers v. Kalo, Co., 333 US 127 
(1948).  
7 In Guaranty Trust, a naturally occurring but previously unknown bacteria was used in a patentable 
process. In Funk Brothers, the discovery and commercial application of the fact that certain bacteria had 
non-inhibiting properties was ruled not adequate to warrant a patent.  
8 Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Union Solvents Corporation, 54 F.2d 400 (D. Del. 1931). Note that 
this was not a United Sates Supreme Court case. It was decided by a federal district court of appeals in 
Delaware, the first level of appeal after the trial court level, and affirmed without comment by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 61 F.2d 1041 (3rd Cir 1932). The next appeal would have 
been to the United States Supreme Court, which was not pursued in this case. These cases have 
precedential value but are not binding. There are twelve federal circuit courts of appeal and, prior to 1982, 
there was a Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. They can issue contrary opinions on the same subject.  
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production of acetone and butyl alcohol.9 Producing the materials by fermentation was 
not remarkable, but Weizmann had invented a new process to isolate a particular bacteria 
and then use that bacteria to produce commercial quantities of acetone and butyl alcohol.  
In 1916, Weizmann applied for a patent for “improvements in the bacterial fermentation 
of carbohydrates and in bacterial cultures for the same.”10 The Patent Office approved the 
application in 1918 but withheld it from publication for reasons of national security. 
Weizmann licensed the process to a commercial manufacturer, which brought a lawsuit 
for patent infringement in 1930 when Union Solvents Corporation began commercial 
production of the same materials. Among the numerous defenses to the claim of patent 
infringement that Union Solvents offered was that Weizmann had been awarded a patent 
for something not eligible for patent protection: the life process of a living organism. The 
Federal Appeals Court for the District of Delaware countered by stating that Weizmann’s 
patent had not been awarded for the new bacteria per se, but rather for the process in 
which the new bacteria were employed, which the Court called “the exercise of inventive 
genius.”11 The Weizmann process allowed for production of commercial quantities of 
butyl alcohol, which was a good substitute for amyl alcohol. At that time, amyl alcohol 
was obtained as a byproduct in the production of spirits, a process prohibition threatened. 
Thus, Weizmann had discovered a new bacteria and employed it in a process of his own 
invention. He was rewarded for the process that he invented but not for the bacteria that 
he discovered.   
                                                
9 Acetone was a solvent used in the manufacture of film, gas containers and artificial silk. It was also a key 
component in cordite, an explosive used during World War I. Butyl Alcohol was a solvent used in the 
manufacture of lacquers used in finishing automobiles and furniture. Ibid., 401.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid., 403. 
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Compare the result in Guaranty Trust with the 1948 in the case of Funk Brothers 
Seed Company v. Kalo Inoculant Company.12 Both companies in the case were involved 
in the packaging and selling of plant inoculants. The process sellers of plant inoculants 
used was to select the strongest strains of bacteria that enhanced plant growth and health, 
produce them in a laboratory and then package them in liquid or powder form for sale to 
the public. The inoculants were highly specialized because specific strains of bacteria 
were useful only for specific plants. Therefore, the inoculants had to be packaged and 
sold separately for each type of plant. It was common knowledge at the time that bacteria 
of the genus Rhizobium enabled plants to take nitrogen from the air, fix it in the plant and 
convert it to organic nitrogenous compounds. There were six species of Rhizobium and 
each species had distinct strains that varied in efficiency. A scientist named Bond 
discovered that certain strains of Rhizobium did not inhibit each other when mixed 
together. With this knowledge, he was able to combine the strains and market a single 
product suitable for multiple plants. This would have greatly decreased the cost of 
packaging and marketing plant inoculants. Bond applied for and was granted a patent for 
the new mixed-plant inoculant. When his employer sought to enforce the patent against 
its competitors, they too challenged the validity of the patent. The United States Supreme 
Court ruled that Bond’s efforts were not eligible for patent protection. Bond had done 
nothing to the bacteria in question. He had simply discovered their respective properties 
and used this knowledge to mix them together in a way that enhanced their commercial 
value. The Court first noted that a patent could not have been awarded for the bacteria, 
stating that “patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature. The 
qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, 
                                                
12 Funk Brothers Seed Company v. Kalo Inoculant Company, 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
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are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of 
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto 
unknown phenomena of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law 
recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the 
application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.”13  
In support of its analysis, the Court cited the 1887 decision in the Alexander 
Graham Bell telephone patent case in which the Court noted that electricity was a force 
of nature Bell employed in his invention.14 If left to itself however, electricity would not 
do what Bell needed for it to do. Bell’s invention was a process to control a force of 
nature to make it accomplish the purpose needed. In other words, Bell employed a force 
of nature in a new and practical use. Comparing Bell’s achievement to what Bond had 
done, the Court concluded that the mere aggregation of biological species fell short of 
invention. Bond had discovered no new bacteria, had not caused the known bacteria to do 
anything other than what they had always done and had not improved their function. He 
had simply made a commercial advance in packaging. Unfortunately for Bond, the most 
impressive part of his work, his discovery of the principles of the bacteria, was not within 
a category of patentable subject matter. In the opinion of the Court, Bond had 
demonstrated skill and insight, but not invention. 
Mancy was a 1974 case in which the applicants sought a patent for a process for 
producing the antibiotic daunorubicin through cultivation of a specific strain of the 
microorganism streptomyces bifurcus, which was found in and isolated from a soil 
sample taken in France. Streptomyces bifurcus was a known antibiotic, as was the 
                                                
13 Funk Brothers v. Kalo, 130.  
14 Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Company, 126 US 1, 532-33 (1887). 
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process for producing it via aerobic cultivation of strains of streptomyces. The applicants 
had simply found a brand new strain of the antibiotic to apply the same process. The 
patent examiner rejected the process application on the basis of obviousness.15 The 
applicants argued that they had found and isolated a novel strain of the microorganism 
and that it was not at all obvious that this strain could be used in the process because most 
strains did not produce such results. In other words, the strain they found and used in 
their process was not known in the prior art. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
held that the applicant’s process was not prima facie obvious.16 One skilled in the art 
would not find it obvious to do what appellants did with the materials they discovered. 
The Court also noted that the applicant had made no claim on the new strain of 
streptomyces bifurcus but:  “would, we presume (without deciding), be unable to obtain 
such a claim because the strain, while new in the sense that it is not shown by any art of 
record, is, as we understand it, a ‘product of nature’.”17  
Citing the holdings in Application of Mancy, Guaranty Trust, and Funk Brothers, 
the patent examiner reviewing the Bergy application concluded that Bergy’s newly 
discovered microorganism could be employed in a patentable process but could not be 
the subject of a patent because it was a product of nature. Bergy appealed the ruling, 
claiming that his process employed a biologically pure form of the microorganism 
streptomyces vellosus. Bergy conceded that the microorganism existed in nature but 
claimed that it had to be isolated and purified in order for it to be of use in the process for 
                                                
15 Obviousness is the third standard in Section 103 of the patent law.  
16 The United States Court of Cusotms and Patent Appeals was originally established in 1909 as a five-
judge federal court of appeals to help with customs cases. In 1929, its jurisdiction was extended to patent 
and trademark cases. It was abolished in 1982 when its jurisdiction was transferred to the newly created 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. United States Government Federal Judiciary History, 
available at www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/patent_bdy. 
17 Application of Mancy, 1294. 
 
  
172 
recovering lyncomycin. In other words, Bergy claimed that he had ‘manufactured’ the 
purified form of streptomyces vellosus for purposes of Section 101 of the patent law.  
The Board of Patent Appeals reviewed Bergy’s appeal and affirmed the 
examiner’s rejection of Bergy’s fifth application for the new microorganism.18 The 
Board, however, completely ignored the examiner’s stated basis for rejecting the 
application (i.e., that it was for a product of nature.) Instead, the Board ruled that claim 
five of the Bergy application was for a living organism. The Board also ruled that, given 
the absence of any precedent, a strict construction of Section 101 of the patent law 
precluded a patent on a living organism because it was not within the scope of any 
Section 101 category.19 The Board of Patent Appeals distinguished between products of 
nature and living things. Products of nature could include inanimate materials such as 
minerals and chemicals that were not living. The Board essentially carved a subset, 
consisting of living things, out of the larger category of products of nature. The Board 
concluded that the subset of living things was not eligible for patent protection under any 
circumstances. Thus, living material was not in any Section 101 category of patentable 
subject matter.    
It was at that point that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 became central to the issue of 
patents on living material. In support of its decision, the Board of Patent Appeals cited In 
re Arzberger, a 1940 decision from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.20 The 
Arzberger application for a patent on a species of bacteria had been filed under the Plant 
                                                
18 This is a board within the United States Patent and Trademark Office. It is made up of the Director of the 
PTO, the Commissioner for Trademarks and the administrative patent judges within the office who are 
appointed by the Director. Upon written appeal of an applicant, the Board reviews adverse decisions of 
patent examiners. See, U.S. Code 35 (2000) § 6. 
19 Application of Bergy, 1033-34.  
20 In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940). 
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Patent Act. The applicant argued that standards of botany and bacteriology stated that 
bacteria were properly classified as plants. While the Court in Arzberger conceded that 
this was true, it rejected the application on the grounds that Congress did not intend the 
Plant Patent Act to apply to bacteria but only to plants in the layman’s sense of the word. 
The Court cited the legislative history of the Plant Patent Act, which identified asexual 
reproduction as grafting, budding, cuttings, layering, division, and the like, but not by 
seed.21  
Based on the holding in Arzberger, the Board of Patent Appeals reasoned that the 
Plant Patent Act of 1930 represented the one and only instance where Congress had 
determined to extend patent-type protection to living things. In so doing, Congress had 
clearly limited the extension of patent protection to asexually produced plants and had 
further defined what it viewed as asexual reproduction. Therefore, the only type of patent 
available to a living thing was a plant patent. Bacteria explicitly did not qualify as a plant 
under the Plant Patent Act. Accordingly, the fifth component of the Bergy application 
was neither sanctioned by Section 101 of the patent law by virtue of being for a living 
thing nor by the Plant Patent Act by virtue of being for a bacteria. In support of its ruling, 
the Board of Patent Appeals noted that Bergy’s argument for an expansive reading of the 
meaning of ‘manufacture’ in Section 101 to include isolated and purified bacteria could 
arguably open up the patent laws to cross-bred animals, such as honeybees, which did not 
occur naturally but the breeder ‘manufactured.’ The Court also noted that the 
interpretation Bergy urged would take plants that the Plant Patent Act excluded and make 
them patentable under Section 101, a result that Congress did not intend.  
                                                
21 Ibid., 837.  
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The Patent Office and its Board of Patent Appeals made a clear statement on the 
limits of the patent law as it applied to living things. The realm of patentable living things 
was identified, defined and limited by the Plant Patent Act of 1930. If one did not have an 
asexually produced plant, one did not have an option to patent a living thing.  
Bergy appealed to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. It was 
during the appellate arguments that the groundwork was laid for the eventual declaration 
by the United States Supreme Court that living material was in the category of patentable 
subject matter. The Solicitor General, arguing before the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals on behalf of the PTO, cited a 1975 case, Application of Merat, relating to a 
patent application for chicken breeding.22 In Merat, the applicant had discovered a 
dwarfism gene in chickens and, through careful breeding, had produced dwarf hens that 
laid normal sized eggs but consumed less food. The applicant applied for patents on the 
breeding process and on the dwarf hens. The patent examiner rejected all claims under 
Section 101 on the grounds that animal breeding was not a process eligible for patent 
protection and that a thing occurring in nature (in this case, a chicken) was not a 
‘manufacture’ for purposes of Section 101. The Board of Patent Appeals agreed and 
noted that if Section 101 recognized animal breeding as patentable then plant breeding 
would certainly be allowed as well and there would have been no need for a specific plant 
patent statute. The Board of Patent Appeals also rejected the application for failure to 
comply with the Section 112 claim requirement. The applicant had failed to state with 
adequate specificity exactly what he was claiming as his invention. The Court of Customs 
                                                
22 Application of Merat, 519 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1975). 
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and Patent Appeals affirmed the rejection based on Section 112 and did not address the 
Section 101 basis for rejection.  
In considering these facts in connection with the Bergy appeal, the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals first noted that the microorganism streptomyces vellosus in 
the Bergy application was clearly not a product of nature because the material was in a 
biologically pure form as a result of human intervention. Therefore, the patent examiner’s 
rejection based on the product of nature exemption was fatally flawed from the start. In 
fact, the Court speculated that the Board of Patent Appeals was well aware of this fatal 
flaw in the patent examiner’s logic and therefore went looking for a better reason to reject 
the claim, ultimately settling on the ‘living material’ argument.23  
The opinion of the three-judge majority stated that there was clear legal precedent 
for patenting a purified product of nature, which is precisely what Bergy had argued. The 
Court cited two cases for its position: Merck v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation 
and Parke-Davis v. Mulford.24 Having established a basis for allowing a patent on 
purified products of nature, the Court saw one remaining issue: Was a purified product of 
nature, otherwise patentable under Section 101 of the patent law, disqualified because it 
also happened to be alive? For three of the five judges, the answer was ‘No’. The Court 
appears to have been mindful of the warning the Board of Patent Appeals issued about 
the potential consequences of opening the patent door too wide to living things. The 
majority took pains to note that it was not deciding if living things in general qualified 
under Section 101 of the Patent law, but only whether microorganisms did. Other 
                                                
23 Application of Bergy,1035. 
24 Merck v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir 1958). This case involved the 
patent awarded for pure vitamin B-12; Parke-Davis, v. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (SDNY 1911); aff’d 196 F. 
496 (2nd. Cir. 1912) was a case permitting a patent on isolated and purified adrenaline. 
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questions involving living things would have to be decided on a case-by case basis. Thus, 
the Court clearly attempted to rule on favor of Bergy without establishing a broad new 
policy on living material and, in fact, was consciously avoiding it.  
The majority opinion also attempted to address the arguments running contrary to 
its holding. In doing so, it suggested a more expansive reading of previous holdings. The 
majority opinion first noted that it was well established that processes employing living 
organisms were nonetheless eligible for patents. In fact, the PTO examiner had approved 
Bergy’s four process applications utilizing streptomyces vellosus. From this fact, the 
majority opinion concluded that if living material was a permissible component of a 
process claim, it should therefore not be barred from a product claim. This position 
seemed to expand a long held precedent that a new and useful process could be the 
subject of a patent but that a product of nature within that process could not. The Court 
dismissed fears of patents on crossbred animals as “far-fetched” but did not carry the 
analysis any further than to state that the larger issue was not before the Court.25 The 
Court suggested that microbiology was more akin to a chemical reaction than a complex 
animal. Clearly the Court was attempting to discount the fears about crossbred animals by 
drawing a distinction between bees and bacteria. In doing so, however, the Court also 
opened the door to the possibility of patent eligibility based on different levels of life 
forms. As to the intent of Congress, the Court stated that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 was 
silent on the question of patentability of microorganisms and that “the collective mind of 
Congress was not turned in that direction” when it passed the Plant Patent Act.26 In sum, 
it was a paper-thin ruling in terms of the vote (3-2) and the substance of the holding.  
                                                
25 Application of Bergy, 1038.  
26 Ibid., 1039. 
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The two dissenting judges focused on the intent of Congress as evidenced by the 
structure of the patent law. They reasoned that if Congress intended Section 101 of the 
patent law to be broadly construed to allow for patents on living things, then plants would 
have been patentable under Section 101 and there never would have been need for 
Congress to enact the Plant Patent Act. By enacting the Plant Patent Act, Congress 
demonstrated its intent to extended patent protection for living material only to plants. 
They cited the legislative history of the Plant Patent Act, saying that it was intended to 
remove discrimination between plant developers and industrial inventors. That 
discrimination was an inability to patent plants. The dissenting opinion also challenged 
the majority’s attempt to equate living organisms with chemical compositions such as 
reactants, reagents and catalysts, claiming that ‘living’ was fundamentally different from 
‘inanimate.’ In addition, the dissenting justices challenged the notion that using a 
microorganism in a patentable process logically compelled that the organism itself was 
patentable. Ultimately, the dissenting justices concluded that whether it was in the public 
interest to allow patents on microorganisms was a question for Congress and not the 
courts.27  
Chakrabarty in the Lower Courts 
 The Chakrabarty case followed closely on the heels of Bergy. It presented the 
Court with nearly identical facts, including a claim for both a new process and a new 
bacterium. Chakrabarty’s area of research was oil spills. Oil spills could be degraded with 
certain bacteria that act to break oil down into simpler components suitable as food for 
aquatic life. Numerous forms of bacteria were required to break down the various 
                                                
27 Ibid., 1041-1042. “We should fill the statutes with judge-made law only under the gravest and most 
impelling circumstances.” 
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components of oil. Unfortunately, the different bacteria strains tended to inhibit each 
other’s growth when mixed together and thus compromised their efficiency. Ananda 
Chakrabarty determined that the information necessary for degradation of oil was carried 
in only a part of the bacterial cell - by plasmids in DNA separate from the bacterial cell’s 
main chromosome. He developed a method for removing the specific degradative 
information from four different bacteria and inserting them into a single bacterium. He 
then combined the new bacterium with a buoyant material so that it would float when 
applied to oil spills. He applied for three patents: one for the process to create a single 
bacterium with the properties of several existing bacteria; a second for the resulting new 
bacterium itself; and a third for the process to mix the bacterium with the buoyant 
carrying material.28  
The Chakrabarty application ran the identical gauntlet as the Bergy application. 
The patent examiner accepted the two process claims but denied the claim for the new 
bacterium, this time on the grounds that living material was not statutory subject matter 
under Section 101. The examiners had apparently discarded the ‘product of nature’ 
rationale and adopted the reasoning the Board of Patent Appeals set out in Bergy. The 
same Board of Patent Appeals heard Chakrabarty’s appeal and upheld the patent 
examiner’s ruling. Chakrabarty appealed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 
which followed its decision in Bergy by reversing the Board’s opinion by the same three 
                                                
28 Peter B. Maggs, “New Life for Patents: Chakrabarty and Rohm & Haas Co.,” Supreme Court Review, 
vol. 1980 (1980), 58. 
 
  
179 
to two vote and holding that a new bacterium could be considered a ‘manufacture’ under 
Section 101.29  
The same two judges dissented in the Chakrabarty case, but offered a more 
refined analysis than the one in Bergy. The two dissenting judges argued that one could 
not view a thing as both a product of nature and a product of man. They conceded that 
there was a middle ground: a modified product of nature. Such modification did not 
establish patentability until the object’s essential nature was substantially altered, 
however.30 In support of their position, they cited the Supreme Court’s 1930 decision in 
American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co.31 In that case, the patent applicants had 
discovered that Borax was an ideal compound for fighting blue mold on citrus plants, 
although the reasons were not entirely understood. Borax was a well known substance 
and all one had to do was dilute it in water and use the water to wash the fruit. The 
Supreme Court ruled that this was not an invention because the fruit was still fruit before 
                                                
29 Application of Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Note that the Chakrabarty patent application 
was actually reviewed by the PTO before the Bergy application. However, Chakrabarty requested 
reconsideration by the patent office examiner, while Bergy elected to appeal the patent office decision to 
the next level, the Board of Patent Appeals. Thus, the patent examiner must have ruled on the Chakrabarty 
application first, presumably rejecting the claim for the new bacteria as a product of nature, and then ruled 
on the Bergy application on the same grounds. The Chakrabarty application stayed in the patent office for 
reconsideration while the Bergy application went to the Board of Patent Appeals. By the time the 
Chakrabarty application came up for reconsideration, the Board of Patent Appeals had ruled on the Bergy 
appeal and established the new criteria that living material was ineligible under Section 101. It is likely that 
the patent examiner was waiting for some guidance on the Bergy appeal before reconsidering Chakrabarty. 
At any rate, when the Chakrabarty application was reconsidered, it was rejected on the new grounds. Bergy 
was first before the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in 1977, followed by Chakrabarty in 1978. The 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals elected to combine the two cases into one when the United States 
Supreme Court remanded Bergy back to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals while the same court still 
had Chakrabarty on its docket. It issued its new opinion on both cases in 1979. Interestingly, Chakrabarty’s 
petition for reconsideration before the original patent examiner put forth a compelling argument that the 
intention of Congress in passing the Plant Patent Act of 1930 was to address the fact that plants could not 
be described in the patent specification required under Section 112 of the patent law. Chakrabarty argued 
that the Plant Patent Act represented no expression of any kind by Congress on the subject of patentability 
of living materials. This argument was not addressed or commented on in any way but would later form the 
basis of the holding in Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 USPQ 443 (Bd. Pat. App. 1985) discussed below. 
30 Ibid., 45-47. 
31 American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 US 1 (1930). 
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and after washing. It was simply better protected against disease. The applicant had not 
invented, isolated or purified the fruit or the borax.32 The dissenting justices in 
Chakrabarty argued that, in similar fashion, Chakrabarty had taken an organism that was 
suitable for digesting oil and had grafted onto it an extra plasmid, thus making it even 
better at digesting oil. He had not, however, changed the organism’s essential nature. 
Therefore, the rule the Supreme Court established in American Fruit Growers should 
apply. Moreover, the dissenting justices cautioned that the nature of Chakrabarty’s work 
with oil spills and its potential for society should not be a factor in determining the intent 
of Congress. It was better left to Congress to determine if Chakrabarty’s breakthrough 
warranted a change in the law.  
As to the argument that the Plant Patent Act was enacted simply to get around the 
problem of adequately describing the invention, the dissenting justices claimed that such 
an argument made sense only if plants were already patentable subject matter under 
Section 101 but difficult to patent because they were ill-suited to the description 
requirement. If the only problem in 1930 had been the description requirement then 
Congress need only have amended that particular section of the law in order to ease the 
description requirement when the patent application was for a plant. Instead, Congress 
enacted an entirely new law with a new description section.  
Bergy Remanded 
 While the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was applying its Bergy logic to 
the Chakrabarty facts, the Patent Office appealed the decision in Bergy to the United 
                                                
32 See also, Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 US 609 (1887). This was not a patent case but it offered the same 
rationale. It held that the application of labor to an article, by hand or mechanism, did not make it a 
manufactured article. Thus, polished seashells were still seashells in the same sense that ginned cotton was 
still cotton.  One did not ‘manufacture’ cotton by ginning it. 
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States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not issue an opinion. Instead, it vacated 
the ruling of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and remanded the case for further 
consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Parker v. Flook, which 
had been decided four days before Bergy.33 In light of this directive, the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals voluntarily vacated its similar ruling in Chakrabarty and 
engaged in a new review of both applications.  
 The case that prompted the United States Supreme Court to vacate the Bergy 
ruling was the patent case of Parker v. Flook, decided on June 22, 1978, by a vote of six 
to three.34 The Parker case did not present the Supreme Court with a patent application 
on living material but rather a patent on a law of nature in the form of a mathematical 
formula. In Parker, a patent was sought for a unique mathematical formula used in 
setting alarm limits for catalytic converters. A previous Supreme Court case, Gottschalk 
v. Benson had established the general rule that a unique mathematical formula could only 
be discovered, not patented.35 The difference between Benson and Parker was that 
Benson had applied for a patent on a mathematical formula per se. In Parker, the patent 
was sought only for a single useful application of a mathematical formula. In other 
words, Benson had sought licensing rights to all uses of a formula in all situations, 
whereas Parker sought rights to a formula only when used in a process to calculate alarm 
limits in catalytic converters. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld the rule in Benson 
and affirmed the decision to deny Parker’s patent application. The Court held that setting 
alarm limits for catalytic converters was not new or unique and it could be accomplished 
in other ways. The only thing novel about Parker’s new process was the mathematical 
                                                
33 In re Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978).  
34 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
35 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
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formula used to achieve the same result and mathematical formulas were not patentable 
subject matter under Section 101 of the patent law.  
Parker had argued that he was not seeking exclusive rights to the mathematical 
formula, but only for a single application of the formula. The Supreme Court found 
Parker’s position to be an argument of form over substance. For example, one could not 
patent the Pythagorean theorem on the grounds that the patent was limited to instances 
where the theorem was used to solve surveying problems.36 The Court conceded that a 
process was not rendered ineligible for a patent simply because it utilized a law of nature 
or an algorithm. In order to obtain a patent, however, the process itself had to be new and 
useful, not just the algorithm within the process. New math formulas were discoveries, 
but not the kind of discovery that public policy sought to protect. In a statement that 
would later be cited against it, the Supreme Court said that it must proceed cautiously 
when asked to extend patent protection to areas not foreseen by Congress when it enacted 
the law.37  
The three dissenting justices in the Parker case opined that Parker had presented 
facts far different than Benson. The issue in Parker was whether a process patent 
application lost its eligibility because one step in the process was not patentable. The 
dissenters accused the majority of importing a standard of novelty and inventiveness into 
Section 101 of the patent law, which should be concerned only with patentable subject 
                                                
36 Parker v. Flook, 590. Interestingly, the Court also expressed concern over the impact of a contrary 
decision on the emerging computer software industry, which relied heavily on mathematics in writing new 
software. In dicta, the court noted that it made no comment on the patentability of computer programming. 
That was a job for Congress. Like the recombinant DNA industry, the computer industry was bursting with 
economic potential and the court was clearly mindful of the possibility of disrupting the new industry. Ibid., 
595. 
37 Ibid., 596.  
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matter. The process claim might be defeated on numerous grounds, but Section 101 was 
not one of them. 
With the Parker opinion freshly in hand, the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals combined the Bergy and Chakrabarty applications and undertook a fresh review. 
Upon reconsideration, the Court reached the same conclusion - that a purified product of 
nature otherwise patentable under Section 101 of the patent law was not disqualified from 
eligibility because it was alive. This time, the vote was 4-1 vote.38 In its new opinion, the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals indicated that it would wipe the slate clean and 
start over with its analysis. The result was an excellent tutorial on the application of the 
United States patent law.  
First, the Court noted that there were no standards for patentability in the United 
States Constitution, but simply authorization for Congress to act if it so desired. Second, 
the major revision of the Patent Act in 1952 organized the criteria for patentability into 
three sections:  
Section 101 – patentable subject matter.  
Section 102 – novelty (so as not to take from the public something it already 
owns).  
Section 103 – non-obviousness (so as not to take from the public something it 
could potentially enjoy through application of knowledge it already had.) 
The Court characterized this structure as three doors through which an applicant 
had to pass in order to obtain a patent. To get through the first door, one had to have a 
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter or some improvement thereon. To 
                                                
38 Application of Bergy: Application of Chakrabarty, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.  1979). 
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get through the second door, it had to be something new. To get through the third door, it 
had to be non-obvious when compared to the prior art.  
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals expressed some frustration at the 
United States Supreme Court for confusing the three sections in its analysis in Parker. 
Unlike Sections 102 and 103, Section 101 was not a standard. It was simply a list of 
eligible categories of things that a person could try to patent if he could comply with the 
conditions for patentability in Sections 102 and 103. The Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals feared that the United States Supreme Court, as well as the parties filing 
appellate briefs, had used language and precedent relating to patentability when 
examining issues of eligibility. 39  
Referring to the Bergy application, the Court stated that the nature of the patent 
law was to stimulate the creation of new technologies. Therefore, one should not argue 
that living material was per se excluded under Section 101 simply because Congress did 
not contemplate it when the statutory language was drafted. The goal of the patent law 
was to encourage the creation of new things that no one previously contemplated. The 
fact that no one had contemplated them is what made them patentable in the first place. 
Therefore, if Bergy had invented something truly new and useful, he should not be denied 
a patent simply because the thing he invented happened to be alive.  
The Court noted that the Section 101 phrase ‘any new’ had been in the statute 
since its inception in 1793.40 The Court then observed that the list of things never 
contemplated by Congress in 1793 was nearly endless. In Bergy and Chakrabarty, the 
                                                
39 Ibid., 959. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, apparently felt some frustration at the higher 
court’s pronouncements, stating: “ . . . we find in Flook an unfortunate and apparently unconscious, though 
clear, commingling of distinct statutory provisions which are conceptually unrelated.” Ibid.  
40 Ibid., 973.  
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thing being contemplated was molecular biology.41 The Court offered no comment on 
whether living material could pass the tests set out in Sections 102 or 103 of the patent 
law. Thus the case before the Court was decidedly not about patentability of living 
material, but about whether living material is in a category of things eligible for 
consideration. Clearly, with this reasoning, the Court was framing the conflict between 
the logical and practical goal of the patent law to stimulate new and useful things, and a 
long standing societal assumption that life processes were simply off limits in 
commercial enterprises.  
As for the Plant Patent Act, the Court concluded that the law should not stand as a 
congressional drawing of a strict boundary on the patentability of living things. The Court 
concluded that it was special interest legislation introduced at the behest of plant 
breeders. Moreover, one could not imply the intent of the 1874 Congress that enacted the 
original version of the modern Patent Act, from the actions of the 1930 Congress that 
enacted the Plant Patent Act. The Plant Patent Act dealt specifically with plants and was 
not intended as a position statement on living things. In addition, the motivation behind 
the Plant Patent Act was to spur growth in an agricultural industry that had been badly 
hurt by the Great Depression. It was also to help amateur plant breeders by extending 
patent protection into a non-industrial area. Finally it was enacted to avoid the previous 
judicial position that plants were things of nature and thus not subject to patent 
protection. The Court also noted that Louis Pasteur obtained a patent on yeast in 1873.42  
                                                
41 Ibid., 974. The court tipped its hand somewhat by citing favorably from the amicus brief filed by 
Genentech, which observed that bacterial organisms are capable of producing human hormones, thus 
opening the door for drugs to treat diseases previously untreatable. This fact alone, while relevant to the 
Section 102 question of novelty, should have been irrelevant to the court’s Section 101 analysis of 
patentable subject matter and yet it was mentioned, as if to justify the court’s action. 
42 Ibid., 985. The court cited to a 1966 research paper that listed multiple instances where the PTO had 
awarded patents on things such as bacteria, yeast and virus vaccines between 1933 and 1963. The court 
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Judge Baldwin, who had previously dissented, voted with the majority but wrote 
his own concurring opinion. He modified his former dissent based on the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Parker. He stated that Parker established a rule that one could not 
patent a mathematical principle because a mathematical principle was a fundamental 
truth. The rule for Bergy and Chakrabarty should therefore be: What is the basic 
principle that makes their invention valuable and are they trying to preclude others from 
using that basic principle? He concluded that Bergy and Chakrabarty were not seeking to 
patent a basic principal in nature because the things they were using did not occur in 
nature. Thus, they relied on nature but did not try to patent it. The remaining vote, Judge 
Miller, continued to dissent. He stated that, if there is a basis for doubt over the intent of 
Congress, the Court should await a clear signal from Congress.  
In sum, the three opinions were disjointed, non-harmonious and cried out for 
resolution. More importantly, the majority opinion essentially threw down a gauntlet 
before the Supreme Court. Without saying it bluntly, the majority appeared to be 
questioning whether the clear language of a statute should yield to a Judeo-Christian 
tenant that any life function is within the exclusive province of nature or a creator. The 
opinion of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals challenged the Supreme Court to 
square the American values of economic reward for creativity and sacredness of life. The 
limits of science and technology had allowed these two values to exist in harmony but 
advancements were bringing them into conflict. The Supreme Court ultimately 
                                                                                                                                            
concluded that it could hardly be viewed as expanding the patent law in light of the existence of those 
patents. The long and unchallenged existence of these patents could be no more complex than a patent 
examiner who did not appreciate (or perhaps did not agree with) the nuance of living vs. inanimate. This, 
combined with the fact that these patents were apparently never challenged in court, probably allowed them 
to lay dormant over the years. The Supreme Court gave these facts passing mention as well but they did not 
play a significant role in the opinion. Ibid., 985, n. 116.  
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sidestepped the opportunity, elected instead to offer a very narrow ruling but one that 
cracked open the patent door.  
The United States Supreme Court settled the issue in narrow legal terms by a five 
to four margin. The majority ruled that a live human-made organism was patentable 
subject matter under Section 101 of the Patent Act. The Court reasoned that the use of the 
word ‘any’ in Section 101 of the patent law was to be given a broad reading, up to and 
including living material. In fact, the majority concluded that the issue presented was not 
properly captioned as one of living vs. inanimate material. Rather, Chakrabarty presented 
an issue of product of nature vs. human invention.43 The Supreme Court ruled that a 
bacterium was in the category of patentable subject matter because it was the product of 
human invention. Thus, the issue of living or inanimate did not require analysis. The 
majority opinion rejected the argument that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 represented a 
statement by Congress on the patentability of living material. The Court stated that prior 
to 1930 the Patent Office viewed plants as products of nature based on rulings that dated 
back to 1889 when it rejected a claim for fibers found in pine needles.44 Also problematic 
for the Patent Office was the fact that plants were simply not amenable to the description 
requirements in the patent law. The Plant Patent Act of 1930 addressed both issues. The 
majority dismissed reference to a 1930 letter from U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Henry 
Hyde, who stated that the Plant Patent Act was needed because patent laws were at 
present understood to control only inanimate nature.45 Instead, they emphasized the 
House and Senate Committee Reports, which justified the 1930 law on the grounds that a 
new plant resulting from breeding was unique, isolated and not producable or repeatable 
                                                
43 Ibid., 308, 313. 
44 Ibid., 311. 
45 Ibid., 312. 
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by nature. Moreover, the Court stated that the object of the patent system was to bring 
new technology into the public domain and thus have a positive impact on both society 
and the economy “by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens.”46  
The majority opinion declined to offer any guidance on the larger issue of 
patenting living material. The majority specifically noted that its ruling addressed only 
the question of whether living material was eligible for patent protection. As to the other 
gatekeepers in the patent law, such as the requirement that patents be novel and not 
obvious based on prior art, the Court made no comment. The Court, in essence, directed 
the Patent Office not to rule living material per se ineligible, but left the Director’s 
discretion intact to determine if living material could pass muster against the remaining 
patent qualification.47  
The four dissenting justices argued that Congress had specifically addressed 
animate invention in the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 
1970 and had drawn a very clear line on the subject. The existence of the two acts clearly 
demonstrated to the justices that living organisms were not contemplated as patentable 
subject matter in the patent law. Otherwise, the Plant Patent Act and the Plant Variety 
Protection Act would never have been necessary. The dissenting justices concluded that 
the majority opinion extended patent subject matter to living material while Congress had 
clearly excluded it.48 
 
                                                
46 Ibid., 307.  
47 Ibid., n.5. For example, it would have been plausible to decline living material on the grounds that it was 
not novel under Section 102 of the patent law.  
48 Ibid., 322. The dissenting opinion should not be interpreted as opposition to patentability of living 
material any more than the majority opinion favored it. The dissenters simply asserted that the decision on 
such an emotional and fundamental issue was more properly made by Congress than by the court. 
Similarly, the majority stressed the right of Congress to immediately pass legislation prohibiting patents on 
living material if it so chose. See, Ibid., 318. 
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Chakrabarty and the Burger Court 
 
The Court’s ruling in Chakrabarty represented a significant repositioning of living 
material as an economic asset consistent with the general philosophy of patent law, which 
rewarded utility and originality and did not concern itself with social policy. The 
Supreme Court deferred to Congress and the Patent Office to place any additional 
limitations on patents for living material, an opportunity neither entity elected to exploit. 
Thus, the Justices of the Court’s 1980 term made the critical decision, whether indented 
or not. The circumstances of the timing greatly favored the philosophy that living 
material could be the subject of patents.  
The President nominates United States Supreme Court justices subject to Senate 
approval. Since the justices receive a lifetime appointment, there is no guarantee that a 
sitting President will have the opportunity to name a justice to the Supreme Court. If this 
opportunity presents itself, however, the President can select a jurist whose track record 
of votes and opinions matches the President’s political philosophy. Research shows that 
ninety percent of Supreme Court justices share the political party of the appointing 
president and that courts tend to follow the philosophy of the dominant political party.49 
Therefore, the political philosophy within the Executive Branch of government can be 
carried over to the Judicial Branch when it has the opportunity to make a Supreme Court 
appointment, although this is not always the case. For example, President Eisenhower 
nominated Earl Warren, a former Republican governor of California, as Chief Justice of 
the United States in 1953. One hallmark of this era was the Warren Court’s landmark 
                                                
49 John B. Gates, The Supreme Court and Partisan Realignment (Westview Press, 1992), 12. 
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decisions on civil rights and personal liberties, particularly school segregation and 
criminal procedure.50  
Richard Nixon was elected President in 1968.51 Between the election of Richard 
Nixon and the 1980 decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, Republican presidents made 
five appointments to the Supreme Court. President Nixon alone made four appointments 
in four years. This was a key event in redefining the United States Supreme Court and its 
philosophy.52 In the space of thirty months, the political profile of the Court transformed 
from one dominated by six liberal justices to one comprised of three liberal, two 
moderate and four conservative justices.53 
The make-up of the United States Supreme Court at the time of its 1980 decision 
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty was as follows:54 
NAME  TERM  PARTY APPOINTED BY 
Burger, C.J.  69-86  R  Nixon 
                                                
50 The Burger Court: Political and Judicial Profiles, ed. Charles M Lamb and Stephen C. Halpern (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1991), 2.  
51 Ibid., 3.  
52 Ibid., 6. 
53 Ibid., 18 
54 Ibid. The transition of the Supreme Court from a fundamentally liberal to a fundamentally conservative 
body was set in motion when Chief Justice Earl Warren submitted his resignation to Lyndon Johnson prior 
to the 1968 presidential election. Commentators assumed that Johnson would nominate sitting justice Abe 
Fortas for Chief Justice and then nominate another liberal justice to fill Fortas’ vacant seat. Fortas was a 
close friend and advisor to Lyndon Johnson. Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside 
the Supreme Court (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 16. This friendship, combined with the 
eleventh-hour nature of the nomination, subjected Johnson to a barrage of criticism and allegations of 
cronyism. Fortas ultimately withdrew his name from consideration. He was soon under new scrutiny when 
Life magazine reported that he had accepted an annual lifetime retainer of $20,000 from a private 
foundation whose founder was subsequently indicted for SEC violations in 1966. Fortas additionally 
resigned his Supreme Court seat under threat of prosecution. Ibid, 18-20. Thus, instead of inheriting a 
liberally packed court, incoming President Richard Nixon, who had run against the Warren Court nearly as 
much as he had run against Hubert Humphrey, inherited a Supreme Court with two empty seats. Ibid, 10. 
Nixon filled those seats with Warren Burger (replacing Earl Warren in 1969) and Harry Blackmun, a 
childhood friend of Burger’s (replacing Abe Fortas in 1969). Nixon filled two additional vacancies with 
Lewis Powell (replacing Hugo Black in 1972) and William Rehnquist (replacing John Marshall Harlan in 
1972). The trend continued with Gerald Ford, who appointed John Paul Stevens (replacing William O. 
Douglas in 1975). Ibid.  
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Stewart  58-81  R  Eisenhower 
Blackmun  70-94  R  Nixon 
Rehnquist  72-04  R  Nixon  
Stevens  75-  R  Ford 
Brennan  56-90  D  Eisenhower 
White   62-93  D  Kennedy 
Marshall  67-91  D  Johnson 
Powell   72-87  D  Nixon 
 
 
Burger authored the majority opinion, joined by Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist 
and Stevens. Republican presidents nominated all five. Brennan wrote the dissenting 
opinion, joined by White, Marshall and Powell. Democrat presidents nominated all four 
The fact that three of the four dissenting justices (Brennen, White and Marshall) were 
alumni of the Warren Court suggests that the decision may well have gone against 
Chakrabarty if the Warren Court had heard the case.  
Warren Burger was a lifelong moderate Republican. President Eisenhower 
nominated him for the United States Court of Appeals in 1955.55 His body of work made 
clear that he was an ardent critic of the Warren Court, especially in the area of criminal 
jurisprudence. While Burger proved to be extremely conservative in his opinions on the 
Court, one essayist described him as neither a philosopher nor a deep thinker. His 
Supreme Court opinions were workmanlike, short on constitutional theory and long on 
fine points required to dispose of cases.56  
Legal commentators fully expected that the Burger Court would undo much of 
what the Warren Court had established. This complete overhaul never came to pass 
however. Burger turned out to be a micro-manager who annoyed and offended his 
                                                
55 Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1979), 10. 
56 Charles M. Lamb, “Chief Justice Warren E. Burger: A Conservative Chief for Conservative Times,” in 
The Burger Court, ed. Lamb and Halpern, 158. 
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colleagues on the bench. The other justices never coalesced under his leadership as the 
Warren Court justices had under Felix Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan.57 Justices 
Blackmun and Stevens proved to be moderate and independent while Lewis Powell was 
somewhat unpredictable. As a result, there were not five dependable conservative votes 
on the bench during the Burger era.58  
The Burger Court was a court of constantly shifting coalitions that offered little 
lasting guidance for courts, legislators or the public.59 Out of fifty major rulings in the 
Supreme Court’s 1980 term, thirty-four (including Chakrabarty) were decided by one 
vote, compared with nine one-vote majorities in the final term of the Warren Court 
(1968-69).60 Many scholars assigned the relative blandness of the Burger Court to the 
quality of its justices. There were four ‘polar’ justices on the Court: Burger and 
Rehnquist on the right and Brennan and Marshall on the left. The remainder of the Court 
was centrist and unpredictable.61 One cannot say that the Court that produced Roe v. 
Wade was completely void of activism but essayists argue that it was a rootless activism. 
Even Roe v. Wade was an exercise in finding a compromise between a woman’s right to 
avoid an unwanted pregnancy and the state’s rights to protect life and health of the 
mother and the fetus.62 This, ultimately, was the legacy of the Burger Court. It 
consistently avoided legitimizing or discrediting basic ideas.63 It dealt with cases on an ad 
                                                
57 Bennet H. Beach, “Nine Minds of its Own: At Term’s End, the Burger Court Still Defies All Labels,” 
Time, 21 July 1980, 75-76. 
58 The Burger Court, ed. Lamb and Halpern, 10.  
59 Ibid.  
60 David F. Pike, “Blurred Signals from the Supreme Court,” U.S. News and World Report, 21 July 1980, 
60. 
61 Bernard Schwartz, The Ascent of Pragmatism: The Burger Court in Action (Reading: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1990), 400 – 401.  
62 Ibid., 410.  
63 Vincent Blasi, “The Rootless Activism of the burger Court,” in The Burger Court: The Counter-
revolution That Wasn’t, ed. Vincent Blasi (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 216. 
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hoc basis, inspired less by moral vision than by pragmatism. Fundamental value choices 
were more often avoided than made. As result, the Burger Court tended to craft practical 
compromises rather than statements of moral force.64  
Chakrabarty stands as a clear example that the Burger Court did not have the 
personnel, leadership or cohesiveness to develop and pursue any ideological agenda as to 
the proper place of living material within the patent law.65 Chakrabarty is a careful, 
narrow and practical compromise. The Court took no stand on the fundamental question 
of who should be allowed to own living material. It does not explore the idea of what it 
means to be ‘alive’ and how this should be woven into the nation’s diverse values and 
interests. The Court simply stated that one section of the patent law could not be a barrier 
to an application that happened to involve biological material. It is a pragmatic decision 
based on individual facts and not on any rigid philosophy. 
It appears that recombinant DNA and similar technologies were both beneficiaries 
and victims of the Burger Court. The argument in favor of patentability Chakrabarty 
presented was well suited not only to the Burger Court in general, but to the Burger Court 
as it existed in 1980. Although the Burger Court was more than willing to test the legality 
of regulatory actions by government agencies, which were somewhat more hallowed 
prior to 1969, it decided few regulation cases that had any effect beyond the specific 
agency and the specific statute at issue.66 There is a longstanding legal theory that 
agencies are expected to be given deference in their interpretation of the statutes under 
                                                
64 Ibid., 212.  
65 Ibid., 413.  
66 Alan B. Morrison, “Close Reins on the Bureaucracy: Overseeing Administrative Agencies,” in The 
Burger Years: Rights and Wrongs in the Supreme Court 1969-1986, ed. Herman Schwartz (New York: 
Viking, 1987), 192.  
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which they operate.67 The underlying assumption is that the statutes are technical and the 
agency that enforces them is the most experienced and qualified in interpreting them. 
Prior to 1984, the Burger Court appeared to believe that court interpretation of statutes 
should prevail over agency interpretation. After 1984, the Court ruled that agency 
interpretations should stand if they were reasonable and if Congress had not spoken 
explicitly on the issue.68 In this sense, Chakrabarty was a beneficiary of good timing in 
that his case came before the Court at a time when it was less deferential to agency 
decisions.  
In addition, the Chakrabarty issues came before a court that valued economic 
practicality. The Warren Court had generally embraced an expansive view of anti-trust 
policy. It believed that the anti-trust laws existed to protect small businesses and to foster 
competition. The Burger Court, by comparison, was disdainful of competitive equality 
and wedded to the concept of economic efficiency.69 Whereas the Warren Court was 
inclined to label a business practice per se illegal, regardless of economic effect, the 
Burger Court embraced a rule-of-reason philosophy that allowed a practice to be 
defended based on its economic impact.70 The Burger Court similarly gave narrow 
readings to consumer protection aspects of the federal securities laws.71 While neither an 
anti-trust case nor a securities case, the Chakrabarty patent and others waiting in line 
clearly presented massive economic potential and Chakrabarty could only have benefited 
by having his case heard before a court that valued economic and business efficiency. 
                                                
67 Ibid., 196. 
68 Ibid., 197. 
69 Jerry S. Cohen and Herbert E. Milstein, “The Burger Court and Business,” 208. 
70 Ibid., 209.  
71 Ibid., 215.  
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This is reflected in the language of the decision.72Balancing the benefits to the industry 
was the failure of the Burger Court to make a definitive statement regarding a profound 
issue: The proper place of living matter in American economic policy. While the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Chakrabarty was a watershed event for patent law, the ruling 
itself was very careful and limited.73  
The press following the 1980 term of the Supreme Court illustrated the frustration 
and confusion with its seeming timidity. Newsweek complained that the Supreme Court 
contented itself with a piecemeal approach, trying to publish narrow judicial decisions, 
not philosophical tracts.74 There was no guidance on controversial issues.75 Other 
commentators suggested that the Court was simply trying to hide that fact that it was 
confused on matters of constitutional interpretation so it simply avoided them. It replaced 
broad examination of moral standards with narrow agreements based on highly detailed 
judgments about particular situations. When each case seemed to turn on what the 
justices thought was appropriate for that particular fact situation, little that was said by 
the Court in one decision bound it in the next. The Court tried so hard to avoid meddling 
in people’s affairs that it left the people without benchmarks.76 This is evident in 
Chakrabarty. Rather than offer a sweeping treatise on the patentability of life, the Burger 
                                                
72 Quoting from its opinion in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. the court said: “[The object of the patent 
system is foster productive effort that] will have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new 
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employment and better lives for our citizens.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 307.  
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ignores Chakrabarty. In fact, no book was found that listed Chakrabarty among the court’s landmark 
decisions with the exception of a volume of cases selected by Burger himself. Unfortunately, that volume 
simply re-prints the case with no commentary from Burger. See, Significant Supreme Court Opinions of 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, ed. Warren Burger (Manila: The Philippine Bar Association, 1984). 
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75 Ibid.  
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Monthly, vol. 12, no.9 (November 1980), 20-24. 
  
196 
Court simply removed one of several potential impediments in the patent law, leaving the 
others firmly in place. As for those, the Court offered no guidance. Nevertheless, the 
entire patent apparatus was opened up to biological material and it readily succumbed to 
the momentum. Chakrabarty came before the right court at the right time and the result 
tipped the scale just enough for momentum to take over. 
The Impact of the Chakrabarty Ruling 
The original application for the Chakrabarty patents had been filed in 1972 and 
had been wending its way through the appeals system for eight years. During that time, 
the Patent Office had adopted a policy of denying applications for patents of living 
material but holding the applications in suspense so that the applicants could maintain 
their filing dates if the United States Supreme Court should ultimately rule in their favor. 
As a result of this policy, the Patent Office had been accumulating a significant stack of 
patent applications in the field of biotechnology. Despite the Court’s deferral to the 
Patent Office regarding its power to throw up more roadblocks, the Patent Office 
apparently decided in the wake of Chakrabarty not to pursue the issue any further. The 
Patent Office promptly released one hundred and fourteen pending patent applications 
including the rDNA applications of Stanford University and Genentech.77 Congress 
similarly declined to step in and moderate the Court’s decision. In fact, it jumped 
squarely on the economic development bandwagon and passed laws to enhance the 
impact of Chakrabarty.  
Genentech hailed the Supreme Court decision as assuring the country’s 
technological future. Critics claimed that the Supreme Court had transformed Aldous 
                                                
77 Harold M. Schmeck, Jr., “U.S. to Process 100 Applications For Patents on Living Organisms,” The New 
York Times, 18 June 1980, 22(A). 
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Huxley’s Brave New World from science fiction to reality.78 Commentators were mixed 
on whether the true value of the research lay in the process patents or the product patents. 
A spokesperson for investment banker E. F. Hutton noted that the “sheer psychology” of 
the assurance of patent protection for all phases of genetic research, including the 
resulting bacteria, would be an important step in moving laboratory advances into the 
commercial arena.79  
On the strength of Chakrabarty, biotech corporations enjoyed a new standing that 
clearly enhanced their value beyond the precautionary investments of industry giants. 
Genentech responded to Chakrabarty with an initial public offering (IPO) on October 14, 
1980. The founders of Genentech, Robert Swanson and Herbert Boyer, had each put up 
five hundred dollars in seed capital in January 1976. Between its founding and the initial 
public offering, Genentech’s track record amounted to $700,000 in losses and no 
marketable products. Twenty minutes after the markets opened on October 14, 1980, 
Boyer and Swanson had each earned $82 million dollars. Genentech stock opened at $35 
dollars per share, hit $89 dollars per share and closed at $71.25. At the closing bell, 
Genentech’s market value was $529 million dollars.80 Market analysts called 
Genentech’s IPO the most striking price explosion in the past ten years. After one week 
of heavy trading, the stock stabilized at $56 per share. At its peak, Genentech had a 
market value of $650 million dollars, the same as Chrysler and about one third the size of 
Monsanto. Even when its stock had settled down to $56 per share, Genentech had a larger 
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market value than American Airlines.81 Recombinant DNA emerged as one of the hottest 
investment fields of the 1980’s. Venture capitalists scoured college campuses for 
scientific brainpower. The world’s best molecular biologists resided at university 
research labs and most of them had ties to private companies by 1980.82 Seven companies 
were working in the field of recombinant DNA at the time. The big pharmaceutical and 
chemical companies expanded their in-house research and partnered with or purchased 
interest in those companies.83  
  Critics continued to question the public safety of rDNA technology. For example, 
they argued, the absence of the Chakrabarty microorganism in nature contributed to the 
ability of oil to lubricate moving parts. Was it wise, then, to introduce into nature a 
bacterium that degraded oil’s most useful function?84 Commentators also offered broader 
critiques of the ethical and moral implications of the Court’s decision. Writing for the 
New York Times the week after the Chakrabarty decision, Harold Morowitz, professor of 
molecular biophysics and biochemistry at Yale, bemoaned the casual manner in which 
the Court had acted on an issue of such gravity. He believed that the nation as a whole 
would have been much better off considering the deep philosophical implications of what 
the Court had done. The Court, in his opinion, had brushed aside thousands of years of 
awe and respect for life that dated to pre-biblical times. He believed that the Court had 
not made a narrow decision on patent law. Rather, it had altered the view of humanity 
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and done so in a way that cut off a grand philosophical debate by making it the law of the 
land that living material was for sale.85  
The upsurge in commercialization dampened such questions. University research 
in the area of biotechnology suddenly achieved a new value. Its accomplishments, 
however, were partly the result of billions of dollars of public funding dating back to the 
Public Health Act of 1944.86 Chakrabarty and his like represented the final steps in a long 
series of developments which had been facilitated at taxpayer expense. The public 
suddenly faced the prospect of buying the fruits of research it had funded since mid 
century. Five years after Chakrabarty, the Court of Patent Appeals held in Ex Parte 
Hibberd that there was no conflict between the Plant Patent Act, the plant Variety 
Protection Act and the original patent statute.87 Thus, the Patent Office could award a 
traditional patent to a new plant variety. This ruling essentially converted the patent law 
and the plant laws into options with different application requirements and different 
protections. Researchers could choose which route they wanted to take rather than be 
directed a specific route based on the nature of the material. The ruling in Hibberd 
dramatically expanded the potential for commercial use of plants.  
Congress Jumps on the Economic Bandwagon 
A few months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
Congress took a significant step in expanding the commercial potential of rDNA 
technology for universities, where much of the research was still taking place. In doing 
so, Congress combined three powerful factors into one economic machine: private 
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business, the university research laboratory and public money.88 Congress passed the 
Bayh-Dole Act on December 12, 1980.89 The new law gave small businesses and non-
profit organizations the right to hold patents on inventions created with the help of 
federally funded research, creating a significant new incentive for universities and small 
businesses to engage in practical and commercially useful research. The Act allowed the 
government contractor, the funding agency and the inventor an opportunity to seek patent 
protection before a government-funded discovery could be given over to the public. A 
small business or non-profit could notify the government of its election to retain title to 
an invention made possible in whole or part with federal funds.90 The federal funding 
agency was then given a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid up license to 
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practice the invention worldwide.91 As a result, rather than the government holding the 
patent and granting licenses on request, the outside entity held the patent and granted one 
license to the government (which it presumably never used) and another to its licensee of 
choice. The sponsors of the Bayh-Dole Act purported to be addressing a problem of 
government inactivity.92 The problem, the sponsors expressed, was that the government 
owned the patent rights to 28,000 inventions that had come as the result of publicly 
funded research but could not afford to develop and market the inventions and would not 
grant an exclusive license to private developers. Thus, only four percent of the twenty-
eight thousand inventions had been successfully marketed. Supporters described the new 
law as being in the best tradition of free enterprise.93 They claimed that even after an 
invention was complete, the development and marketing costs posed the same issues and 
required the same incentives. In other words, they were suggesting that the patent process 
had two distinct phases before the public could benefit from the invention. First, the thing 
had to be invented. Second, and just as critical, the inventor had to have some incentive 
to invest in post-invention commercial development. It was in this second phase that the 
government lacked the resources to be effective. As a result, government-owned patents 
were collecting dust.94 Opponents to the bill argued that the remaining ninety six percent 
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of the twenty eight thousand inventions were sitting on the shelf because they were junk, 
desired by no one in the private market place. They argued that if the government owned 
a patent, it should be given to anyone and everyone and they should then compete. Public 
taxation for private gain, they argued, was wrong. The Act created an outcry over the 
public’s right to benefit from the fruits of publicly funded research. They argued that the 
public should not pay twice for the same invention and that the law ran contrary basic 
patent philosophy of creating an incentive for inventors and investors to fund their own 
research.95 
A second law, the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, made 
technology transfer an integral part of the research and development responsibilities of 
federal laboratories and their employees.96 It obligated the head of each federal executive 
department to transfer to the newly formed National Technical Information Service 
unclassified scientific, technical and engineering information from federally funded 
research for dissemination to the private sector, academia, state and local governments 
and other federal agencies.97 If the technology resulted in a patent, the royalties were to 
be shared with the federal agency and individual inventor within that agency. This helped 
to get government created research into the hands of academic and private researchers to 
hopefully improve and extend.  
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Working in tandem, these two laws acted to push government funding and 
government created technology out to the private sector. The law did not create a new 
right to private sector patents from government-funded research; it simplified and 
realigned the process. Instead of the government controlling the patent and the inventor 
standing in line for a license along with anyone else who had only to request one, the 
inventor now held the patent and granted one license to the government, which, although 
it held certain ‘march-in’ rights under exceptional circumstances, would not likely be a 
competitor.98  
In November 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States 
over one-term incumbent Jimmy Carter. Reagan campaigned on a platform of removing 
government control from the business sector an allowing prosperity to spread via the free 
market. In 1983, President Reagan significantly enhanced the power of the Bayh-Dole 
Act by directing the heads of executive departments and agencies to extend the more 
generous title provisions given to small business and nonprofits to all government 
contractors, including large businesses, so that they too could own patents on inventions 
made possible through government funded research.99  
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CGIAR Responds to the New Paradigm 
The events set in motion by Cohen and Boyer rippled through the scientific and 
agricultural community. The new process for combining genetic material held much 
promise for drugs, food and investors. The subsequent legal and policy decisions by the 
courts, Patent Office, Congress and Executive Branch served to reinforce traditional 
economic view of intellectual property and plants. Both served to enhance the value of 
the new technology. Patents helped spur investment and growth in research and plants 
offered new opportunity in the form of specific traits found in genetic sequences. As 
CGIAR continued to collect and preserve seeds for use in improving agricultural yields in 
developing countries, it was simultaneously amassing an asset that was growing in value 
every time biotechnology took step forward and the courts and lawmakers reacted 
positively. These events left CGIAR with new options for addressing its financial woes 
heading into the decade of the 1980s. The events also underscored the importance of 
CGIAR becoming much more attuned to intellectual property issues and developing a 
policy that, at the very least, protected its seed collections and ideally enhanced their 
value while remaining loyal to the CGIAR mission.  
Despite existence of the Plant Patent Act (1930), UPOV (1961) and the Plant 
Variety Protection Act (1970), new developments in biotechnology, combined with 
economic concerns, appear to have forced the issue onto CGIAR’s radar in 1980. Like 
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Henry Wallace in the late 1920s, CGIAR had gone about its business with little apparent 
concern for intellectual property issues through most of its early existence. By 1980, 
however, TAC was well aware of the potential opportunities and issues created by 
advancements in recombinant technology. CGIAR’s history from 1980 through the end 
of the twentieth century reflects a new emphasis on intellectual property issues and the 
events summarized in this chapter appear to have a contributing factor.  
The TAC board added a new agenda item to its 1980 meeting: plant breeders’ 
rights. After a preliminary discussion with the research center directors, all parties 
concluded that plant breeders' rights schemes had not yet created major problems for the 
CGIAR research centers’ international breeding programs. Such schemes embodied a 
potential impact on freedom of distribution and use of improved genetic material the 
research centers produced. The issue placed CGIAR into a delicate balancing act. CGIAR 
needed to preserve its traditional procedures in order to keep the seed collections in 
circulation while, at the same time, preventing outside parties from acquiring and 
securing intellectual property rights on its creations. Moreover, CGIAR needed to 
accomplish its goals in a way that did not foster distrust among its developing world 
partners or suggest incompetence to its industrial world donors. In short, CGIAR needed 
to establish and enforce procedures for handling seeds in an intellectual property 
environment.100  
 Already some of the CGIAR research center directors had felt the need to clarify 
patent issues before cooperating with outside institutions.101 TAC feared that private 
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multi-national companies would appropriate, patent and restrict genetic seed lines 
developed by others and placed in cooperative testing programs prior to release. In other 
words, someone would eventually secure a patent or a plant registration certificate on 
genetic material derived from material that CGIAR made freely available without such 
protection.102 It was even conceivable that a CGIAR scientist could do that same thing. 
The issue before TAC in 1980, therefore, was: Should the CGIAR research centers 
develop patent policies for their genetic creations and should their personnel be subject to 
contracts prohibiting them from seeking patents on their own creations achieved while 
employed by the research center? A second issue involved the developing countries that 
supplied the materials in questions. If those countries concluded that CGIAR was not a 
responsible custodian of their freely donated natural resources, they could jump on the 
intellectual property bandwagon and proclaim their indigenous plant material, the 
lifeblood of CGIAR’s research, as an economic asset. If CGIAR attempted to advise its 
developing country partners on if and how to enact appropriate intellectual property 
legislation, it would begin to look like a political operative, something that was anathema 
to the Rockefeller and Ford philosophy of avoiding bureaucracy and staying focused on 
science.  
 If those issues were not adequate to create controversy, the research centers raised 
the additional issue of intellectual property protection as a contributing factor in genetic 
erosion and the potential culpability of the CGIAR system for enabling it. TAC’s initial 
response was that CGIAR in no way contributed to genetic erosion on the grounds that 
CGIAR acted responsibly in its distribution of improved plants that incorporated non-
indigenous genetic material into a local eco-system, thus increasing rather than eroding 
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the genetic profile of a given area.103  
 In the hope of sorting out the myriad issues, TAC solicited and received a 
consultant’s report in early 1981. The report’s authors first addressed the conservation 
issue, stating that wartime food shortages and post war starvation fears had spurred 
demand for more productive farming systems. Agriculture at that time was about 
generating more food, to the exclusion of other considerations. As breeders became more 
focused on specific traits that would provide higher yields of food crops, they utilized a 
narrower band of special high-yield characteristics to establish uniform base breeding 
lines, enhanced through chemicals, fertilizers, herbicides, and irrigation. Those plant lines 
contributed to loss of genetic diversity because the breeders abandoned older breeding 
lines and wild landraces. In short, breeders could not be relied upon to preserve genetic 
diversity as doing so was not their primary focus.104 The consultants warned TAC that 
conservation and commercial interests did not go hand in hand. Breeding responded to 
short term commercial interests of demand and profit; conservation focused on long term 
ecological stability. While conservation goals certainly inured to the benefit of the private 
sector in the long run, responsibility fell to the public sector for their implementation.105 
These conflicting interests carried the potential to pit conservationists against those who 
viewed intellectual property rights as a tool for economic growth in developing countries. 
 Both sides, however, required ecological diversity in order to achieve their goals. 
Primitive or wild plant material had to be collected where it grew naturally. If a country 
refused to freely share its materials, the result could be extinction as uniformity in crop 
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varieties expanded and claimed more farmland. Some countries could assert a sovereign 
claim over such materials and refuse to give it away. The result could again be extinction, 
which could harm the entire planet if the wild landraces possessed a vital characteristic. 
In a sense, then, breeders and the conservationists both needed to arrive at the same place, 
albeit for different reasons.106 The report concluded that responsibility for conservation 
fell to the public dole. Breeders developed multiple plant lines and then preserved the 
valuable ones. They could not be expected to take on the responsibility and cost of 
conserving plant lines of no value in order to help prevent genetic erosion or because 
some other breeder might some day need them.107  
 On the question of economic rights in plant material, the author observed that the 
CGIAR research centers normally provided breeding lines to developing nations, which 
then further bred the lines for their own specific needs and goals. From this fact, the 
author concluded that the lines coming out of the research centers were probably not 
stable enough to qualify for intellectual property protection. Moreover, none of the 
developing countries that received the lines had intellectual property laws. A casual 
approach had evolved from these facts. For example, the Mexico research center, 
CIMMYT, suggested to its partners that its private property rights in its own breeding 
lines should simply be respected and that governments should voluntarily refuse to 
register any CIMMYT developed materials. CIMMYT believed that “responsible and 
honest” companies would respect its wishes.108  
 There were other considerations, however. A developing nation could become 
westernized and join UPOV, or a private breeder could manage to obtain and secure 
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intellectual property rights on CGIAR material in another jurisdiction. The author was 
keenly aware that donors funded the CGIAR research centers and speculated on the result 
of CGIAR’s failure to secure royalties it might have a legal right to demand. Would 
dereliction at that level cause donors to re-think their commitment to CGIAR?109  
 With the consultant’s report in hand, TAC addressed three basic issues, all of which 
posed potential risk to CGIAR. First, as farmers replaced local varieties with new 
cultivars, did genetic erosion occur? Second, what were the ramifications of registering a 
new cultivar under a local law? Third, if a country had no laws on plant breeders rights, 
were CGIAR materials fair game for the private sector?  
 Research Center protocol permitted recipient countries to name and release 
varieties developed from materials originating at CGIAR facilities and improved with 
public money. Local naming had the benefit of making new varieties more acceptable for 
use. Since the varieties were freely available and not registered under any law, however, 
they could be appropriated by commercial interests and used for profit in other 
jurisdictions regardless of the fact that they originated through public funds from multiple 
sources and were intended to be the property of the world community.110  
 The research centers professed two goals: conservation and plant improvement. In 
both cases, they needed raw materials from the developing countries with which they 
partnered. To date, that had been a free, two-way exchange: raw material from the 
developing nation to the research centers in exchange for improved breeding lines ready 
for finishing from the research centers to developing nations. Under the new paradigm of 
breeders’ rights, the research centers were conflicted. They relied on developing 
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countries for their plant genetic resources. If they began registering improved varieties 
under breeders’ laws they might alienate the developing countries. Even if the research 
centers registered their varieties for defensive reasons and collected no royalties, they still 
asserted a public declaration of ownership and control. Developing countries could no 
longer name their own varieties, for example. If the research centers claimed no royalties, 
however, the large donors might blanche at the idea of CGIAR foregoing all those 
potential profits while still coming to them for financing. Clearly aware that it was 
treading on potentially dangerous ground, TAC committed to a very transparent process 
that would bring in all the major stakeholders. TAC’s goal was to produce a consensus 
policy statement that would satisfy both the research centers and the CGIAR Board.111  
 The stakeholders reviewed a second whitepaper in 1982. Developing country 
dependence on CGIAR had become greater than originally anticipated. Developing 
country partners could not conduct the adaptive research necessary to finish CGIAR’s 
basic work on behalf of an entire region of the globe. As a result, CGIAR had been 
forced to allocate resources to adaptive research as well. The authors suggested that 
ownership of improved plant materials should pass to the recipient developing countries. 
Ideally they would finish the plants and establish something eligible for registration. 
Since the raw materials originated with the developing nations, and since donors funded 
the CGIAR research centers, it seemed that ownership was simply one more benefit given 
to the developing countries along with improved plant material. Although its improved 
varieties were not stable enough for registration, CGIAR could still release them under 
material transfer agreements that required the recipients to share royalties for any 
registered finished lines resulting from the CGIAR material. Ultimately, however, the 
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authors suggested that CGIAR simply use the forum of public opinion to discourage 
abuse of CGIAR materials. They also suggested that pursuing legal rights would be too 
time consuming and expensive for the CGIAR research centers and would divert them 
from their job of maintaining varieties.112  
 For their part, the developing nations faced a much greater burden than simply 
writing and enacting intellectual property laws. Such laws necessitated a governmental 
and scientific infrastructure capable of implementing, administering and enforcing the 
law. Citizens of developing nations with the requisite knowledge to administer 
intellectual property laws were the same people needed in local breeding programs. They 
could not perform both jobs. Ultimately, the report concluded that food was more 
important than legal rights, stating that CGIAR’s research centers should continue as 
before and that plant breeders should not be held responsible for maintaining genetic 
diversity, which was a job for the public sector.113 
 Based on the reports and discussions, TAC reached a number of observations, 
conclusions and recommendations. TAC asserted the economic value of CGIAR’s work, 
stating that breeding programs were vital not only to agriculture but also to entire national 
                                                
112 M. Heuver, J.J. Hardon, and K.A. Fikkert, “Plant Breeders Rights and International Agriculture 
Research Centres: A Discussion Paper,” August, 1982, 
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seed each year. Author interview, Warren Stine, 12 July 2011.   
113 “TAC Workshop on Plant Breeders Rights and the IARCs,” October 1982 
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economies of both developed and developing countries. Breeding programs: “… are of 
vital importance to agriculture and the whole national economy both in developed and 
developing countries.” 114 Since semi-finished varieties from CGIAR research centers 
could be appropriated, finished and registered by third parties, it was essential that the 
research centers publicize information on varieties entering international distribution 
networks so that users and registration offices would know their origin.  
 The independent nature of the CGIAR research centeres emerged within the report 
as well. TAC noted that the centers had “an open-door policy as regards germplasm 
exchange” and although they would have the legal right to seek registration “they do not 
wish to seek any exclusive rights” preferring instead to “promote the widest use of this 
improved material for the benefit of all developing countries.”115 The research center 
philosophy provided for earlier and faster movement of material. Since intellectual 
property rights did not exist in the developing world, there was no evidence regarding the 
impact of such laws on the research centers’ preferred strategy. However, “considerable 
fear was expressed” that parties with limited involvement in the development of new 
varieties could  prematurely gain unauthorized possession of materials in advanced stages 
of development and testing and apply for and obtain exclusive rights to them. These 
concerns “may place serious limitations on the willingness of plant breeders to exchange 
and expose their promising lines.”116 This point was especially true in light of the fact 
that the research centers routinely made their material available free of charge to the 
public sector in both developing and developed countries. This practice represented “the 
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major risk of appropriation of the IARCs material by third parties for commercial 
profit.”117 The  solution was to publish research center data as a means of protecting 
varieties from registration by a downstream entity.118  
 In addition, “considerable fear was expressed” regarding the establishment of plant 
breeders’ rights laws in developing countries, particularly as to the law’s possible effect 
on the movement of semi-finished varieties. This could entail the “involvement of parties 
with limited involvement in the development of new varieties gaining access to material 
in advance stages of development and testing and gaining rights to them. This could limit 
the willingness of breeders to exchange their promising lines for testing.”119 A party in a 
nation with plant breeders rights could exploit the situation by appropriating the CGIAR 
material and “with slight changes” register it under plant breeders rights laws.120  
The TAC committee report was a hodgepodge of concerns that was heavy on 
issues and light on solutions. By 1982, CGIAR had come face to face with a changing 
world that did not operate under the simpler paradigms that had allowed the Rockefeller 
program to flourish in Mexico and serve as its own blueprint. Science and laws had 
changed or been reinterpreted to put CGIAR in need of demonstrating responsibility and 
trust before a diverse and skeptical audience. As the twentieth century came to a close, 
CGIAR continued to fight for its vision.  
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CHAPTER 5. AN ECONOMIC COMPROMISE 
 
 
 In the years following the United States Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, Americans again embraced the economic potential of biotechnology from 
Congress to academia to Wall Street. Genetic traits in plants and seeds took on an 
enhanced role in both agriculture and pharmaceuticals. The Patent Office, having 
received permission from the Supreme Court to clear the patent road of obstacles relating 
to living material, allowed economic players to lock in exclusive rights to smaller and 
smaller components of nature. True to the long-standing economic philosophy of patent 
law, the new order helped to coax out significant capital investment for research and 
development. The wisdom in the earth began to funnel down into corporate 
organizational charts as giant corporations staked their claims in the new and lucrative 
field. The ripples from this new dynamic spread throughout the world and were large 
enough to rock some boats at CGIAR, which had neither the money nor the resources to 
keep pace in the world of biotechnology.  
 By the mid-1980’s, biotechnology and patent policy had ushered in full patent 
protection to open pollinated plants as well as smaller portions of living material such as 
traits preserved within bacteria. Unlike the seed registration system established in the 
Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, patents came with no exceptions for research or 
individual farmers wishing to preserve and/or sell seeds for re-planting. As a result, 
technology offered the means to identify smaller and smaller portions of living material 
and discover their utility in sufficient detail to warrant full patent protection. Three 
dynamics resulted from these advancements. First, the economic value of unique plant 
traits rose, as did the value of seed collections where those traits might be found. Second, 
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the need to secure legal rights in whole plants lessened as the ability to isolate and 
transfer traits in a laboratory setting increased. Traditional breeding became simply one 
method of transfer. Third, CGIAR reached a pivotal moment in its short history. It was 
behind the curve of the new technology due to lack of resources, both financial and 
intellectual. One of its most valuable resources, its seed collections, existed under a 
questionable legal structure that threatened to neuter CGIAR’s ability to establish or 
enforce legal claims it might have had to its breeding work. It also used methods of seed 
sharing that were outdated by commercial standards, but which nicely complemented its 
unique system of barter with the developing world: free germplasm in exchange for 
improved plant varieties. The CGIAR leaders realized that adoption of the industrial 
model of ownership could make it a viable player in commercial markets and allow it to 
turn its seeds into income producing assets. Given CGIAR’s willingness to freely share 
seeds, the industrial model could also help prevent the disastrous loss of its assets to third 
parties that might take unprotected germplasm and convert it to patented products. The 
very same action, however, could alienate its skeptical partners in the developing world 
who could easily interpret the move as a self-serving grab for profit. This conflict 
exposed the structural weakness in CGIAR’s system of management. The CGIAR board 
was unable to lead on this critical issue and was instead reduced to mediating the often 
conflicting interests of its various constituencies.    
 The final blow came in the 1990s with the Convention on Biodiversity and later the 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which included 
the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property agreement (TRIPS) signed in 1994 as 
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part of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization.1 These 
agreements essentially completed a decades long effort to push the developing world into 
an industrial model of agriculture that had begun with the Rockefeller Foundation and 
continued with CGIAR itself. When the developed world forced the developing world to 
establish intellectual property regimes as a prerequisite of participation in a broad array 
of trade opportunities, CGIAR relented and did the same. 
 The combination of technology, patent law and trade policy forced CGIAR to make 
difficult decisions as to its structure, mission and seed collections. It ultimately embraced, 
or perhaps conceded to, an essentially economic solution, thus bowing to the will of 
forces beyond its ability to challenge or outlast. The concession was not, however, to a 
new paradigm but rather to a more extreme gradation of the existing paradigm. The 
Rockefeller Foundation, World Bank and donor nations all desired to teach developing 
country farmers how to produce crops in an industrial model. In their view, the solution 
to world hunger and overpopulation lay in improved standards of living. The future 
belonged to farmers with the money and resources to adopt the entire package of inputs 
that represented modern agriculture. Farmers who refused or lacked the resources to 
change would simply find something else to do, presumably wage labor in the expanding 
economy.  
 This chapter traces the long and tortuous path traveled by CGIAR in its efforts to 
balance diverse goals and constituencies in a manner that preserved its relevance in world 
agriculture as the twenty-first century loomed. Although the CGIAR mission, at its heart, 
embraced a distinctly western philosophy of helping people by making them wealthier, it 
                                                
1 See, World Trade Organization, text of Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
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217 
also strove to preserve a model of free exchange and shared benefits. CGIAR’s small but 
significant step toward the patent model was also a small but significant step away from 
the common heritage model. Moreover, the move served to muffle one of the few voices 
for common heritage that had the status and resources to be heard over the din of market 
oriented capitalism coming from the other side. CGIAR’s move left the twenty first 
century agricultural world more unified in economic philosophy and procedures than ever 
before.  
CGIAR’s Fight to Remain Relevant and Unified 
 CGIAR faced two issues in the 1980’s that threatened to harm its standing as plant 
breeder dedicated to improving agriculture in the developing world. The first issue was 
whether CGIAR should utilize intellectual property laws to protect, if not improve, its 
position. The second issue was the lack of resources necessary to make full use of the 
new biotechnology in breeding operations.   
  If CGIAR had an ally in the fight to preserve free sharing of germplasm, it was the 
United Nations, an active and interested participant in the CGIAR program and a sponsor 
of numerous programs dedicated to the developing world. Faced with a growing wave of 
commercial biotechnology that threatened to identify and privatize the most valuable 
genetic material within the world’s cache of germplasm, the U.N.’s Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) sought to counter punch in 1983 with the International Undertaking 
on Plant Genetic Resources (the Undertaking). The Undertaking represented an 
aggressive effort to establish a common heritage view not only of raw plant material but 
of improved plant material as well. Its first article stated that the document was based on 
the “universally accepted principle that plant genetic resources are a heritage of mankind 
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and consequently should be made available without restriction.”2 The fifth article 
aggressively called for the free international flow of all germplasm at no cost, including 
advanced materials in the hands of private breeders. Desired material in the hands of 
developing nations or advanced material in the hands of industrial nations should be 
made available upon request “free of charge, on the basis of mutual exchange or mutually 
agreed terms,” implying that developing nations should be able to request improved plant 
material from any other nation so long as it similarly offered up its raw material as well.3 
Not surprisingly, the resolution vote split along economic lines. The United States and 
twelve other industrialized nations voted ‘no’ on the Undertaking against seventy-seven 
‘yes’ votes.4 Given the increasingly attractive opportunities for cooperation between the 
USDA, research universities and private industry, it is not surprising that the United 
States and other industrialized nations feared the consequences of participation in an 
Undertaking that might mandate transfer of improved material in public hands. Such a 
mandate could serve to drive the private industry away from the public sector.   
 The Undertaking was an ideological victory. CGIAR had long supported a 
convention based on a free-sharing model.5 Unfortunately, the convention did nothing to 
alleviate real-world issues that CGIAR faced. The twelve ‘no’ votes came from the same 
countries that housed the academic and private business peers with which CGIAR needed 
to partner if it was going to keep its research at the cutting edge of the new technology. 
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3 Ibid.  
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 172-174.  
5 Technical Advisory Committee, “Report of the Second External Program and Management Review of the 
International Board of Plant Genetic Resources,” April 1985: 65.  
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Those peers, representing both human talent and money, were becoming increasingly 
economics-minded in outlook and practice. They did not embrace the ideals of common 
heritage and free sharing as expressed by CGIAR and the FAO. CGIAR’s seat at the 
same table with these institutions came courtesy of its enviable seed collections. Without 
a clear and enforceable intellectual property strategy, however, CGIAR was like a rabbit 
discussing dinner with a fox.  
 The reality of CGIAR’s predicament and the need to address it soon became clear 
to CGIAR’s auditors. The issues identified through the external review report 
underscored the difficulty CGIAR faced in adapting to the industrial model of intellectual 
property rights in germplasm. In January and February of 1985 an external review of 
CGIAR’s International Board of Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR) brought intellectual 
property issues back into the spotlight. The examiners dedicated one portion of the 
review to legal constraints on the free flow of germplasm. The reviewers noted that 
developing nations could legally restrict the exchange of plant genetic resources through 
export restrictions. Those restrictions could be based on crops deemed commercially 
important or based on a list of nations branded as politically favored or disfavored.6 The 
review panel (anticipating the GATT and TRIPS agreements) envisioned a day when 
bilateral agreements would force reluctant nations to put their germplasm into global 
commerce as condition of participating in global trade. If this vision came to pass, they 
warned, CGIAR and its research centers could be shunted to the margins since CGIAR 
was not sovereign and could not operate in an environment in which it had to purchase 
raw germplasm or pay royalties for access to specific traits. Even worse than being 
relegated to second-class status as a plant breeder, CGIAR could lose assets it already 
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possessed. The review panel strongly recommended that IBPGR strengthen its legal 
standing in relation to CGIAR’s seeds so outside parties could not deter CGIAR in its 
philanthropic mission by patenting CGIAR seeds. The reviewers stressed that they had 
not conceived their recommendations with a view toward generating profits for CGIAR, 
but rather as a defensive strategy to accommodate CGIAR’s free flow of germplasm 
while negating the potential assertion of proprietary claims from a downstream user. To 
that end, the review panel recommended that IBPGR strengthen the language in is letters 
of agreement with seed recipients to assure that transferred material remained freely 
available to any professionally qualified institution. At the time of the report, such a 
commitment arguably existed but was documented in the form of a footnote in a grant 
application form incorporated by reference into the letter of agreement.7 In other words, 
the CGIAR Research Centers had twice removed from their key document the language 
most critical to protecting the integrity of the system of free sharing of germplasm. The 
language was most likely ignored or unknown by parties receiving germplasm and 
unenforced or unmonitored by the CGIAR research centers.  
  The review panel saw an additional upside to CGIAR’s participation in the world of 
patents. Laws creating plant breeders’ rights gave private breeders an incentive to create 
new commercial varieties potentially useful to CGIAR. The CGIAR research centers 
could conceivably employ patented commercial varieties in their work and still give away 
the results to developing countries that did not have intellectual property laws and would 
                                                
7 Ibid. On the issue of genetic diversity, the review panel was fatalistic and saw no justification for groups 
such as CGIAR to claim the moral high ground. Plant breeders' rights legislation indeed acted as a catalyst 
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not be viewed by the private sector as a lucrative market.   
 A closely related but more complex issue, and the one that had to be resolved in 
order for CGIAR to become more effective in protecting its germplasm, was the legal 
identity of the IBPGR. The review panel cited the lack of legal standing as one catalyst 
for the FAO Undertaking. The panel noted that CGIAR had created IBPGR and CGIAR 
was, in turn, “an informal group of donor governments, international organizations, 
private foundations, and representatives of regional groups of developing nations.”8 Since 
CGIAR had no legal personality or structure, it was non-existent in the eyes of the law. 
Therefore, any letter of agreement to which CGAIR was a signatory begged the question 
of CGIAR’s standing to enforce its rights. Given that the IBPGR and indeed CGIAR, the 
brainchildren of a collection of independent and benevolent actors, were so self-
consciously apolitical, the entire CGIAR structure essentially neutered itself in terms of 
exercising or enforcing legal rights.9  
 Not oblivious to the issue, IBPGR had secured an opinion letter in 1983, which 
concluded that IBPGR had an international legal personality that would permit it to 
enforce its rights in a court or international tribunal. The rationale for this conclusion was 
the ability of states to create organizations with legal personality by international treaty, 
national legal incorporation or “by less formal agreement between states as expressed, for 
example, when assembled in a conference.”10 The fact that there was an issue at all and 
that it had to be resolved by an opinion letter clearly suggested that the IBPGR did not 
actively operate as a legal entity, but rather a cooperative association of entities. Any 
attempt, therefore, to exercise intellectual property rights could further cloud the issue 
                                                
8 Ibid., 65-66. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid.  
  
222 
rather than bring closure.  
 Amazingly, after pointing out the dangers in CGIAR’s legal structure, the review 
panel retreated behind the failed FAO strategy expressed in its Undertaking. Rather than 
recommending to CGIAR that it establish viable legal status, the panel suggested instead 
that CGIAR prod the rest of the world to join in creating an environment of free 
exchange. The panel recommended that “governments responsible for a genetic resources 
collection commit themselves to the FAO that they are holding the material as part of an 
International Genebank under the auspices of FAO, and will make material in the base 
collection available to FAO.”11 The IBPGR balked at the possibility of serving two 
masters and harming its reputation in the process. While the IBPGR agreed to “maintain 
and strengthen its cooperative links with FAO,” it made clear that it could not "operate 
both under the authority of the CGIAR ... and also under the monitoring of the 
Commission insofar as this implies any form of control.”12 IBPGR believed its public 
profile was, and should remain, one of autonomy and technical expertise, which made it 
trustworthy to donors and certain countries.  
 CGIAR was so layered in hierarchy that fast and pragmatic policy from a 
centralized source was extremely difficult to achieve. Given the disparate interests that 
made CGIAR possible and the critical need for cooperative effort, CGIAR struggled to 
move quickly in a changing world, as evidenced by the years needed even to get such 
issues on the agenda. Plants had become a hot economic property and therefore a hot 
political property. CGIAR, by comparison, remained a technical and non-political 
organization, just as the Rockefeller Foundation had tried to be in Mexico. As such, it 
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clung to the simplest and most bureaucracy-free method of operation: free sharing.  
 In 1988, after eight years of wrangling, the CGIAR board attempted to placate the 
external reviewers while remaining loyal to its vision of free sharing. CGIAR publicly 
reiterated its basic long-term objectives and established yet another committee to advise 
the previously established committee on intellectual property developments. In a new 
policy statement, CGIAR vowed it would continue to support work on plant genetic 
resources “to ensure that the diversity of gemplasm is safely maintained and made 
available for use in programs of research and crop improvement for the long term benefit 
of all people.”13 The board also established a task force composed of donor, TAC and 
research center representatives, “to follow the broader political and legal issues connected 
with biotechnology and to bring these to the attention of TAC and the CGIAR.”14 The 
short policy statement, which TAC assembled over a period of two years and the CGIAR 
board accepted, reflected a growing realization that an organization such as CGIAR could 
no longer operate within the narrow confines of pure research. Like it or not, CGIAR had 
become a factor in a complex web of economic development, commerce and political 
power that reached beyond developing world farmers. Although TAC stressed that it 
intended “not to break any new ground” with the policy statement, the CGIAR board 
welcomed it as meeting “a great need in defining the CGIAR position for audiences 
outside of the Group which were concerned more with the political than the technical 
aspects of the question.”15 If the CGIAR board’s position was not clear enough, the 
meeting minutes made it even clearer: “Several speakers emphasized the commitment in 
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the paper to consider germplasm not as private property but as held in trust for future 
generations of research workers worldwide.”16  
 The policy statement reflected an attempt to remind the various parties looking 
upon CGIAR as a seed laden power broker that it had no desire to be anything more than 
an extension of the Rockefeller philosophy that brought higher yielding corn to Mexico 
in the 1940’s. The board acknowledged, however, that success in its stated objectives 
depended at least partially on developments in the political arena. The response did not 
meet with uniform approval from the board. Meeting minutes describe an unidentified 
contingent within the board that wished to “monitor developments in legislation 
concerning intellectual property rights in the products of biotechnology, and the 
implications for crop improvement in the [CGIAR] system and the free exchange of 
germplasm.” Although the task force emerged out of these concerns, the meeting minutes 
described intellectual property as a topic “not specifically addressed or addressed less 
completely than some members would have wished.”17 
 The second problem CGIAR faced was its lack of expertise and money necessary to 
use biotechnology to to its fullest potential. Before the emergence of biotechnology, 
CGIAR had been an expert in the field of breeding and simply wanted to assure free 
sharing of materials. It was very much a peer organization in the public and private plant 
breeding community. With the advent of biotechnology, however, CGIAR fell one major 
step behind the cutting edge. Biotechnology had not only pushed CGIAR’s seeds into a 
commercial arena, it had similarly pushed the supply of human capital in the same 
direction.  
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 Biotechnology drastically altered the manner and nature of plant breeding, which 
threatened to severely limit the ability of traditional breeders such as CGIAR to produce 
high quality plant varieties. Without the money and expertise needed, CGIAR faced an 
insurmountable handicap. In the year 2000, for example, researchers reported that the 
time and cost to develop a typical seed ready to be introduced into commercial 
agriculture was twelve to fifteen years and twenty to fifty million dollars.18 Joseph B. 
Saluri, Vice-President and legal counsel for Stine Seed Company, estimated the cost in 
2011 to get a transgenic soybean trait to the market at approximately two hundred million 
dollars.19 The new process that biotechnology made possible carried its own unique 
challenges. Getting a trait to express in a plant was no longer a matter of cross-breeding 
plant varieties over multiple-generations, a significant challenge in itself but one at which 
the traditional breeders excelled. Biotechnology offered the potential for using transgenic 
traits, which were genes from different species transferred into seeds.20 One unique gene 
insertion into a plant, known as an ‘event,’ had to be done thousands of times in the hope 
of obtaining a ‘lead event,’ which was a seed that not only expressed the desired trait, but 
did so without harming any of the other desirable qualities already present in the seed. 
The process was neither fast nor simple. Stine Seed, for example, created ten million 
lines of soybeans in order to produce one thousand usable lines worth keeping in the long 
term, a success rate of 0.01% from which it had to recoup all costs.21  
 The new call for action came not from external reviewers, but from within. 
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CGIAR’s research centers stepped up in the early 1990s to advocate for greater action on 
the part of CGIAR to acquire the people and money needed to remain relevant and to 
protect the CGIAR seed collections in some way other than proclaiming a general policy 
that they be freely shared. The research centers had been discussing potential benefits and 
threats from biotechnology since 1984 when the International Rice Research Institute 
hosted a seminar on the topic. The research centers hosted a second workshop in late 
1990 entitled: "Consequences of Intellectual Property Rights for IARCs.” 
Representatives of the research centers, American universities and the private sector 
attended the workshop.22 The report issued after the meeting contained a more urgent 
tone than the CGIAR board’s 1988 policy statement. Biotechnology, the research centers 
claimed, offered a significant step forward in plant research but the human talent in the 
new field was found almost exclusively in the private sector and the university. 
According to the center directors: “Biotechnologies which have the potential to accelerate 
progress in the resolution of agricultural problems within the mandates of the IARCs are 
developing rapidly. It is important for the IARCs to become acquainted with these 
biotechnologies and use them when appropriate.”23 Familiarity with and use of 
biotechnology required bodies and dollars. “A critical mass of trained successful 
personnel and the relevant facilities are necessary to the long term exploitation of biotech. 
Unless necessary human and financial resources needs be met, the resources of Centers 
and their clients could be stretched to a point where effectiveness is severely impeded.”24 
                                                
22 “Technical Advisory Committee Report of the Fifty-Fourth Meeting,” July 1991: 45. 
http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/cg9110b.pdf (Accessed December 17, 2010). 
23 “Biotechnology in the International Agricultural Research Centers of the Consultative Group on 
International Agriculture Research - A Statement by Center Directors,” May, 1990: 1. 
http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/cg9005i.pdf (accessed December 13, 2010). 
24 Ibid., 3.  
  
227 
The location of this need was clear: “The private sector is a very important component of 
the biotechnology community. Its importance lies in the level of investment made in 
research and development, in its contribution to technology transfer, and in product 
synthesis and distribution.”25   
 Like the external reviewers, the research centers also expressed concern about 
protection of the seeds they so desperately needed in order to continue their work. 
Although the research center directors were wholly against a private sector model of 
ownership for the CGIAR germplasm, they recognized the need to become much more 
adept at navigating the same waters as the private sector in order to maintain 
effectiveness and even relevance in the field of crop improvement:  
It is accepted that the legal protection of inventions and intellectual property are 
part of the practice of biotechnology … There is a clear need for information and 
expert guidance within the CGIAR on patents and intellectual property issues in 
order to aid decision making within Centers … Such guidance would also help the 
Centers to take advantage of potential benefits such as the promotion of 
collaborative arrangements, the facilitation of access to technologies and the 
generation of revenue by the [Research Centers] and their clients.26  
  
 The report suggested that the research centers wanted to continue working with the 
private sector as a true peer organization that could extract fair value for its assets, which, 
in this case, meant leveraging its seed collections to obtain access to biotechnology. 
Despite their collective desire to better understand the ins and outs of intellectual 
property so as to take advantage of opportunities and protect its assets, the research 
centers did not wish to use it as a financial tool. The research center directors stressed to 
CGIAR that its position on gene patenting “needed to be clarified as a matter of 
urgency.” They observed that routine patenting of genetic materials could lead to 
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multiple conflicts in the traditional exchange of material between research labs and would 
more likely hinder than promote the enhancement of genetic resources. The benefits of 
patenting living material were, in the view of the research centers, highly questionable 
and they advocated for drafting and publication by CGIAR of a statement that its research 
centers would not seek to patent genes and did not consider patenting to be a potential 
source of income.27 In many ways, the research centers, like the CGIAR board wanted to 
have it both ways. They wanted to operate under the new order but did not wish to 
immerse themselves in it. They wanted to study it further and ponder its intricacies but 
they were studying a train as it was pulling out of the station.  
 By 1991, every stakeholder in CGIAR had come to understand and appreciate the 
importance of CGIAR’s germplasm. Along with this realization came a greater 
appreciation of the diverse agendas represented by the various constituencies that made 
CGIAR possible. They began to eye each other with concern and uncertainty, like a 
group that had freely shared a car for decades only to discover that the trunk was full of 
gold. The questions of who exactly owned the car, an issue of little concern previously, 
suddenly became one in urgent need of resolution. The concern was not simply the 
financial potential of CGIAR’s seeds and how that money might be utilized, but a 
sobering fear that their value, along with the relationships they helped to forge, might 
simply disappear through inaction or mismanagement.  
TAC illustrated this concern by observing that CGIAR was not the only potential 
player in the intellectual property game. The enhanced status of germplasm could 
potentially result in an enhanced bargaining position for developing countries as well. If 
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CGIAR continued to plod along while fretting over its relationship with developing 
countries, those same countries might join the industrial world in leaving CGIAR behind.  
The key lay in seed banks. Maintaining germplasm stores required considerable time and 
money, making it historically difficult if not impossible for the national agricultural 
research systems in developing countries to maintain their own seed banks. The new 
financial potential for germplasm in the bio-tech age, however, made government 
investment in seed banks both attractive and justifiable. Pursuing such a strategy had the 
potential to put distance between the developing countries and CGIAR. Instead of 
donating germplasm to CGIAR, developing nations could claim sovereignty over their 
landraces and use them as for-profit assets in international trade. CGIAR had, after all, 
dedicated itself to pushing the developing world into an industrial model. It could not 
very well cry foul if those countries embraced the idea more extensively than CGIAR 
thought likely. CGIAR, through its plant genetic resources board, faced the new 
challenge of justifying its continued worth to the developing world. In other words: 
“IBPGR needed to earn a ‘leadership’ position in the global plant genetic resources 
community in order to become effective as a catalytic institution.”28 The economic 
chickens were coming home to roost.  
‘Leadership’ was an amorphous concept, however. TAC, ever loyal to the 
Rockefeller legacy, did not envision IBPGR as a policy making body, but neither could it 
be a source of technical expertise without more money and staff. TAC’s solution was as 
tepid as its two-years-in-the-making policy statement. It recommended that the IBPGR 
become something of a gadfly to the private sector. TAC encouraged the IBPGR to use 
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the public forum to become an educator on issues of access to germplasm and 
conservation of bio-diversity.29 Like the CGIAR policy statement of 1988 and the 
external audit report of 1985, TAC labeled the issue as critical but then recommended a 
public relations type response. Some TAC committee members, however, appeared to be 
growing impatient with the level of caution reflected in the recommendations, likely 
doubting that the industrial seed complex dedicated significant time to reading CGIAR 
press clippings. Dr. James Ryan, Deputy Director of the Australian Center for 
Agricultural Research in Canberra, voiced an “urgent need to protect the processes, 
results and products generated by the [research centers].” In order to do this, “TAC would 
need to come to grips with the issue as part of its ongoing review of CGIAR priorities 
and strategies.”30 Even those who supported the CGIAR position wanted to see more 
aggressiveness. Dr. Michael Arnold of Cambridge, apparently not satisfied with the 
CGIAR policy statement of 1988, encouraged the CGIAR to stop taking a “passive view” 
of the issue and “make known its firm support for the free exchange of germplasm.”31  
 Despite being in the middle of a policy tug-of-war, CGIAR did not have the luxury 
of simply dictating policy. The board had to mediate a diverse group of interests. The 
informal but complex hierarchy of CGIAR presented a three-tier structure of 
relationships. The CGIAR board sat at the top. It allocated donor monies to the research 
centers. Although it did not dictate the research centers’ research priorities, it certainly 
consulted on them by reviewing budgets and pushing funds to acceptable projects. Next 
came the research centers, each with its own board of directors. Then came the 
developing nations with their natural resources and publicly funded national agricultural 
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research systems. The NARS worked directly with the CGIAR research centers to finish 
and distribute to farmers the improved plant material developed from raw germplasm. 
The NARS also worked to develop local expertise in the art and science of crop 
improvement. The NARS and the research centers enjoyed a close and trusting working 
relationship, more so than either had with the CGIAR board. Finally came the donors, 
private and public, that funded the collective work of CGIAR. Any strategy involving the 
germplasm, intellectual property rights and biotechnology would have to address and 
satisfy all of these constituent groups. 
 External reviewers conduct a new audit of IBPGR in 1991. The report once again 
beat the drum for a solution or at least a plan for managing CGIAR’s germplasm. The 
reviewer’s report summarized three important consequences of the biotechnology boom, 
all of which had become more apparent over the years and had a potential impact on 
CGIAR. First, sources for material that could potentially improve plants had expanded 
significantly. The recombinant DNA process had broken down natural breeding barriers. 
The ability of researchers to insert genes by the process of recombination meant that an 
entire new range of organisms was potentially available to CGIAR researchers but also, 
therefore, in need of conservation. Second, as developing countries adopted plant 
breeders’ rights laws or other forms of intellectual property protection, CGIAR would 
have to more clearly define its policies. Third, the entire new landscape of intellectual 
property law for plants would necessarily cut back on the free flow of germplasm and 
other genetic material.32 The reviewer’s report, according to the CGIAR board summary, 
warned that: “[W]ith the development of modern biotechnology is an increased emphasis 
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on intellectual property in both the developed and the developing worlds. It appears likely 
that a number of developing nations, including certain of the host nations of CGIAR 
institutions, will adopt plant breeders' rights (PBR) protection by sometime in this 
decade.”33  
 Ironically, CGIAR had maintained steadfast loyalty to a common heritage and free 
sharing policy under the assumption that developing nations would be distrustful of 
anything less. CGIAR’s official policy was that seed donations from developing nations 
were not tagged with a point-of-origin designation for economic or political purposes. 
According to the CGIAR policy statement: "Collections assembled as a result of 
international collaboration should not become the property of any single nation, but 
should be held in trust for the use of present and future generations of research workers in 
all countries throughout the world."34 At that time CGIAR held over 460,000 accessions 
that it made freely available to the developing countries it served.35 Thus, CGIAR policy 
held that germplasm, once donated to CGIAR, was no longer ‘owned’ by the donating 
country. By 1991, it seemed, those same countries had become skeptical of contributing 
germplasm to a community pool. The report noted that developing nations were 
beginning to realize the increased value of their germplasm and some had responded by 
embargoing some industrial crops while others rejected the CGIAR principle of free 
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exchange.36 Additionally, the developing countries had begun to wonder about the status 
of their donated seed should one of the research centers close its doors. CGIAR faced the 
possibility of a donor nation asserting a claim for return of its donated material if a 
research center were to shut down, a contingency for which it had no policy or legal 
analysis.  
Finally, the external reviewers’ report warned that the landscape in which CGIAR 
operated and tried to maintain harmony was going to became much more complicated 
when the broader forces behind international trade policy pushed the developing world 
into an intellectual property paradigm as a pre-requisite to participation. The reviewers 
warned CGIAR that the expected completion of the General Agreeement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) “will almost certainly include a Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) Code. Such a Code would be binding on all parties to the new GATT 
agreements - which would probably include nearly all nations, developing or 
developed.”37 TRIPS would place a significant burden on developing countries by 
requiring them to develop, implement and administer intellectual property laws as a 
condition to being a GATT participant. CGIAR and its ancestors had pushed the 
developing world toward an industrial model of agriculture; biotechnology pushed a little 
harder and trade policy was about to finish the job.  
The report concluded with a mild scolding of CGIAR and its affiliates for having 
something of a head-in-the-sand attitude: “IBPGR and its Board initially reacted very 
slowly to these changes, considering other organizations and groups taking an interest in 
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plant genetic resources as trespassers in their territory … IBPGR misjudged the signs of 
the time, which any internationally financed organization does at its peril.”38 
Seeds Held in Trust 
CGIAR’s policy that it held donated seeds in trust for the benefit of the world 
carried with it some basic responsibilities that it had not explored in great detail. Until the 
1980’s it appears that CGIAR’s concept of seeds held in trust served primarily as 
justification for free sharing. Common heritage assumed that seed was freely available 
and that its users would extend the same courtesy to others. In that sense, CGIAR was 
like a seed library that provided centralization and management of inventory intended to 
circulate among users. The new focus on germplasm and its value forced CGIAR to 
explore the trust concept from more of a legal viewpoint. If CGIAR truly was a trustee of 
the seeds, as opposed to a custodian, it had certain fiduciary responsibilities beyond 
warehousing.  
CGIAR had to address two critical questions. First, what entity (if any) actually 
possessed legal rights in the CGIAR germplasm? Technically, the developing countries 
had donated the germplasm to specific CGIAR research centers best suited to help them 
in developing improved varieties. The parties understood that the donated material was  
held in trust for the benefit of the entire world. It appeared, therefore, that the research 
centers owned, or at least controlled, the disposition of the seeds, albeit in a fiduciary 
capacity. If a CGIAR research center ceased to operate, should CGIAR facilitate return of 
its seeds to the donor countries or should it transfer them to another, and likely less 
suitable, research center? Second, and more troubling, if the research center was indeed a 
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fiduciary of the seeds it received and if third parties could obtain and patent specific seed 
traits, did the research center have a fiduciary obligation to secure its own intellectual 
property rights in order to retain that value within the CGIAR organization?  
 The CGIAR board commissioned a whitepaper to examine the issues. The paper, 
completed in late 1991, explored the idea of applying legal trust theories to CGIAR’s 
operations. It offered a theory that justified use of intellectual property rights consistent 
with the CGIAR mission. Trustees routinely worked to protect, manage and, ideally, 
enhance the value of trust assets, not for themselves but for the trust beneficiary. If a trust 
asset was income producing, CGIAR should view the income as an additional trust asset 
held under the same conditions as the original seeds. The problem, however, was that a 
trust should distribute income to the beneficiary. In the case of CGIAR, the trust 
beneficiary was any developing nation trying to improve its agricultural production. Or 
was it? The analysis introduced the possibility of individual farmers as the proper 
beneficiaries, warning against any seed policy that might “be exercised to the detriment 
of the developing nation farmer.”39 This observation served to underscore the 
complicated nature of agricultural aid. Not all farmers benefited from CGIAR’s efforts. 
Those most likely to benefit were the ones able to finance larger and more complex 
farming operations and take on the risk of new crops. Others did not possess the 
resources necessary to change and some risked losing their small and inefficient farms all 
together. Ironically, it was these very farmers who helped select and preserve landraces 
over many generations. Their ‘reward’ was a more robust economy that would hopefully 
offer them regular wage labor. In one sense the western idea of the trust was a 
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harmonious pairing with the western methods of farming. The idea of parsing up and 
distributing royalties from patented plants to such an amorphous population was not 
appetizing to CGIAR, however, Neither was the idea of redirecting profits into new 
facilities and more researchers. CGIAR could certainly argue that the latter option was in 
the long-term interest of the developing world but the clear and immediate beneficiary 
would be CGIAR itself. 
 Another complicating factor arose. The most likely CGIAR asset to be protected as 
intellectual property were the improved breeding lines, which had been created through 
the long and difficult work of the research center staff. According to the CGIAR 
whitepaper: “The advanced material reflects an intellectual input separate from that of the 
unimproved sources. Such material is clearly the Center’s asset: the Center has full rights 
to patent or dispose of it (save as those rights are affected by a particular grant or 
contract).”  
 The authors ultimately proposed implementation by CGIAR of a model material 
transfer agreement that provided for the grant by CGIAR of exclusive or non-exclusive 
licenses to patented material sought to be used in a for-profit manner by commercial 
entities.40 The report embraced the idea that CGIAR should not become a victim of its 
own policy of free sharing and should place conditions on those who would seek to profit 
from CGIAR’s largess. The authors of the white paper did not instill confidence in their 
recommendation. In fact, they acknowledged that they were inventing as they went and 
looked to the FAO for guidance: “We recognize that we are on un-trodden ground. The 
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application of this body of law to international genetic resources (or other similar 
resources) has not previously been attempted. Hence, we attempt to interpret the concept 
as well as possible and with the help of the Undertaking.”41  
 In the meantime, the research center directors had formed their own ad hoc 
Committee on Intellectual Property Rights, a sign in itself that the research centers were 
determined to exercise some independent judgment on these critical questions. The 
committee submitted its own report in late 1991 and TAC discussed it at its March 1992 
meeting. The research center report conceded that CGIAR was going to have to adhere to 
basic principles of intellectual property in order to fulfill its mission, but it was firmly 
opposed to the option of reinvesting profits, fearing that potential profit might then 
become a criteria in research strategy and decisions.42 The funding organizations also 
weighed in, making it clear that they would not support any CGIAR policy that permitted 
intellectual property protection for living organisms. The research center committee 
quickly revised its draft to make this clear.43 CGIAR’s Committee of Board Chairpersons 
acknowledged the gravity of the issue but did little more than encourage the down-stream 
entities to continue in trying to resolve it. It described intellectual property rights as “an 
extremely complex and sensitive issue which is overridingly important to the future 
development of the CGIAR system” and instructed both the research centers and TAC to 
give the issue “high priority.”44 The comment was a strange mixture of urgency and 
passivity, reflecting the loose organization of the CGIAR system. The CGIAR board 
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appears to have known that it could not dictate policy on this issue, perhaps due to a lack 
of expertise but more likely due to a lack of power. Any solution was going to have to be 
a bottom-up undertaking through which the research centers put the solution on the table 
along with their endorsement. The fact that the research centers themselves were 
autonomous further diluted the chances of their speaking with a single voice. CGIAR’s 
structure had allowed for considerable flexibility and ease of management in the early 
years. Like the Rockefeller team in Mexico, research centers built relationships and 
solved problems locally. The higher one went in the system, the more one encountered 
names and titles designed to lend prestige and credibility to CGIAR’s mission. Their 
main focus was to secure and marshal funds from donors and then allocate them to 
worthy projects. The biotechnology boom presented CGIAR with an opportunity and a 
threat. How to manage its seed assets called for a type of leadership that the CGIAR 
system was not designed to provide. Unlike a for-profit company, CGIAR could not 
simply perform a cost-benefit analysis and issue a board decision. It had to hold together 
a coalition and also adhere to a philosophy that favored common heritage over profit 
potential. As a result, it struggled to build consensus, while its peers moved forward and 
began to narrow the options.  
The Convention on Biodiversity 
 One peer group that had by this time seen the reality of the new order of things was 
the United Nations, which was preparing to revisit the strict common heritage position 
expressed in the Undertaking. The U.N.’s assertion in the 1983 Undertaking that raw and 
improved germplasm was the common heritage of humankind had landed with a thud at 
the feet of the industrial world. Nine years later, the U.N. set out on a more capitalist-
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oriented approach designed to help developing nations become economic players in the 
biotechnology game. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED), also known as Earth Summit, convened in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The 
meeting produced the International Convention on Biodiversity (CBD). The CBD was 
unique in that it focused on resources wholly within the borders of sovereign nations. 
Traditional subjects of international agreements were global resources that nations shared 
such as airspace, the ozone layer or bodies of water. Biological diversity, such as plants 
that provided reliable food crops, was found within sovereign borders but shared one 
critical characteristic of global resources: it was vital for the care and even survival of the 
entire population.45 Thus, an argument could be made that the global community should 
manage and protect valuable landraces housed in sovereign nations, which should also 
share the cost and responsibility of maintaining them. As one commentator put it, when it 
came to biotechnology the north had the technology but the south had the bio.46  
Earth Summit represented a perfect opportunity for the common heritage lobby. 
Food, like air and water, was basic to human survival. The problem was that the oceans 
and the skies were fixed and self-perpetuating. The only thing mankind had to do was to 
keep from damaging them and try to repair what damage may have already been done. 
Plant life, however, could not feed the modern population simply by being left alone. It 
had to be domesticated and managed and, ideally, improved. Doing so was costly but the 
private seed industry was happy to take on the challenge, along with the public 
universities and the private philanthropies. As the money and talent gravitated to the 
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private industry, the remaining entities had to choose between idealism and pragmatism. 
Membership in the common heritage camp dwindled as a result, as reflected by the CBD.  
Participating nations signed the CBD in 1992 and it became effective in 1993. 
The CBD abandoned the common heritage language of the Undertaking and expressed 
the goal of mutual sharing in a more transaction-oriented mode. The shift was subtle but 
clear. Instead of simply sharing germplasm in a mutually agreeable fashion, the parties 
could bargain for specific terms on a transaction-by-transaction basis. The stated 
objectives of the convention remained idealistic. They included conservation of 
biological diversity, sustainable use of components of biological diversity, fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of genetic resources, and appropriate 
transfer of relevant technology. The means for attaining the objectives, however, shifted 
from common heritage to fair compensation. The CBD achieved its vision of equality by 
focusing on ownership of private property, specifically national sovereignty over 
individual plants and animals as tangible goods in commerce. In its Article 15, the CBD 
stated that genetic resources were subject to the sovereignty of individual states and that 
collection of those resources required prior informed consent.47 The CBD further 
stipulated that there should be a quid pro quo in the acquisition of germplasm. In 
exchange for germplasm, some technology should be transferred from the country 
acquiring the germplasm to the country providing the germplasm.48  As with most 
international conventions, including the FAO Undertaking that preceded it, the CBD was 
little more than a set of aspirational goals that the signatories agreed to work on to the 
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extent they were appropriate under local conditions and, of course, to the extent of 
availability of funding provided from the industrial world.49  
Just as the FAO took on a difficult task in arguing for common heritage of all 
plant resources, the U.N. took on a difficult task in trying to equate bio-diversity with 
human survival. The pro-diversity lobby veered into dangerous waters by making the 
moral case for the right of species to exist. For critics and opponents, the CBD became an 
easy target - a glorified effort to create global park rangers. The industrial countries 
preferred the hard economic reality of the GATT treaty.50 The United States, for example, 
refused to sign the CBD while supporting the patent-type system established in the 
TRIPS portion of GATT. Underdeveloped countries did not have the economy nor 
industry to take full advantage of the northern patent systems, but those systems were 
nevertheless forced on them as a condition to the myriad other benefits of being a GATT 
participant.51 The retreat of the U.N. as represented in Article 15 of the CDB, combined 
with the TRIPs agreement in GATT, effectively ended the common heritage argument 
put forth in the Undertaking.  
 CGIAR remained a firm supporter of the U.N. philosophy, including its resignation 
to a more commercial approach to plant and seed management and notable movement 
toward operating more fully under such a paradigm. In 1992, TAC recommended an 
update statement of principles tailored to the CBD, which at that time had not yet been 
finalized: “There was broad consensus that [CGIAR] should ensure consistency between 
its future policy and the articles of the convention once it was agreed.”52 CGIAR’s 
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updated Statement of Principles regarding intellectual property was stronger and more 
comprehensive than anything it had produced to date. It reflected the resignation of the 
CBD that germplasm was going to be an item of commerce in the global marketplace, but 
also determination that CGIAR would be a careful economic steward of its seed 
collections. The draft document of the updated principles included a clear statement of 
support for research center patents under specific circumstances. It continued to assert 
that research center genebanks were held in trust for the world community with 
unrestricted availability. While acknowledging the existence of plant breeders' rights and 
farmers' rights, it viewed naturally occurring genes as common property not subject to 
intellectual property protection by CGIAR research centers. The research centers could 
consider seeking intellectual property protection for novel biotechnological techniques, 
processes and other inventions they developed if such protection was deemed necessary 
in order for developing country partners to have access to those technologies. Intellectual 
property protection was not, however, to be used as a mechanism to generate capital even 
if designated for investment in additional research. Any profits were to be used to further 
the conservation and use of genetic resources in developing countries.53 Ideally, the 
CGIAR board had preferred to use publication as the means of placing and keeping its 
assets in the pubic domain but ultimately endorsed intellectual property protection “after 
a specific judgment that such protection would assist in bringing the benefits of research 
to developing nation farmers.”54 It is notable that the policy statement left the patenting 
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decision to the research center, which would clearly be within their technical prerogative, 
but was also likely a decision they had every intention of making on their own. In fact, 
nothing in the policy statement strayed from the basic positions advocated by the research 
centers. 
 Although it maintained its policy of unrestricted availability of germplasm, CGIAR 
made clear that unrestricted access did not mean unrestricted use. Specifically, CGIAR 
sought to shut off the potential loss of its own asset to a third party that might claim a 
proprietary right. CGIAR also sought to mimic the CBD by recognizing the sovereign 
rights of developing nations in their indigenous germplasm. The CGIAR policy stated 
that any provision of germplasm to non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) would be 
accompanied by material transfer agreements that would ensure “that any useful genes 
discovered in the material could not be withheld from the country from which the 
material originated, nor could the [research] Centres be prevented from using-the 
material, or specific genes derived from it, for the benefit of developing countries.”55 In 
other words, CGIAR sought to retain for itself and its donors and unrestricted license to 
use anything of value developed from its shared germplasm.  
 CGIAR also sought to encourage its developing world partners to enter commercial 
markets with CGIAR products. If a CGIAR research center provided a country with 
advanced lines that the country then converted to finished lines, those countries would be 
free to release the finished varieties themselves or license them to the private sector. This 
would be done in such a way and through a series of agreements that effectively 
prevented the private company from imposing any restrictions on the further use of the 
same material by either the transferring country or the CGIAR research center. As for the 
                                                
55 Ibid., 1-2. 
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more modern process of isolating, modifying and inserting non-plant genes into plants, 
the CGIAR conceded that it was not a player in such technology and so would have to 
“recognize certain patent rights in industrial countries and, in some cases, to pursue such 
patents themselves … to ensure that the most beneficial advanced technologies and their 
products would be made available to developing nations at as low a cost as possible.”56 
 The revised CGIAR policy statement, combined with the CBD, represented an 
acknowledgement that CGIAR was operating in a venue that demanded intellectual 
property procedures. The new policy was a responsible effort by CGIAR to demonstrate 
its worthiness to hold developing world assets. It was also a noble effort to keep the ideal 
of free sharing alive to the extent possible by attaching conditions that assured continued 
pursuit of philanthropic research. Most critically, however, the new policy reiterated the 
long held view that CGIAR accomplished its goal of improving lives in the developing 
world by making it wealthier. CGIAR authorized and encouraged the developing world 
to get into the seed markets by licensing their finished varieties to the private sector. The 
CBD similarly proclaimed sovereign control over raw germplasm, which should not be 
taken without some type of compensation. In essence, the ideal of free sharing became an 
intermediate step in a process that eventually generated profit. But for whom? CGIAR 
seemed to settle on the notion that it was being true to its mission as long as funneled 
profits from intellectual property to developing nations rather than itself. It was not 
particularly discerning as to how those profits eventually dispersed. This fact aroused 
advocates for individual farmers who were concerned that CGIAR was ignoring the most 
deserving and needful beneficiaries.  
                                                
56 Ibid., 4. 
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The FAO Trust Revisited 
 Having acknowledged the need to operate within a commercial and intellectual 
property paradigm and setting out policies for doing so, CGIAR still faced the problem of 
enforcement. A patent, after all, was nothing more than a set of property rights. If CGIAR 
was willing to use patents as a strategic tool to further its mission, some entity with legal 
standing would have to emerge in order to create, administer and enforce those rights as 
needed. The need for CGIAR to resolve the issue became all the more urgent with TRIPS 
looming on the horizon. Once again, the concept of seeds held in trust emerged as a 
possible solution. In 1993, TAC reported to CGIAR that the research centre directors 
were working with the FAO on the logistics for placing their base germplasm collections 
under the legal umbrella of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources.57 
Upon hearing of the report and status, CGIAR placed the issue on the agenda for the 
upcoming meeting of the research centers “at the request of several donors” and also 
appointed an Oversight Committee consisting of individual representatives of donor 
countries that would “define issues sharply and speed up their resolution.”58  
 The new CGIAR draft principles in circulation, as well as the possibility of using 
the FAO’s legal identity to protect the CGIAR seed collections, presented an opportunity 
for a broad array of CGIAR participants and commentators to weigh in. The research 
centers hosted a meeting in October of 1993 that included a hearing on the recent 
proposals. Perhaps not surprisingly, CGIAR received varied reactions that reflected 
opposing goals. Comments helped to illustrate the very difficult task CGIAR faced in 
                                                
57 “Report of the fifty-ninth meeting of the Technical Advisory Committee,” March 1993: 50. 
http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/cg9305b.pdf (accessed December 21, 2010). 
58 “Summary of Proceedings and Decisions, CGIAR Mid-Term Meeting,” 1993: 13. 
http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/csop0593.pdf (accessed December 21, 2010). 
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keeping everyone happy. For example, representatives of the non-governmental 
organizations “expressed strong concern that the document may give the impression that 
the CGIAR and the centers are in favor of [intellectual property rights].” By contrast, 
representatives of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV) detected “antipathy” to intellectual property in the same document.59  
 The comments also reflected a growing recognition that the ideal of common 
heritage had given way to the need for fair compensation. Advocacy on behalf of the 
developing world had not waned but it had been recast in economic terms. The problem 
was a growing distance between the individual farmer and the sovereign nation as the 
ultimate beneficiary. Advocacy groups began to hound CGIAR for settling on research 
centers, governments and large farmers as the beneficiaries of the potential profits 
generated by intellectual property rights in the perhaps naïve expectation that those 
benefits would trickle down to all farmers. For example, the Rural Advancement 
Foundation International asserted that “if [CGIAR research] Centers were to adopt 
intellectual property practices they would be seen to be endorsing a system which is 
taking away rights from farmers in favor of breeders … there is no discernable line 
between genebank collections and research products and that, as much as trusteeship 
applies to the former it must also apply to the latter.” The Columbian Institute for 
Agriculture (ICA) similarly observed that “[c]ountries of origin of genetic resources, or 
which supply these resources, must have unrestricted access not only to the [research 
                                                
59 Center Directors' Committee on Intellectual Property Rights, “A Review of Intellectual Property 
Protection within the CGIAR,” October 8, 1993: 1. http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/cg9310i.pdf 
(accessed December 21, 2010). Among those who offered unreserved support for the CGIAR position were 
institutes, both private and public in the following countries: Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Malaysia, Korea, 
India, Costa Rica, China, Japan, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Myanmar, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, 
Tanzania, Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, El Salvador, Venezuela, and Costa Rica. Ibid., Annex V.   
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centers’] active collections, but also to base collections when necessary. This preferential 
treatment is a fair reward for the fact that they own a major part of the Earth’s biological 
diversity.” Even the Secretariat of the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources 
chimed in: “The recognition or seeking of patents over plant genes is the most worrying; 
the CGIAR should not be involved in any process which might render difficult the 
downstream utilization for developing countries of plant genetic resources in its trust. … 
If this germplasm belongs to the world community, then the policy related to it should be 
defined with the representatives of the world community.”60 In a separate hearing, a 
representative of the NGO community complained that profits from plant material did not 
benefit originating farmers. He was adamant that “it is not acceptable to allow patents on 
research products while maintaining free access to raw plant material.”61 Unfortunately, 
much of the material had been given freely to research centers and there was no paper 
trail of exchange. Because of the wide extent of sharing around the globe and the 
homogeneous quality of germplasm, it was difficult if not impossible to trace materials 
back to their country of origin.  
 The research centers generally believed that intellectual property rights should not 
apply to donated material but parted ways with some of the developing nation advocates 
in drawing a clear distinction between donated material and materials arising from their 
own breeding programs.62 As for the proposal to place the seed collections under the 
FAO umbrella, the research centers approved and hoped to sign agreements by 1994. It 
appeared that the FAO lent to CGAIR and air of credibility that some developing 
                                                
60 Ibid., Annex IV, 23-29. 
61 “Summary of Proceedings and Decision, International Centers Week,” December 1993: 24-25.  
http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/csop1193.pdf (accessed December 21, 2010). 
62 Center Directors' Committee on Intellectual Property Rights, “A Review of Intellectual Property 
Protection within the CGIAR,” 2-3.  
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countries had perceived as lacking. The report stated that the action would “increase the 
confidence of developing countries and others that the Centers are taking their role as 
trustees seriously.”63  
 The meeting report included a draft model agreement for placing CGIAR seed 
collections under the auspices of the FAO. The agreement noted the “importance to 
humanity of protecting and conserving plant germplasm for future generations” and also 
stated that “germplasm accessions have been either donated by individual countries or 
institutions to the [CGIAR research centers] … on the understanding that these 
accessions will remain freely available and that they will be conserved and used in 
research on behalf of the international community, in particular the developing 
countries.” The FAO would “hold the designated germplasm as trustee for the benefit of 
the international community, in particular developing countries, in accordance with the 
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources.”64  
Despite agreement on placing the CGIAR collections under the auspices of the 
FAO, the research centers still had to access and use the materials as before and the 
manner in which they did so remained troubling. The FAO trust strategy simply provided 
CGIAR with a legal entity capable of asserting property rights in a court of law. The onus 
                                                
63 Ibid., 3. Five years later, the CGIAR would summarize the strategy as follows: The Food and Agriculture 
Organization’s International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources was designed to short-stop national 
laws that might have crippled CGIAR collection and storage programs. In other words, get a treaty in place 
before the nations start creating their GATT mandated in-situ laws, which would create ownership rights 
for the private sector that CGIAR did not want to comply with or complete against. The agreement would 
place an International Network of Ex Situ Collections under the Auspices of FAO. CGIAR was concerned 
that TRIPS was a forum where the agricultural community has limited influence, making it urgent for 
CGIAR to find its own solution, one of which was the international undertaking that would allow CGIAR 
to work within its traditional framework and “free of burden of many current political controversies.” The 
undertaking would cover not only the CGIAR collections but also national collections. Failure to act could 
“have negative impacts on long-term donor support.” See, “Summary of Proceedings and Decisions, 
International Centers Week,” October 25-29, 1999: 59-60. 
http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/icw99sop.pdf (accessed January 4, 2011). 
64 Ibid., 35-39.  
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to minimize the need to use this resource remained with the research centers. Little would 
be accomplished if the FAO was forced to spend significant time and money pursuing 
legal remedies shoddy practices necessitated. Despite the new policy statement, 
individual research centers still acted autonomously and varied greatly on their policies 
toward protection of germplasm they used and new materials they created.65 Moreover, 
the north-south divide burst into the limelight as CGIAR participants and commentators 
debated the wisdom of protecting and profiting not only from seeds but also from genes 
and genetic resources.66 TAC tried to build consensus by pointing out that the current 
CGIAR system entailed extensive sharing of undocumented germplasm, which was 
becoming more risky in the biotech age. A TAC report stated that the CGIAR System 
distributed over 745,000 accessions in the period of 1987 to 1991. Of those, 45% were 
distributed between CGIAR research centers and their associated international 
institutions; one-third were distributed within respective host countries; and one-fifth 
                                                
65 See, Ibid., 5-17. The individual research center positions on use of germplasm are summarized as 
follows: CIAT – Free access but would ‘contemplate’ patenting its own science and technology as a ‘last 
resort.’; CIFOR – address all IP issues in agreements; CIMMYT – Free access but will protect products of 
its own research; CIP -  no policy; ICLARM – no policy; ICRAF – no policy; ICRISAT -  prefers ‘open 
door’  approach plus publication. No ‘defensive patenting’ which is cost prohibitive; IFPRI no policy; IIMI 
– no policy; IlTA - will seek intellectual property protection over the results of its research only as 
necessary; ILCA – no policy; ILRAD – will retain for itself the proprietary rights to such its own 
discoveries; IRRI - unrestricted availability will not seek intellectual property protection on breeding lines. 
Will provide non-exclusive use to any entity. Collaboration with profit-making organizations for the 
development of hybrid rice technology will proceed after consultation, where appropriate, with the 
authorities in the respective host country; ISNAR – no policy; WARDA – no policy.  Ibid. 
66 Comments suggested unease with CGIAR finally taking firm action, perhaps reflecting that most parties 
remained uncertain as to who would win and lose as a result. At CGIAR sponsored panel discussions, the 
commentary was varied. A representative of Kenya still feared that CGIAR plant material obtained by a 
private company in a developed country would be genetically improved and then patented and would come 
back to the originating country “with a price tag.” She noted that “developing countries will be particularly 
careful that they are not taken for a ride when negotiating with companies who may know the value of what 
their resources better than the country.” By contrast, representatives of the private seed industry argued that 
a stand against patenting natural genes would make the adoption of any intellectual property policy 
meaningless and valueless and would substantially delay technology transfer and postpone welfare gains. 
He argued that if FAO truly supported the policy of seeds held in trust, then the World Health Organization 
would be forced to discontinue its substantial portfolio of collaboration with the private sector to develop 
key technologies such as malaria-vaccines, which relied extensively on patented natural genes. “Summary 
of Proceedings and Decision, International Centers Week,” December 1993: 24-25.  
http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/csop1193.pdf (accessed December 21, 2010).  
  
250 
went to other countries, with a small but growing proportion going directly to the private 
sector.67 Clearly the private sector still played a minor role at this time, but once the 
material began to circulate, and given the great disparity between CGIAR research 
centers in their policies on sharing, the potential for germplasm to end up in the hands of 
a for-profit end-user with access to intellectual property protection was inevitable. 
According to TAC, “[T]he issue of ‘ownership’ has now changed from the idea of 
genetic resources being the common heritage of mankind, envisaged in the FAO 
International Undertaking, to the notion of national sovereignty under the Convention.”68  
The FAO trust would: “help clarify the ambiguities surrounding national sovereignty 
over the germplasm now held by the CGIAR Centres.”69 Just when momentum seemed to 
emerge, the complex CGIAR machine once again brought it to a halt. At the July 1994 
TAC meeting, the research centers’ Directors Committee reported that it “hoped to 
complete its work and produce a final centre-wide policy statement on intellectual 
property rights within twelve months.”70 As the research centers took the lead in slowing 
down the process, CGIAR began to reinvent itself in way that justified its new patent-
friendly philosophy.  
CGIAR’s Mission: A Moving Target 
 A new Intellectual Property Rights Panel chaired by Dr. M.S. Swaminathan 
reported at the October 1994 meeting of the research centers. The Swaminathan report’s 
introduction contained a fascinating piece of historical perspective, bordering on 
                                                
67 CGIAR Secretariat, “Stripe Study of Genetic Resources in the CGIAR,” April 26, 1994: 13, contained in 
“CGIAR Mid-Term Meeting, May 23-27, 1994.” http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/tc9403c.pdf 
(accesed January 5, 2011). 
68 Ibid., 6.  
69 Ibid., 14. 
70 “Report of the Sixty Third Meeting of the Technical Advisory Committee,” July 1994: 24. 
http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/tc9403b.pdf (accessed January 5, 2011). 
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historical revision, that was indicative of the entire 1994 meeting. As the world had 
changed, CGIAR not only struggled with how it would change in response but it also 
struggled in defining what it had been in the past. CGIAR attempted to justify its new 
position on intellectual property by casting it as consistent with long-held CGIAR values. 
Within the new report, CGIAR’s goal became social and environmental justice for small 
farmers and the planet. The report stated: “The major aim of the CGIAR has been to 
protect and promote the interests of small and resource poor farming families in 
developing countries. CGIAR’s new vision places the productivity, profitability, and 
stability of food-based farming systems in the developing countries on an 
environmentally sustainable and socially equitable basis as being of highest priority.”71 
This aim was not consistent with the repeatedly stated goal in the early 1970s of 
increasing food production in order to prevent mass starvation, even at the expense of 
farmers unwilling or unable to adopt a modern, commercial mindset toward agriculture. 
Keeping a small farmer small was never going to feed the world, something that the 
Rockefellers and the World Bank under McNamara saw very clearly in the early days. 
The Swaminathan committee attempted to meld its revised CGIAR vision with a 
progressive attitude toward intellectual property. The panel endorsed the 1992 CGIAR 
position that research centers would not seek intellectual property protection for the 
purpose of generating income as a source of operating funds. The panel also 
recommended that patent protection could be appropriate as a defensive measure to keep 
others from patenting and profiting in CGIAR research, or as a means to the goal of 
delivering still better products to the farming community. In addition, the committee saw 
                                                
71 “Report of the Intellectual Property Rights Panel,” September 15, 1994, in “Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research, International Centers’ Week,” October 24-28, 1994: 1.  
http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/cg9410g.pdf (accessed January 3, 2011). 
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patents as a tool to provide CGIAR with a chip for negotiating for other proprietary 
technology for the benefit of developing countries.72 In other words, patents helped 
provide better products to small farm families, clearly a more humane position than one 
of modernizing farming to enhance local economies at the expense of small farm 
families.  
 The Swaminathan report also took on the longstanding tradition of sidestepping 
political entanglements. The report departed sharply with the earlier stated policy of 
IBPGR in 1985 when that group had resolutely pledged to stay away from lobbying 
developing countries on intellectual property issues. With the advent of TRIPS, the 
Swaminathan panel saw the CGIAR as a champion, perhaps the lone champion, of the 
position that TRIPS-mandated legislation should incorporate UPOV-type provisions 
allowing farmers to save and exchange registered seed as well as providing an exemption 
for academic research. Thus, CGIAR should: “co-sponsor with interested developing 
countries, a program on the development of national systems for plant variety protection, 
in partnership with interested countries.” The report also encouraged CGIAR to get the 
centers’ germplasm collections under the auspices of the FAO “as quickly as possible.”73 
By the reports’ conclusion, the committee had melded the old and the new into an 
awkward alliance: “The foregoing steps are designed to ensure that the primary purpose 
for which donors provide funds to the CGIAR, namely promoting sustainable food 
security and livelihoods among the world’s economically and ecologically disadvantaged 
                                                
72 Ibid., ii -  iii. Two years later, a contingent of commentators urged CGIAR to take a lead role in using the 
intellectual property issue to set social policy and to take into account “new information about women and 
their role in genetic resources control and ownership.” While the board did not adopt the policy, it was 
“accepted as an interim set of working guidelines” and the Genetic Resources Policy Committee under 
Swaminathan was reestablished for another two years. See, “Summary of Proceedings and Decisions, 
International Centers Week,” January 1997: 67 http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/csop1196.pdf  
(accessed January 4, 2011). 
73 Ibid.  
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women, men and children is achieved under the emerging global trade environment.”74In 
the same sense that CGIAR had always tried to juggle multiple interests, it also tried to 
juggle traditional goals that reflected the harsh reality of feeding the world with the more 
popular goals of cultural identity and environmental responsibility. The fact that CGIAR 
felt obligated to address those goals and put itself forward as their champion without 
really changing its modus operandi suggests two things. First, those issues still carried 
some clout and the voices of common heritage had not fully succumbed to industrial 
capitalism. Second, addressing those issues was less a matter of substantive change and 
more a matter of arguing that the industrial agriculture model already took care of them. 
If anything, CGIAR was moving closer to industrial capitalism but spinning it as 
environmentally and family friendly.  
  The Swaminathan report generally concurred in the idea that all CGIAR genetic 
resources were held in trust and made freely available and that research centers should 
not seek intellectual property protection unless absolutely necessary to ensure access by 
developing countries to new technologies and products, but never for income-generating 
purposes75 In a companion document entitled ‘Suggested Guiding Principals for the 
[Research Centers]’ the panel also recommended a position that naturally occurring genes 
were common property and not eligible for patent protection.76 Swaminathan also sought 
                                                
74 Ibid., 9.  
75 Ibid., 22. 
76 Ibid., Annex 3. Interestingly, the Committee resurrected a policy statement in intellectual property rights 
from 1991 provided by the Rockefeller Foundation to its rice research institute. The policy suggests that 
Foundation was more aggressive when speaking for itself rather than as a co-founders of CGIAR. The 
Foundation clearly expected to see results. It advised that pursuit of intellectual property rights in 
developed countries was permissible if used for a proper goal. The purpose of the policy statement was to 
“clarify what the Foundation expects of grantees with regard to collaboration and the sharing of materials. 
Our consideration of requests for financial support will increasingly be based on the degree to which 
grantees contribute to this chain of collaborations as well as the scientific quality of their research.... It is 
expected that Rockefeller Foundation rice biotechnology grantees will share materials and technology 
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to rein in the research centers by securing their collective authorization to speak on their 
behalf with  “the numerous institutions that shape international policy in this area.”77 In 
sum, the panel report moved CGIAR much closer to acknowledging the reality in which 
it lived as well as the need to work on its public message.   
 By the end of 1994, CGIAR and the FAO had executed agreements placing the 
genetic resource collections of the CGIAR research centers under the auspices of the 
FAO’s Commission on Plant Genetic Resources. CGIAR also strengthened its 
recommendation on intellectual property for research centers, sating that “Centers should 
seek patent protection in order to prevent appropriation by others, to ensure further 
product development, and to use ownership of intellectual property to negotiate access to 
other proprietary technology for the benefit of developing countries.” 78 The direction 
was timely if not long overdue. TAC reported in 1995 that every CGIAR research center 
was involved in “many -- in some cases well over 100 -- collaborative research projects 
involving other research institutes.” While not every collaboration was relevant to use of 
patentable property, many were classified as “high-science.”79 In such cases, funding 
usually came from the outside research institute or the country in which it resided. TAC 
                                                                                                                                            
resulting from Foundation-supported research with cooperating researchers at zero royalty for use in 
developing countries. Grantees should not enter into agreements that conflict with this obligation … At the 
same time, it is recognized that grantees may wish to pursue intellectual property rights on their discoveries 
and their improved materials in order to obtain economic return in developed countries for the support of 
further research and to maintain a strong bargaining position in the event of any intellectual property 
disputes. For purposes of this policy ‘developing nations’ include all the nations of Central and South 
America including Mexico, all the nations of Asia except Japan and the Soviet Union, all the nations of 
Africa, and the nations of Oceania except Australia and New Zealand. All other nations are considered 
‘developed’.” Ibid., Annex 4 The panel concluded that the Rockefeller statement “may serve as a useful 
basis for CGIAR policies.” Ibid.  
77 “Report of the first Steering Committee Meeting,” September 15-16: 5-6. 
http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/cg9410f.pdf (accessed January 3, 2011). 
78 Summary of Proceedings and Decisions, International Centers Week,” 1994: 9-10. 
http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/csop1194.pdf (accessed January 3, 2011).  
79 Technical Advisory Committee, “The Role of Advanced Institutions in the Work of CGIAR,” September 
1995: 1. http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/cg9510i.pdf (accessed January 5, 2011). 
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wanted to make sure that such efforts were cost effective and that the results would 
contribute to development of international public goods. With a wary eye on GATT, 
TAC cautioned that “partnership arrangements would need to continue to ensure that all 
products and processes discovered in the research can be made available to all [CGIAR 
research centers] and to all [national agricultural research centers] of developing 
countries,” a goal that would require “considerable attention to legal issues.”80 In other 
words, even with the seed collection under the FAO umbrella, CGIAR still faced the 
challenges of management and enforcement. Not surprisingly, there was no shortage of 
opinions on how those responsibilities should be handled. 
The Private Sector Committee 
 CGIAR’s move to place its seed collections under the auspices of the FAO and 
green-light use of patents by research centers roused several interest groups and 
generated diverse reactions. Although CGIAR reiterated its desire to facilitate free 
sharing, it had nevertheless sent a clear message that sharing did not encompass 
exploitation. CGIAR would not be deprived of assets and income to which it had a 
superior claim. To the extent it made money in the process, that money would be used to 
benefit the developing world. The imprecise nature of that benefit brought commentary 
on behalf of the basic cultural unit within the developing world: the individual farmer. 
CGIAR seemed to respond by staying course but modifying its message to suggest that 
its mission had always focused on farm families and the environment in which they 
operated and such concern would be continue to be well served in an intellectual property 
paradigm. On the other side, the private sector likely woke up to the fact that CGIAR’s 
                                                
80 Ibid., 3. 
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new policies, while positive, could enhance its ability to compete for emerging markets. 
Although it generally supported a CGIAR adept at using intellectual property laws, it 
wanted to be sure that it was done in a manner that did not foster unnecessary 
competition.   
 Ever cognizant of its delicate balance of supporters, CGIAR established a new 
Private Sector Committee (PSC) in 1995 to better understand and interact with the 
burgeoning market sector that was hungry for genetic material. The PSC wasted no time 
in pushing CGIAR toward a more industry friendly position. The committee quickly 
established a vision of cooperation and role assignments based on profitability. There was 
no reason for public or charitable entities to compete in profitable genetic research that 
the private sector was more than willing to take on. The simple answer was to let the 
private sector focus on “high productive areas” thus allowing the national agricultural 
research centers and CGIAR “to be increasingly concentrated on more marginal areas.”81 
In order to help accomplish a proper split in focus, CGIAR needed to do a better job of 
marketing itself to the private sector.82  
 The PSC delivered a white paper to CGIAR at the latter’s May 1997 midterm 
meeting. The paper warned CGIAR that it could not gain access to needed technology 
absent a willingness to partner with the private sector. Such partnership required 
recognition of the fact that private companies could eventually find developing nations 
worth their efforts once those countries became sufficiently advanced to be a customer. 
The private companies were less interested in increasing yields in obscure crops and 
more interested in reaching a critical mass of purchasers. The PSC described the private 
                                                
81 “Report of the First Meeting of the Private Sector Committee,” December 7-8, 1995: 2. 
http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/psc001.pdf (accessed January 11, 2011).  
82 Ibid., 4.  
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sector as “less interested in crops per se than in potential markets … The market 
segments of greatest interest to the private companies are those where they can capture 
the most value.”83 It is notable that the private sector’s desire for developing countries 
was the same as CGIAR’s; both wanted them to see agriculture produce for the 
marketplace rather than subsistence.  
 In order to partner with the private sector, CGIAR would be required to build up its 
intellectual property assets so that it could gain entry into the market by becoming an 
attractive business partner. Doing so “would compel the CGIAR to reconcile the public 
good nature of its work with the norms prevailing in the biotechnology industry.”84 The 
PSC paper identified two processes in the new world of biotechnology: Creation of genes 
that encode the proteins responsible for the desired trait, and techniques for inserting, 
identifying, or manipulating the genes in cells through plant transformation systems, 
selectable markers, and gene expression techniques. New issues created by these 
                                                
83 Private Sector Committee, “Strengthening CGIAR-Private Sector Partnerships In Biotechnology: A 
Private Sector Committee Perspective on Compelling Issues,” April 30, 1997: 7, in “CGIAR Mid-term 
Meeting,” May 26-30, 1997. http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/cg9705k.pdf (accessed January 11, 
2011). One attraction to biotechnology was similar to the attraction of traditional crop breeding and that 
was its scale neutrality. In other words, any farmer could plant a bioengineered seed instead of a land race, 
whereas not every farmer could afford a new tractor. The advocacy conveniently ignores the cost of 
fertilizer, pesticide and irrigation, however. See, “Summary of Proceedings and Decisions, CGIAR Mid-
Term Meeting,” May 26-30, 1997: 20. http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/csop0597.pdf (accessed 
January 15, 2011). 
84 Ibid., i. According to the report: “The private sector is responsible for approximately 80 percent of 
research in plant biotechnology worldwide. In the United States alone, the private sector spent US$595 
million on agricultural biotechnology research in 1992. The private sector’s large investment in 
biotechnology has made it a major player in the “basic” research end of the “basic-strategic-applied-
adaptive research” continuum. This contrasts with the private sectors traditional role as the user of the basic 
and strategic research findings of public sector institutions. While agricultural biotechnology firms were 
concerned with approval of their regulatory submissions on transgenic plants in the early 1990s the CGIAR 
and its partners were assessing how science could be used more effectively to address the developmental 
and environmental challenges faced by developing countries. This was the major theme of the CGIAR’s 
Renewal Program, which, after a careful review of issues, redefined in 1995 the CGIAR system’s mission 
as ‘contributing through research to sustainable agriculture for food security in developing countries,’ and 
outlined a research agenda to help accomplish this mission. A major emphasis of the Renewal Program - to 
strengthen global and regional research partnerships - was sparked by a number of factors, including … 
declining public resources devoted to research.” Ibid., 1-2.  
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processes included valuation and separate pricing of the new trait distinct from the value 
of the entire seed (or ‘vehicle’) that carried the trait, thus creating a “trait market” for 
technology at the molecular level.85 CGIAR, because of its reputation and credibility, 
served as the entity best suited to introduce the new technology to the developing world, 
or at least that portion of the developing world that was able to change: “Developing 
countries with strong [intellectual property] regimes, regulatory environments, and 
private sector are of interest to the private sector in the North because there is potential to 
capture value from investments.”86 The PSC envisioned a system to equip the CGIAR 
research centers with the new technology and allow them to push it down to the 
developing countries along with advice and guidance in setting up intellectual property 
regimes. Because of their credibility in the developing world, the research centers would 
“play an important intermediary role” including one of “honest broker” in linking private 
companies to new markets.87 In other words, if CGIAR could convince the developing 
world to accept hybrid seeds, it could also convince it to accept biotechnology.  
 The PSC paper made clear that for the private sector to be interested in such 
partnerships there had to be sufficient incentives. One incentive, of course, was access to 
the germplasm, which CGIAR had moved in the wrong direction by placing in trust with 
the FAO. That the developing world’s most valuable asset was potentially outside of a 
private commercial framework by being held in trust was a clear source of concern and 
perhaps even frustration to the private sector: “The vast majority of the world’s ex situ 
plant germplasm (3.8 million stored seed samples) is held by the public sector … 
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although the [CGIAR research] Centers hold only 14 percent of these seed samples, this 
amounts to roughly 40 percent of the unique food-crop germplasm in living collections. 
The elite breeding material of the [research centers] on tropical and orphan crops is of 
particular global importance. In contrast, in developed countries, most of the important 
elite breeding material is held by private companies.”88  
 Given the “research vacuum” in developing countries due to a lack of private sector 
investment, in turn linked to a lack of opportunity for intellectual protection, CGIAR was 
in the driver’s seat. It had “few equals in developing countries” in terms of resources.89 
What it lacked was capacity to deal with biotechnology. There were 3800 scientists and 
engineers per million of population in the United States and less than 200 per million of 
population in the southern hemisphere based on 1990 data. In the United States, (referred 
to as “the country most dedicated to the idea of intellectual property rights and the 
primacy of the private sector”) market capitalization of biotechnology firms stood at $83 
billion, an increase of over $30 billion since the market’s inception less than a decade 
before.90 Private investment dwarfed CGIAR’s commitment of $30 million to 
biotechnology annually as of 1997.91 The private sector led the pack in advancement and 
its platform for achievement rested on intellectual property rights in order to recoup 
investments. Europe and the south lagged behind the United States due to the former’s 
“strong public sentiment against biotechnology” and the latter’s lack of patent laws. 
CGIAR was not without influence however as fully 70% of seed crops then used in 
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developing counties had benefited in some way from CGIAR material.92  
 Those who read the PSC report endorsed it. In plenary session, “the CGIAR was 
urged to become a more significant global player in biotechnology, by raising its capacity 
and profile in select biotechnology areas of particular relevance to agriculture and natural 
resources management in developing countries.”93 Ultimately, “it was recommended that 
the CGIAR assemble portfolios of intellectual property across the system as a basis for 
enhancing the CGIAR’s position in negotiating access to enabling technologies, many of 
which are held by the private sector.”94  
 The report presented CGIAR with a new vision and challenged it to move its 
economic strategy to a new level. If CGIAR truly wanted to help the developing world 
and if it defined help in economic terms, then it should take the developing world’s 
germplasm and not only turn it into improved crops but also use it to advance 
biotechnology. If higher yields could enhance local economies, biotechnology could 
attract private investors. For CGIAR this may have been too much advancement coming 
too quickly or possibly a signal that its vision of economic growth for the developing 
world could be pushed too far. Whatever the reason, CGIAR responded with typical 
caution.  
More Committees – More Opinions 
 The CGIAR board established two new committees in 1998 to address general 
issues of biotechnology and proprietary science.95 In addition CGIAR took to the bully 
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pulpit to enlist the help of government regulators in its efforts to protect the germplasm 
that had been circulating before the new procedures had been put into place. What it 
could not accomplish legally, it tried to accomplish through public pressure. The 1998 
CGIAR press release called for a moratorium on the granting of intellectual property 
rights on designated plant germplasm originating from the collections of CGIAR 
agricultural research centers around the world. CGIAR conceded that recipients who 
obtained materials prior to 1994 were in no way legally bound to refrain from seeking 
intellectual property rights, but called upon all such parties “to honor the spirit of the 
agreements with FAO and to refrain from applying for intellectual property rights, 
regardless of the date the material was received.”96  
 The new proprietary science committee quickly became bogged down in conflict. It 
reviewed all mainstream intellectual property systems as well as “alternative rights 
regimes” such as the United Nations’ Convention on Biodiversity, farmers’ rights and 
traditional sovereign rights over resources.97 It was unable to reach consensus on 
recommending a position: “Because our views differ strongly, we can neither endorse the 
current systems of rights nor oppose them.”98 The panel veered into, and similarly 
disagreed on, the impact of biotechnology in the developing world. Some members 
feared that too much of a good thing would eventually harm rather then help local 
farmers. They saw an inherent conflict in using advanced technology for the poor because 
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greater yields invariably forced prices down.99 As far as the CGIAR research centers 
were concerned, they cautioned that research and development should never have as its 
objective the generation of income or the creation of marketplace leverage. Some 
condemned any efforts by CGIAR research centers to seek intellectual property 
protection primarily to create “bargaining chips.” They claimed that generation of income 
would be a “constant temptation” that would divert the research centers from their 
mission. In addition, they claimed that few such efforts ever yielded income but all such 
efforts carried expenses. 
 Others on the committee found use of intellectual property to be acceptable in 
limited circumstances but wanted to see the resulting income pushed further down the 
social ladder. “The money generated should be used for the mission, and for 
remunerating sources of germplasm (there are many possibilities, including paying 
farmers who preserve biodiversity, royalties to communities of origin supporting 
research, into on site conservation benefiting the poor, etc.). Not to protect such 
developments is to waste useful resources.”100  
 One area of agreement, however, was shock regarding the CGIAR research centers’ 
blissful and sometimes willful ignorance as to their handling of germplasm. The 
committee identified 166 applications of proprietary technologies CGIAR research 
centers used: “The majority of the categories of proprietary technology used by [the 
research centers] are protected by patents, though may not be in the countries where the 
CGIAR’s clients operate … It is worth mentioning that for nearly 40 research 
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applications, the type of permissions were not known or lacking in the questionnaires.”101 
In other words, the research centers were flaunting the patent laws either because they 
were convinced that those laws did not apply in the jurisdiction where the materials were 
being used or they simply did not know and had no desire to find out. This revelation 
suggests that the research centers’ long standing concern with intellectual property was 
not uniform across all centers and more focused on protecting what went out as opposed 
to what came in. It is telling, however, that the report did not cite a similarly long list of 
lawsuits. Whomever was working with the research centers was either equally 
uninformed or had made a strategic decision that harassing CGIAR was not worth the 
time or money. It could be that the material those entities received from CGIAR was 
worth the trade. Another possibility is that, knowing the lack of expertise on the part of 
CGIAR and its geographic areas of operation, other entities did not fear that they would 
seek patents.   
 Perhaps in an effort to defend their practices, center directors highlighted the 
collaboration of the maize research center in Mexico and the French research center 
ORSTOM as a good case study of patent potential for CGIAR. The two entities were co-
owners of a patent for apomictic maize, which they obtained in order to protect access to 
the crop by resource poor farmers and to ensure that the CIMMYT-ORSTOM project 
could continue its research.102 The joint effort rejected proposals from two private 
companies due to unacceptable terms but remained willing to partner with the private 
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sector. The Center directors put the problem bluntly: “[T]he challenge is to reconcile the 
goals of both sides. For CIMMYT and ORSTOM the goal is to help the poor; for the 
private sector, it is profit.”103 
 Despite the anecdotal success of patent use, the research centers continued to 
display a shocking disregard of patent rights belonging to outside parties. When polled, 
the research centers expressed two views. According to the first view, the research 
centers were using patented technology only for research purposes: “[T]his is at least 
within the spirit of the patent laws, if not necessarily the letter in all cases … owners are 
unlikely to sue, because of the bad publicity it would cause them.” The alternate view 
was that the research centers, as bodies supported largely by public funds, had a duty to 
behave in an exemplary manner, including respecting all rights of all parties, no matter 
what excuses they might be able to rationalize.104  
 Those research centers cited three basic but competing arguments regarding 
CGIAR’s use of intellectual property. The first argument was ‘pro’ intellectual property. 
It stated that biotechnology was central to CGIAR’s goal of increasing food production 
and use by CGIAR of such technology could proceed only in the context of strong 
intellectual property regimes, thus necessitating CGIAR’s involvement as both a licensor 
and licensee. CGIAR’s inability or refusal to participate in the intellectual property realm 
would eventually isolate CGIAR from its private industry peers. If CGIAR refused to get 
more involved in intellectual property and instead claimed the moral high ground of 
common heritage and human rights, it would essentially cut off its nose to spite its face: 
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“Some who hold this view are gravely concerned about the idea of the CGIAR acting as a 
‘voice for the poor.’ ”105 The mission and method of CGIAR was still unsettling to some. 
CGIAR had done a very good job of increasing crop yields by helping certain farmers 
expand their operations and bring more income into the economy. The poorest farmers 
might not be able to continue as before but they should theoretically be able to find work 
in a growing economy. In that sense, CGIAR did not ‘speak for the poor’ but rather for 
the nation as a whole. If it were to shift its focus to the well-being of the poorest farmers 
and to further define well being as honoring their avocation, problems could result.    
 The second and third arguments, while resigned to some need for intellectual 
property, expressed a fear of becoming too enmeshed. The second position argued that 
CGIAR could accomplish the majority of its aims through its traditional methods. 
Entering the intellectual property realm was something CGIAR was simply not equipped 
to do in terms of money or expertise and to reorient CGIAR in that direction simply did 
not pass a cost-benefit analysis. If time were to be spent in the area of intellectual 
property, it would be better spent establishing and asserting a strong legal basis for 
exempting itself from intellectual property, such through argument for the research 
exemption.106 In other words, the research centers were on the right track and simply 
needed to solidify their assumptions about operating under an exemption.  
 The third philosophy argued that the CGIAR mission was “alleviating hunger and 
poverty and serving the majority of farmers.” Biotechnology came in far behind a process 
driven approach to achieving this goal. CGIAR was well positioned to work in a field that 
required high input of local knowledge and specialized crops. The extent to which 
                                                
105 Ibid., 15-16.  
106 Ibid., 16-17.  
  
266 
outsiders genuinely improved crops obtained from with in this dynamic was negligible.  
“The CGIAR need not become involved with proprietary science: it should only make 
research investments in technologies that the private sector is not investing in, and for 
which the only ‘market’ is the poor.” This view saw CGIAR’s job as protecting small 
farmers in developing countries by fighting TRIPS, not bowing to it: “CGIAR should 
point out the degree to which the increased use of intellectual property impinges on the 
[CGIAR] system’s ability to carry out its mandate, and the negative consequences of the 
standardised implementation of the TRIPS accord.”107  
 The Private Sector Committee (PSC) weighed in at the same meeting with its own 
comments designed to negate any suggestion that there was a conflict between CGIAR’s 
mission and a closer association with the private sector and its methods. The PSC 
observed that the two catalysts for the debate about CGIAR’s best course of action had 
been ratification of the CBD by most nations “with the United States representing one 
notable exception” and TRIPS, which made it “clear - that a paradigm shift in agriculture 
research is occurring.”108 The PSC Committee readily associated the private sector with 
the CGIAR mission, which it interpreted as economic in nature. In fact, the PSC claimed 
to have a “vested interest” in the mission, which it saw as “promoting the economic 
development of the CGIAR’s client countries, many of which represent important market 
interests.”109 The statement suggested that the private sector viewed CGIAR as an entity 
that would advance agriculture in the developing world to a point where those nations 
could attract and deal with the private sector directly. This philosophy stood in stark 
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contrast to those on the Proprietary Science Committee, which seemed resigned to the 
fact that poor countries would always be poor and the job of CGIAR was to help them in 
ways that held no interest for the private sector.  
 The PSC was livid at the suggestion by research centers that owners of technology 
would not take legal action because of the research exemption and potential for negative 
publicity. Such thinking, they claimed, “sends a negative signal to industry and is likely 
to further impede open cooperation.” In addition, “donors, especially those with 
significant positions on IPR protection, may be less inclined to support the CGIAR if it 
adopts a policy of outright disrespect for proprietary systems.”110  
 The PSC wholly endorsed the idea of CGIAR taking to the bully pulpit and 
“assume a clear advocacy role on behalf of the poor and food insecure” but encouraged it 
to use the stage to promote the use of technology “in addressing the dual requirements for 
increased food production and preservation of the environment.” As if to hit CGIAR 
where it lived, the PSC also noted that CGIAR’s involvement with biotechnology to date 
had been “sub-optimal” and would have to increase “if the CGIAR system is to remain 
scientifically current and credible and to fully realize the impact of donor funding.”111   
  The midterm CGIAR meeting concluded with the board acknowledging that it was 
“inevitable” that the research centers would increasingly be using proprietary material in 
their work and would need to use patents “in ways that prevent the profit making private 
sector from getting a free ride on publicly funded research that uses germplasm held in-
trust.”112 Still, the board made no effort to tell the research centers what to do.  
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 The Technical Advisory Committee continued to wrestle with the issue. TAC 
agreed that CGIAR should seek intellectual property protection in order to access needed 
technology, partner with needed institutions, and transfer technology in a safe and secure 
manner. TAC acknowledged that securing and protecting patents was costly and could 
divert the research centers from their primary mission and threaten relations with 
developing countries. Overall, however, TAC concluded that intellectual property rights 
should not be the end goal of any research project but should be pursued when they could 
be traded for technology or used to generate income.113 Once again the target shifted 
slightly as to the CGIAR mission: “For the CGIAR, the ethics of the case for IPR are 
rooted in the CGIAR ‘s people-centered strategies for poverty alleviation.”114  
 TAC dropped a bombshell, however, when it went on to state that intellectual 
property revenues should go, in part, to fund the cost of intellectual property acquisition 
and enforcement. The remainder would stay with CGIAR to be used for the benefit of its 
partners but would not go back to them in the form of revenue sharing.115 The Private 
Sector Committee continued to pound its drum at the research centers’ meeting in 
October of 1998 by calling on CGIAR to either get its house in order or forget about 
private sector cooperation.116   
 For its part, the CGIAR board appeared more concerned about liability than 
opportunity. The board’s Oversight Committee requested an opinion from legal counsel 
for the World Bank “on whether there is any liability on the members of the CGIAR for 
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the conduct of the [research] Centers or any other part of the CGIAR system.”117  
 At the mid-term meeting in 1999, CGIAR received a series of recommendations on 
integrated gene management in the context of intellectual property. Noting the massive 
consolidation of the private sector and its huge influx of research funding, accompanied 
by aggressive pursuit of intellectual property rights, CGIAR admonished that “no 
research organization can afford to remain static” and that facing the new intellectual 
property wave was: “arguably, the biggest issue before us.”118 The research centers 
remained adamant, however, that no central legal body would speak or hold patents for 
them collectively, a position that exasperated the CGIAR.  
 Three pressing issues were on the table by century’s end: first, compliance by the 
developing nations with internationally agreed upon conventions, such as GATT; second, 
loss of ability to provide products to partners resulting from ineffective intellectual 
property management; and third, compliance and enforcement, assuming an effective 
intellectual property strategy could be adopted and implemented. By this time CGIAR 
had rejected public disclosure as an effective strategy, owning in part to the fact that the 
research centers needed the proprietary technology of others to continue their work. 
Given the strong aversion to patenting raw materials, CGIAR had to establish a policy on 
what minimum work had to be done to germplasm before intellectual property protection 
could be claimed. Once again, the CGIAR was floundering in unfamiliar waters.  
 The private sector committee continued an aggressive campaign to get the CGIAR 
board to do something about intellectual property, finally arguing that CGAIR donors 
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faced legal liability if practices did not change. The PSC upped the ante by pointing out 
that CGIAR’s head-in-the sand attitude would make it virtually impossible to secure 
funds that the organization deserved and also impossible for the private sector to make 
any rational decision on partnering with CGIAR. It described the CGAIR approach to 
intellectual property as “90 percent political and 10 percent legal … The private sector’s 
interest is simple: it would like to know what the rules are when it engages into a 
transaction with the CGIAR.”119 In October, the Committee claimed CGIAR’s 
methodology was not only robbing it of potential income, status and progress, but also 
making it a contributory infringer by distributing materials it held from outside 
sources.120 The clear message was that CGIAR, despite its posturing, was not really 
contemplating getting into biotechnology. It was very much into it already and in a very 
sloppy and dangerous way. As a result the Private Sector Committee claimed that “fast 
action on the CGIAR’s behalf was absolutely essential to avoid a serious risk of 
litigation.”121 The committee then went for the jugular: “The committee was concerned 
that the lack of clear legal arrangements may pose a 'contributory infringement' problem 
for CGIAR investors.”122 
 In May of 2000, CGIAR greeted the new century with the same list of issues and 
the same uncertainty for their resolution. The private sector continued to lobby for a 
better and more business-like relationship with CGIAR, noting that CGIAR’s efforts to 
collect and preserve germplasm had been “a great service to mankind, but did not 
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contribute to poverty reduction per se.” The PSC set forth a vision that encapsulated the 
debate that had been growing for the previous fifteen years and which had painted 
CGIAR into the corner where it then stood. The PSC envisioned working with CGIAR to 
create a truly new variety of crop with “a demonstrated benign benefit, given away for 
nothing.” Such an effort would placate the donors, world opinion and, perhaps more 
importantly, serve the private sector well: “Increasing the income of poor subsistence 
farmers would eventually make them business partners for the [private sector] - a relevant 
outcome for the CGIAR, the poor and the industry.”123   
As the twenty-first century dawned, CGIAR had taken significant steps to place 
its germplasm into a legally recognizable framework with the power to establish and 
enforce legal rights connected to sharing of plants and seeds. What it had not 
accomplished, however, was a clear set of policies and guidelines to dictate how and 
when this new structure would be utilized. In one sense, CGIAR’s inclusiveness was its 
undoing. It constantly invited commentary, study, and recommendations from a broad 
group if interested parties, and consistently shied away from hard and final policy 
statements. CGIAR’s indecisiveness derived from its diversity. It pursued too many goals 
and employed too many allies to make consensus a reasonable possibility. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that it reverted to the base philosophies that had created it in the 
first place: improvement of people’s lives through greater income. Its spirit of 
philanthropy was firmly encased in the language and procedures of the commercial and 
economic world. Two legacies of the industrial world - biotechnology and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – effectively assured that result. Biotechnology and 
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GATT were not, however, the opening salvos in a battle between the philosophies of 
common heritage and for-profit commerce; they were rather the final blows in a long 
historical line of developments that defined progress in economic terms, using the tools 
of intellectual property and agricultural production.  
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CONCLUSION 
Historical study of agriculture and patents provides an ideal setting in which to 
examine how Americans define progress and value and how those definitions affect 
various parts of the world when exported in the form of assistance and aid to developing 
nations. The events summarized in this dissertation suggest that we define progress and 
value in economic terms and measure them according to monetary value. This 
perspective has historically guided and even dictated actions taken by those who have 
sought to help developing nations through improved agriculture, making it a significant 
factor in the international debate over ownership of plants, seeds and genetic information, 
as well as the impact of intellectual property rights on multiple issues including 
environmental protection, food safety, nutrition, bioethics and cultural identity.  
Contemplating the impact of intellectual property laws on the status of plants and 
seeds in the developing world can lead to an incomplete and overly simple conclusion: 
Industrial countries with more resources and technology force change on developing 
countries by offering assistance in the form of techniques that reward risk-taking with 
profit. This conclusion, while valid in some respects, threatens to frame the issue as a 
basic power-struggle between polar interests - profit-oriented seed companies and 
industrial governments versus people-oriented human rights organizations and 
philanthropies – an easy and attractive narrative, especially for a mass audience dealing 
with complicated issues. The importance of food production to the world community, 
however, calls for a broader perspective, including analysis and discussion of historical 
dynamics that shaped American attitudes toward intellectual property rights and 
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agriculture. Failure to examine these issues in their historical context could lead to policy 
decisions and public opinions about those decisions that are not fully informed.  
Historical context helps in understanding the political, cultural and economic 
forces that shape and define value and progress. Examination of actions taken by 
organizations such as the Rockefeller foundation and CGIAR indicate willingness at 
times to embrace private property and profit as a tools for promoting progress in the 
developing world, as illustrated by the Rockefeller program in Mexico and CGIAR’s 
abandonment of free sharing in favor of a trust model of seed protection. Their missions 
and tactics reflect a bias or at least an openness toward economic solutions that works 
against cultural-based advocacy seeking to bring non-economic criteria into the 
definitions of value and progress. These observations may seem counter-intuitive to 
devotees of the simple ‘industrial versus human rights’ model but are entirely consistent 
when examined against the history that helped shape their definition of progress. The 
historical record suggests that these historical catalysts are not recent; they have roots that 
stretch back to 1790.  
Economic definitions of value and progress are also convenient, offering solutions 
tied to a monetary value based on a market price, something relatively easy to establish in 
most circumstances. The system works well for outputs such as harvested crops based on 
yield and market price. Directed breeding and genetic modification, however, shifted the 
focus to inputs, which included in some cases landraces containing desirable traits. 
Landraces survived and ultimately thrived as a result of natural adaptation to their 
environment as well as through multiple generations of agricultural knowledge. Seeds 
from landraces carry genetic information that has stood the test of time and selection. 
  
275 
Despite this long process of improvement, the western perspective views landraces as 
products of nature - raw materials for breeders and geneticists. There was no question 
that seeds in nature had value or else no one would have cared about who used them or 
how or if they paid for using them. The problem lay in determining exactly what that 
value was and how it would be recognized. Placing economic value on landraces as 
inputs into hybrid seeds created two problems: determining the owner of the input and the 
input’s fair market value. Calls for recognition of value in non-economic terms, such as 
preservation of cultural identity, only complicated the process. Filtering these issues 
through a market-oriented system ultimately forced advocates for the developing world to 
adopt, whether willingly or resignedly, economic solutions, reflecting the modern 
industrial perspective of most participants. For example, one solution to dealing with the 
proper valuation of seeds was to designate them as either free or part of a fair exchange in 
both their natural and improved states. The U.N.’s International Undertaking and 
CGIAR’s policy of freely available germplasm reflected this position. Both policies 
acknowledged economic value in landraces and sought to secure a share of that value to 
developing world farmers through some kind of ‘fair’ exchange of cultural knowledge for 
technical knowledge. This philosophy became less tenable as the economic value of 
seeds increased in the late twentieth century. Advocates of those philosophies, such as 
CGIAR embraced more rigid and legalistic strategies in part because their policy makers 
came from that background. The Rockefeller Foundation and then CGIAR were strong 
advocates for their system of free inputs and free sharing of seeds but to the end of 
delivering modern commercial farming to the developing world. The idealism of their 
philanthropic mission to help developing nations existed within a set of commercial 
  
276 
strategies to achieve that goal. Free sharing of seeds was a preferred means to that end 
but not an exclusive one, as CGIAR’s actions bear out. CGIAR’s actions suggest that 
common heritage was not a social or cultural construct within its mission, but rather a 
practical means of justifying its long-used system of managing its seed collections. 
CGIAR needed free sharing of seeds in order to keep from fading in relevance. CGIAR 
adopted the trust model when its free-sharing philosophy proved inadequate to protect the 
value of its assets. In other words, CGIAR’s actions support the conclusion that its 
concepts of value and progress were sufficiently malleable to embrace an economic 
model that indirectly benefited developing nations that contributed landraces but did not 
put money into individual farmers’ pockets or even assure their continued livelihood. 
This example illustrates why it is overly simplistic to simply group organizations such as 
CGIAR with human rights organizations in a battle over intellectual property rights and 
common heritage.   
 Anthropologists offer a welcome perspective in understanding value and its 
meaning across different cultures. Small farmers unable or unwilling to change faced 
extinction in a modern agricultural milieu that required complex and costly systems of 
fertilizer, pesticides and irrigation necessary for use of improved seeds. From an 
anthropological standpoint those farmers, and the rest of the world, faced loss of cultural 
identity, a portion of which arguably produced landraces that made improved seeds 
possible, resulting in debate as to if and how cultural knowledge should be recognized 
and compensated, either financially or through preservation. From an economic 
standpoint such farmers had the option of wage labor in the expanding economy. 
Advocates for small farmers argued that it was unjust compensation and also unfair to 
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simply pick a spot in the historical timeline of plant improvement, in this case a spot 
considerably far along, and declare that an entity, usually a large corporation, deserved 
exclusive rights for having taken the final steps in a multi-generational process. Plants, 
they argued, were humankind’s common heritage and should remain so both before and 
after improvement by whatever means. If the goal was an expanding economy, 
advancement in agriculture was best accomplished in the developing world by imitation: 
observing what others did and then doing the same thing. This was not possible under a 
patent regime, which monopolized innovation rather than expanding it.1 Some advocates 
went further, arguing for cultural preservation over a sterile uniformity in which tradition 
and unique identity were lost forever.  
It would be wrong to think that small indigenous farmers had no interest in their 
financial standing or were anti-technology. For example, anthropologists have cited cases 
of traditional farmers embracing technology such as global positioning to settle boundary 
disputes.2 The primary difference for the non-western world was that the concept of value 
was not limited to economic value; it reflected non-economic concepts as well, including 
social status, reinforcement of gender roles, privilege of age, and kinship. Use of seeds 
and technology was based on cultural as well as economic needs.3 The narrower western 
definition essentially stripped plants and seeds of their non-economic characteristics in 
favor of the more universal concept of economic value. Western tradition was to calculate 
economic value and compensate the party that created it, as with intellectual property 
rights. The process proved to be much easier for the specific action of a person or persons 
                                                
1 See, Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press (2008), 80. 
2 David A. Cleveland and Stephen C. Murray, “The World's Crop Genetic Resources and the Rights of 
Indigenous Farmers,” Current Anthropology, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1997), 479. 
3 Ibid., 483. 
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who invented a tangible thing such as a machine or even a hybrid derived from directed 
breeding or genetic modification. The process was not so easy with landraces. First, a 
landrace might not present a precise attribute with a calculable market value and, second, 
its value could not be traced to a specific person or group of persons deserving of 
compensation.4 Even if a fair market value could be determined and a traditional act or 
practice credited with its creation, cultural affiliation did not create legal identity 
sufficient to pursue intellectual property rights or enter into contracts. Trying to negotiate 
with self-appointed representatives of native cultures could result in unenforceable 
agreements as well as faulty assumptions that all natives were homogenous, much like 
the experience of some U.S. treaties with Native American tribes in which the negotiators 
assumed that one tribal chief was as good as the next.5 Some advocates proposed 
recognition of legal status for ‘communities of peoples’ with sovereignty over their own 
knowledge and folklore without regard to national boundaries, thus removing the ability 
of governments to absorb unique communities of people into a more homogenous nation-
state.6 The fact, however, is that current trends are in the other direction. For example, 
indigenous knowledge was not protected under the U.N.’s Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. The only way a cause could survive was if national laws recognized it. 
Even then, the Declaration deemed the cause an individual right and not a collective right 
                                                
4 Stephen B. Brush, “Indigenous Knowledge of Biological Resources and Intellectual Property Rights: The 
Role of Anthropology,” American Anthropologist, Vol. 95, No. 3 (1993), 661. 
5 See, Michael F. Brown, Who Owns Native Culture?, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (2003), 111-
114. 
6 J. Sanford Rikoon, “On the Politics of the Politics of Origins: Social (In) Justice and the International 
Agenda on Intellectual Property, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore,” The Journal of American Folklore, 
Vol. 117, No. 465 (2004), 333. 
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of an indigenous group.7 This left the need for some entity with legal standing to step in 
and represent the rights of the cultural group. The idea of a legal right, after all, suggested 
a corresponding duty to assure that the right could be enjoyed.8 The result was a tendency 
to push cultural issues into institutional settings such as governments, which were 
receptive to western thinking when tied to financial aid. This dynamic underscored a 
concern among some advocates as to the true goals of those who purported to act for 
cultural interests, whether it was CGIAR, the U.N. or governments. Just as agricultural 
modernization favored wealthier and more progressive farmers, decisions at those 
institutional levels were made by people drawn primarily from a more progressive, 
better-educated and commercially oriented population.9 The result was property-oriented 
policies being applied to people-centered issues. In the minds of some, it was not that the 
indigenous farmer was not creative or a contributor if economic value, but rather that he 
simply had no power over those things when he was thrust into an arena with no 
representation other than people who agree with his cause in theory but were trained to 
solve problems in a western style.10 The result was an attitude that perhaps acknowledged 
the need for some form of compensation but steered it toward an institutionalized setting 
to be used for some general good. The dynamic resisted any deeper acknowledgement of 
cultural autonomy, such as the right of indigenous people to preclude or limit uses based 
on cultural or religious values.11 The source of such an absolute prerogative right fell 
                                                
7 Peter-Tobias Stoll and Anja von Hahn, “Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Knowledge and Indigenous 
Resources in International Law,” in Indigenous Heritage and Intellectual Property, Silke von Lewinski, 
ed., The Hague: Klewer Law International (2004), 18. 
8 James M. Donovan and H. Edwin Anderson, III, Anthropology and Law, New York: Berghahn Books 
(2003), 146. 
9 Rikoon, “On the Politics of the Politics of Origins,” 327.  
10 Ibid, 326-327. 
11 Cleveland and Murray, “The World's Crop Genetic Resources and the Rights of Indigenous Farmers,” 
482. 
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under the broad heading of ‘human rights,’ an amorphous concept even in the context of 
anthropology. The idea of a human right suggested a right that existed by virtue of being 
human, not by virtue of any cultural circumstances. There was no truly universal concept 
of an obvious and inherent right by virtue of being human, however. The definition of a 
human right varied from culture to culture.12 In fact, there was an argument that even 
human rights were defined only in the context of relationships and that relationships 
existed only when there was a potential for exchange of goods and services. Value, 
therefore, was derived not simply from being human but rather from the services that 
humans could render.13 Even in the context of human rights, economic worth found a 
toehold.   
In examining the issue of plant patents and its impact on agricultural policy, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the processes of invention and crop production have been and 
continue to be dominated by a philosophy that views economic advancement as the end 
goal. Inventors and farmers are seen as improving their situation when their efforts result 
in something that generates income. This philosophy is not without implications in social 
and cultural areas of concern that are harder to quantify in terms of value, such as public 
property, common heritage, cultural preservation, environmental protection and even 
human rights. Comprehensive discussion of these issues demands commentary from a 
broad array of constituencies including historians, sociologists, anthropologists, 
economists, agronomists and philosophers. The dominant voice, however, has been one 
                                                
12 Ibid., 493. Donovan and Anderson suggest that there are four rights that could be considered as universal 
without much controversy. All are expressed in the negative: Freedom from slavery, genocide, racial 
discrimination and torture. Donovan and Anderson, “Anthropology and Law,” 147. None of these 
standards, with the possible exception of freedom from racial discrimination, could likely be employed in a 
theory of limiting seed use in the name of cultural preservation.  
13 Peter Lawrence, “Law and Anthropology: The need for collaboration,” 1 Melanesian Law Journal 40 
(1970), 44, quoted in Donovan and Anderson, “Anthropology and Law,” 163. 
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of capitalism and the marketplace. This author makes no comment on the rightness or 
wrongness of this fact but rather an observation that solutions to these issues are found 
within an extremely narrow band of options. If we understand those options in their 
historical context, then we can better understand the parameters of the contemporary 
debate, regardless of whether the goal is to support them or change them. Those who fall 
into the latter camp have an uphill battle because their voices struggle for an audience 
within halls of power concerned with trade, profit and progress.  
In his brilliant novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell explored an idea 
called ‘Newspeak’ in which the fictional party members systematically purged the 
English language of words with the ultimate goal of rendering dissenting speech 
impossible.14 A rebel could not proclaim rebellion if he had no idea how to express what 
he was thinking. That is perhaps too harsh an analogy for the debate between the ethics 
and economics of food production but it behooves historians as well as philosophers, 
anthropologists and socialists to be ever diligent in keeping the debate alive if they hope 
to make a difference and to understand the historical context that drives our understaninf 
og value and progress. No one is trying to purge language or close debate, but the forces 
of economic progress do not face a similar challenge. They have a ready stage and 
audience in the halls of government and commerce. History is replete with instances of 
individuals standing up against institutional forces in the name of individual rights and 
interests that have no interest in profit. A study of those instances and their impact on 
these questions would be a welcome contribution because, if we parse the language of 
common heritage and human rights from our vocabulary of agricultural policy, whether 
intentionally or by neglect or resignation, we risk the arrival of a day when we can no 
                                                
14 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1949), 309.  
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longer engage in a well-rounded debate about how we should deal with the wisdom in the 
earth.  
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